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Abstract 
 
 
The cultural policies of New Labour, devised by the first British government 
department of "culture", the DCMS, have been noted for their conceptual 
inconsistencies and unsupportable claims, yet the rationales behind them have never 
been adequately explained. This thesis argues that, when seen from an historical 
perspective, the intentions of the Secretary of State, Chris Smith, and the DCMS in 
fact followed a consistent logic by which cultural policy was re-conceptualised to 
take DCMS into the heart of government where social and economic concerns 
dominated. Building on the principle of cross-government policy and the "pillars" of 
excellence, access, education, and the creative economy, DCSM claimed a 
foundational role for culture in propagating the roots of economic growth formed 
around theories of social capital. In doing so, it shifted the traditional balance 
between the public and private realms, compromised traditions of laissez-faire, 
instituted new mechanisms of governance, and marginalised the arts. The thesis 
concludes that Chris Smith and the DCMS sought power by arguing a role for 
culture in social and economic policy initiatives; an ambition that could not be 
achieved with policies for culture in its traditional meaning. The conceptual 
incoherence that resulted was ignored as insignificant to its purposes. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The Research Question 
 
 
The rationales of New Labour's cultural policies have never been adequately 
explained.  They referred extensively to the importance of culture yet appeared 
primarily interested in matters that had never before been formally considered by 
governments as cultural. The Department of Culture, Media and Sport claimed a 
central role for cultural policy in realising New Labour’s social and economic 
objectives, yet it attempted to do so with policies well beyond the remit of any 
previous arts or implicitly cultural department.  
 
New Labour made large claims for the potency of its cultural policies, despite 
criticisms of their "conceptual inconsistencies" (Selwood, 2006: 36). Many were 
founded on unproven assertions with few precedents and little supporting evidence. 
Some seemed even to defy basic common sense:  “Culture” it was argued, could 
“make a valuable contribution to delivering key outcomes of lower long-term 
unemployment, less crime, better health and better qualifications” (DCMS, 1999b: 2). 
These claims were not limited to Westminster. The Scottish Cultural Commission of 
the Labour-led Scottish Parliament asserted that culture could “...make a difference 
to our success in tackling poverty, it can make Scotland a healthier place and it has a 
significant contribution to make towards our economy” (Scottish Cultural 
Commission, 2005). The sociologist Perri 6 summed up the government’s position, 
arguing that “Culture is now the centre of the agenda for government reform, 
because we now know from findings from a wide range of research that culture is 
perhaps the most important determinant of a combination of long-run economic 
success and social cohesion” (6, 1997: 272). Yet that evidence is elusive, even argued 
by many to be non-existent. 
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These claims assumed a notion of culture that was essentially anthropological: a 
reified concept of society and its constitutive relations in which the arts were but 
one manifestation. These are not questions of individual policies, each of which had 
its own formative context, but of the whole of which those policies were a part. For 
DCMS that whole was definitively "culture", which by praxis meant participation in 
policies of work skills, education, information technology, technical innovation, and 
the workings of government (its roles in ten of the Social Exclusion Unit's Policy 
Action Teams), framed by the promotion of access, excellence, creativity, and 
embedded in what became known as the creative industries (Social Exclusion Unit, 
1998: 58-59). What, in all this, had become of the traditional idea of culture as the 
arts, heritage and intellectual works? 
 
One explanation given by cultural policy theorists is that arts policies were 
strengthened by being attached to other more politically powerful policies (Gray, 
2002: 88;  Gray and Wingfield, 2011: 590;  Gray, 2008: 217). There is some good 
evidence for this (as discussed later), but it looks less convincing when seen in the 
context of DCMS's comparative disinterest in the arts. A more common argument is 
"instrumentalism"; viz, using the arts as instruments for the delivery of other 
policies. But that description is wholly inadequate, most obviously as it fails to 
explain why a department of culture promoted its ultimate purposes as those of 
other areas of government. It further presumes that the arts could be effective as 
instruments of policy, yet researchers have hunted in vain for strong supporting 
evidence. A report commissioned by DCMS in 1999 stated: “it remains a fact that 
relative to the volume of arts activity taking place in the country’s poorest 
neighbourhoods, the evidence of the contribution it makes to neighbourhood 
renewal is paltry” (DCMS, 1999b: 6). Van Puffelen, writing on the validity of arts 
“impact studies” referred to the claims made for cultural policy as founded on “basic 
fallacies” (Puffelen, 1996: 252). Graeme Evans, also reporting to DCMS on the state of 
research into this topic, concluded: “Methodologies which bring together 
approaches across anthropology, cultural and urban studies/sociology … which can 
measure social, economic and physical change, are yet to be developed…”. And with 
3 
 
respect to the type of evidence that was then being produced, he said: “… 
standardised performance indicators and quantitative benchmarks are neither 
desirable nor useful measures…” (Evans, 2005: 973). Even as DCMS policy was in 
formation, a supportive paper by François Matarasso, said to have “... played an 
important role in establishing a near-consensus in Britain among cultural policy-
makers” (Merli, 2002: 107), had been forcefully attacked on the basis that it “... does 
not produce a well-founded understanding of the social impact of the arts. The 
research design is flawed, research methods are not applied in a rigorous way and 
the conceptual bases are questionable” (2002: 114). In other words, neither the data 
nor a methodology for its collection existed to support policy claims, or at least in 
any robust form. Eleonora Belfiore, in one of a number of studies she and Oliver 
Bennett made into the social impacts of the arts and culture, summed-up the 
position succinctly, in effect accusing New Labour of pursuing cultural policies that 
were founded on “mindlessness” and “bullshit” (Belfiore, 2009: 343) .  
 
A conundrum here is that policy-makers were aware of the unsupported nature of 
their claims, being advised by reports they themselves commissioned, yet appeared 
to pursue and promote their policies with utter certainty for their effectiveness. The 
contradicting arguments were hardly contested but, rather, appear to have been 
largely ignored.  Chris Smith, the newly ensconced Secretary of State for DCMS, had 
made his interests immediately clear in stating that the Department placed them "at 
the centre of the country’s economic life and regeneration” (C. Smith, 1997a). The 
CMS Select Committee later concurred, saying:  “The Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport is avowedly an economic Department” (DCMS, 1998a). But even if this was 
a legitimate aim for a department of culture, how could it be achieved by a small 
department and the 54 independent NDPBs it funded (accounting for "about 95% of 
the department's programme" (DCMS Select Committee, 1999a: v))?  
 
These were the motivating questions for this research, prompting a search for 
rationales that would explain the incongruities and inconsistencies of New Labour's 
cultural policies, their internal conceptual conflicts, and make sense of the 
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ostensibly absurd contentions for the power of culture. They opened areas of inquiry 
in political theory and practice, economics, the administration of government, and 
the traditions of cultural interventions by governments contained within five 
underlying questions: 
  
 How did New Labour understand and use its concept of “culture”?  
 Can the "conceptual inconsistencies" and incongruities of policy be 
explained? 
 To what extent did the policies of DCMS arise from British traditions, and to 
what extent did they break from them?  
 What mechanisms did DCMS employ to realise its stated ambitions?  
 If cultural policies deserved to be at the centre of government, as Chris Smith, 
suggested, what concept of the state and of national governance did that 
imply? 
 
While these questions widened the field of research, they were brought together 
under one central question: what were the rationales for the cultural policies of New 
Labour? As each was explored, a model appeared of how the rhetoric, policies and 
actions of DCMS might unite to structure a society for economic effect. Shorn of its 
focus as merely a distributor of funds to NDPBs, the apparent inconsistencies of 
DCMS policies can be explained by its employment of a reified form of culture in 
which networks of economically active and self-determining citizens operated. This 
research has shown that the cultural policies of New Labour were, in fact, economic 
policies constructed by Chris Smith and the DCMS to take them from a department 
at the periphery of government right to its centre. 
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The Importance of the Research 
 
 
The single most important outcome of this research is to propose cogent and 
interlinked rationales for the cultural policies of the DCMS. It explains the 
disparities within policy and the seemingly exaggerated claims for their power, and it 
shows why and how Chris Smith reformed a government department for the arts and 
heritage into one he perceived as central to the New Labour mission. It presents a 
comprehensive, compelling hypothesis than can elucidate the motives behind the 
full breadth of DCMS's policy and the “pillars” on which they were constructed: 
"excellence, access, education and the creative economy" (C. Smith, 1998: 2;  2009).  
 
The literature on New Labour's cultural policy does not explain nor, in many cases, 
even recognise DCMS's break with the traditions of earlier departments for the arts, 
nor its comparative disinterest in the aesthetics of artistic accomplishments and 
their replacement by an intense focus on social and economic policy. Aspects of its 
policies have been observed, praised, criticised or castigated to varying degrees by 
different authors depending on their analytical approach. The arts community 
contorted in an uncomfortable double face, expressing  disdain for New Labour's 
rhetoric (which, nevertheless, it often adopted) and bewilderment at the DCMS's 
reluctance to increase arts grants-in-aid. Yet many remained loyal to New Labour for 
what was presumed to be its left-leaning credentials (for example, see Glaister, 1998: 
8). Sociologists hardly noticed the absence of a traditional arts policy, while some 
Cultural Studies theorists thought they found New Labour societal arguments in 
keeping with their particular form of realism. The influence of Cultural Studies has 
been strong though, redefining the arts as “the domain of consciously crafted 
symbolic works” (Ahearne, 2009: 142), thus more semiotic than transcendental and 
more an aggregated social mechanism than autonomous artistic expression. But the 
theories arising from all these approaches are partial, tending to see policies in 
isolation and never adequately describing their underlying and consolidated political 
logic.  
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The omissions in the literature arise in part from the composite nature of the subject 
matter. Cultural theorists tend not to deal in quotidian political practise, while very 
few political theorists concern themselves with cultural policy. There are notable 
exceptions, as will be referenced, but they are few in number. This thesis goes some 
way towards correcting this admission, opening areas of debate and providing new 
sources of evidence that will be of value both to government and the academy.  
 
Some elements of the arguments that follow are not new, but their synthesis into a 
single theory for political action is substantially original. As will be shown, DCMS 
policy resulted directly from Chris Smith's ambition to place the department at the 
centre of government, but his ideas can been seen most clearly when placed in an 
historical context.  Strands of centuries-old attitudes and practices can be found in 
DCMS policy, embedded even now in norms and values of society but sometimes in 
an uncomfortable accommodation between classical liberalism and New Labour's 
ideological tendency for social engineering. At a purely political level, so too can be 
observed the specific rejection of the policies of Labour's past electoral failures in 
favour of "modernisation" and an embrace with what was perceived as the most 
potent features of entrepreneurial capitalism. Its cultural policies demonstrated all 
of these traits, while being politically motivated by a single set of interrelated 
rationales. 
 
The new material applied in this research begins with a review and taxonomy of 
cultural meanings, further clarifying their different uses by governments and 
theorists since the mid-18th century.  Appropriation Accounts, published annually 
from 1861 to 2002, were used to trace institutional change (or its absence) and 
provided evidence not previously analysed1. In a case study of the City of 
Birmingham Symphony Orchestra, unpublished interviews with Chris Smith, Alan 
Davey, the Arts Council, and Birmingham City Council were especially illuminating 
                                                     
1
 Peacock and Godfrey refer to their use in assessing financial receipts by national museums and 
galleries, but not for tracing the development of government policy more generally: originally 
published in Social Trends, November 1973, pp 61-5, republished in PEACOCK, A. T. & GODFREY, C. 
1976. Cultural Accounting. In: BLAUG, M. (ed.) The Economics of the Arts. London: Martin Robertson. 
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when exploring what the Audit Commission referred to as the policy “Delivery 
Chain”. Some commonly over-simplified axioms of political theory have been 
challenged in the process, demonstrating how they were adjusted rather than 
abandoned or rejected by changing political ideologies. The concepts of laissez-faire, 
the place of the arts in a market economy, and l'art pour l'art fit this description, 
each of which to varying degrees has often been misrepresented not only in public 
debate but even in academic literature on cultural policy. 
 
These matters are discussed in the process of constructing a hypothesis for the 
rationales of cultural policy under New Labour, but they have since also been 
normalised and globalised. In a speech at the 2012 Edinburgh International Culture 
Summit, Lord Wilson of Tillyorn, speaking for the British Council, declared:   
 
Culture ... can help to solve intractable social and economic problems; to 
raise understanding between people and nations; and to encourage 
solutions to some of the major international challenges we all face 
(Edinburgh International Culture Summit, 2012). 
 
 
This simple text embeds assumptions that half a century ago might have seemed 
absurd or at least nonsensical. Now they go almost unchallenged. But the ideas that 
lie behind them are similar to those developed and employed under the New Labour 
government a decade and a half earlier. It now appears that the importance of the 
questions this thesis addresses goes well beyond New Labour, their time in office 
and their constituency; they address a transformation in both governmental and 
public understanding of cultural policy. 
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A Typological Review of Literature and Sources 
 
 
The research for this thesis has located and defined the logic with which New Labour 
constructed and implemented its particularly form of cultural policy; its constitutive 
history, its innovations, and its purposes. As noted, this has not been a subject of 
great interest to cultural theorists and even less to those working in the field of 
politics. The former have failed to produce a comprehensive argument that can 
explain the full breadth of DCMS policies, tending instead to treat them as 
individually incoherent within the collective whole, while the latter have largely 
missed their significance in Third Way ideology and, empirically, within political 
practice. As a result, across the spectrum of political and cultural studies the 
analyses of cultural policy can be characterised by the large variety of theoretical 
approaches. In the typological review that follows, these approaches have been 
divided into eight categories: (i) journals and institutions; (ii) Cultural Studies; (iii) 
definitions of "culture"; (iv) the historical perspective; (v) instrumentalism; (vi) 
culture in economics; and (vii) culture as governance. A final section on sources then 
follows. The characteristics of each are briefly discussed with respect to their ability 
to answer the questions to which this thesis is directed. The intention is not to 
provide exhaustive lists of individual writers, critics and theorists but more to 
orientate the various approaches within the arguments that follow. 
 
Journals and Institutions 
If the culture in cultural policy means the arts and intellectual works, then its 
literature is vast in size and history. Significantly, though, the changing nature of 
cultural policy and its ever-extending reach into social and economic matters is 
reflected only in a  small and neoteric literature that began to appear late in the last 
century. The advent of journals on cultural policy has been concomitant with its 
purported importance within government. The first peer-reviewed journal published 
on the specific topic, the European Journal of Cultural Policy, was launched just 
nineteen years ago, in 1994. Responding to the increasing globalisation of its subject, 
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it was then renamed the International Journal of Cultural Policy in 1997 - the year 
New Labour took office. There had been earlier journals with an interest in culture: 
Media, Culture & Society, essentially concerned with media studies, was launched in 
1979, then Cultural Studies was "introduced" in 1987 "when no one quite knew what 
it [Cultural Studies] was" (Grossberg, 2006). The website of Cultural Studies explains 
that the journal "explores the relation between cultural practices, everyday life, 
material, economic, political, geographical and historical contexts". The 
International Journal of Cultural Studies, organisationally unrelated to Cultural 
Studies, followed in 1998.  Statistical analyses of cultural activities (broadly defined) 
were the original focus of Cultural Trends, first published in 1989. In its early days, its 
subjects typically addressed finance, employment, audience numbers and types, 
"industry" data, and the evidence (or its absence) claimed by governments for their 
policies. In more recent years it has also become embroiled with the Cultural Studies 
agenda and broadened its articles to include the "cultural industries", theorising 
cultural values, and concepts of creativity. 
 
In some respects the statistics and data published in Cultural Trends has fed the 
work of  "cultural economics" analysts,  a subject that would seem central to any 
analyses of New Labour's cultural policies. Although a journal specifically on that 
subject, the Journal of Cultural Economics, was first published much earlier in 1973, 
Cultural Trends remains the only journal in the field but has also shown some 
interest in questioning the concept of cultural policy. Rethinking Marxism 
(published since 1988) does carry the sub-title of A Journal of Economics, Culture & 
Society but its concern is quite specifically for Marxist theory -  a theoretical under-
pinning specifically rejected by Tony Blair (Blair, 1996: 59).  Another similar title, the 
Journal of Cultural Economy was launched in 2008 as part of "the publishing 
programme of the ESRC Centre for Research on Socio Cultural Change". Its interests, 
though, are more aligned with the anthropological aspects of Cultural Studies than 
with the classical economics of the Journal of Cultural Economics, both subjects 
quite remote from the rationales of policy. 
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A broad intellectual approach to cultural controversies and trends was taken-up by 
Cultural Critique in 1985, and a much more recent title, Journal for the Study of 
British Cultures, dates from 1994. While both take a social, anthropological, 
understanding of culture, only the former has more than a tangential interest in 
politics or political theory. In complete contrast, the Journal of Cultural Management 
and Policy, first published in 2011, is concerned with the practical issues of 
management of cultural operations and the application of cultural policy. In most 
articles it assumes, unlike the Cultural Studies literature, that "culture" refers solely 
to the arts although with a broad understanding of what the arts include -  its 
meaning having been extended in recent decades both by the relativism of 
postmodern thought and under the influence of Cultural Studies.  
 
Cultural Studies 
Of all these journals, only the International Journal of Cultural Policy has a primary 
concern with governmental policies. But, as with Cultural Trends, the vast majority 
of its articles are concerned with the analysis and implications of policy and less with 
political processes; its authors tending to approach their subject from the viewpoint 
of cultural and social theory rather than political practice. This further differentiates 
their conceptual understanding of culture from the Cultural Studies authors who 
seek meaning in the signs and symbols attributed to all human works with which 
they read power relations within a socially stratified society. Culture by this 
understanding becomes "signifying practices or symbolic goods" (Bennett, 2004: 237) 
and its products the "texts" with which they are read (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 2, 
passim). Through the symbolic nature of creative works and the "semiotic 
interactions" between people, proponents claim, can be perceived the real nature of 
the world; a structure of relations between people, their environment, their temporal 
and physical locus, and their perceived history (Shapiro, 2004: xiv). Using this 
"theory of culture", Cultural Studies is professed to be a critical tool with which to 
illuminate humanity's social, historical, material and political context (Eagleton, 
2012).  
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Cultural Studies has its origins in a post-Marxist construction found in the works of 
the Frankfurt School and its later French cognates (most importantly Michael 
Foucault). As Toby Miller and George Yúdice expressed it: "Michel Foucault's 
concept of governmentality1  is key to the actions and claims of Western states in the 
cultural domain, both historically and today" (T. Miller and Yúdice, 2002: 3). This 
Foucauldian approach is now contested by scholars preferring Gramsci's theory of 
cultural hegemony but both positions occupy the same analytical arena (Gray, 2010). 
In its British manifestation, it was largely built on the work of the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham (CCCS). Founded in 
1964 by the University’s Professor of English, Richard Hoggart, it was said to be “a 
brave intervention in established literary and social science orthodoxies”; the term 
Cultural Studies being “a convenient shorthand for work that treats film, the arts, 
media and communications, as well as lived, everyday cultures and is driven by the 
major strands of neo-Marxist, structuralist, post-structuralist and postmodern 
thought” (Cunningham, 1993: 306). Since its inception, Cultural Studies has covered 
a vast field: “sociological, organisational, behavioural, and anthropological” 
(Thompson, Ellis et al., 1990: 97). Its subjects of study can be as abstruse as Barthes 
Rhetorique de l’image (Barthes, 1964), insightful as Baudrillard’s Simulcra and 
Simulation (Baudrillard, 2006), or as seemingly facile as analyses of TV soap operas 
(Geraghty, 2005). Robert Hewison explains its history in some detail, while quoting 
Hall's intentions that it be a subject "at the point of intersection between a number 
of disciplines" (Hewison, 1995: 186). Its influence has since been profound, even 
among those who would not accept the ideological tenets that still linger from its 
Marxist origins.  
 
Within the considerable literature on the subject, Jim McGuigan is one of its most 
trenchant contemporary theorists and one who elaborates its characteristic critique 
of neo-liberalism with force and clarity, regarding cultural policy as "... a 
manifestation of the pervasive dominance of economic reasons today: to put it 
                                                     
1 "governmentality" is said to be an expression coined by Roland Barthes: BARTHES, R. 1989. 
Mythologies. New York, Noonday Press.). 
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bluntly, naked capitalism" (McGuigan, 2004: 1;  see also McGuigan, 1996;  2005;  and 
Cunningham, 1993). McGuigan's views are challenged by many (Swingewood, 1977;  
Cowen, 1988 are strong examples), not least of which are the historians of the arts 
and social economics (Macfarlane, 1979;  Davis, 2000), but his approach is common 
within Cultural Studies, if not always so well expressed. It challenges rather than 
explains the principles on which Tony Blair et al constructed the "New" Labour party 
in the 1990s.  As a result, despite the considerable intellectual merits of Cultural 
Studies it is a subject that obfuscates the characteristics of New Labour's cultural 
policies. Although its sociologically critical constructions can appear complicit in 
their formation, its socialist origins cloud New Labour's economic rationales and, 
thus, any convincing explanation for their cultural policies. 
 
Analytical Approaches 
These different approaches to the study of cultural policy are more than schismatic, 
being built on quite different intellectual foundations. In an expression borrowed 
from philosophy, they have been referred to as "ontological" positions. As used by 
political theorists, the term refers to: "a view about the nature of social existence and 
social beings" (Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 13) or, as Colin Hay put it: "... the nature of 
social and political reality to be investigated" (Hay, 2002: 61). This is not simply a 
reference to an epistemological gulf between Cultural Studies and an empirical 
approach to cultural policy studies (described by Oliver Bennett as "The Torn Halves 
of Cultural Policy Research" (Bennett, 2004)), but more pertinently to different ideas 
on what culture and cultural policy actually are and what purposes policy serves. As 
a result, analysing the arguments around the cultural policy literature requires the 
researcher to understand the "ontological" positions adopted.  
 
Different approaches do not, though, always appear coherently as rigid 
demarcations. University departments and their research centres, for example, show 
biases in their work but a great deal of cross-over between approaches. Glasgow's 
Centre for Cultural Policy Research claims the "media and communications 
industries" as the focus of its work which accords with Cultural Studies approach, 
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whereas the Centre for Cultural Policy Studies at Warwick University seeks a much 
broader "engagement with both the practical realities of working in the cultural and 
media industries and with theoretical questions around the conditions of 
contemporary culture". Its research subjects reflect this, covering cultural "impacts" 
(in the current rhetorical metaphor), heritage, religion, management, and critical 
philosophical reflection on concepts of culture.  Both contrast with the Centre for 
Cultural Policy and Management at City University, London, which reports its 
interests as being: "Developing critical skills for a professional cultural sector", viz, 
those who work within the "industry". But the fluidity with which these intellectual 
approaches are often mixed can lead to incoherence and "a great deal of analytical 
confusion" (Bennett, 2004: 238); a significant point considering that New Labour's 
cultural policies have themselves been criticised as containing paradoxes and 
“conceptual inconsistencies” (Selwood, 2006: 36). However, the assumption that this 
incoherence was innate in DCMS policy may mistake confusions resulting from 
diverse analytical approaches with those of political intentions.  
 
"Culture" 
This word is a definitional Hydra, impossible to define or pin-down. Many authors 
have noted it as a "slippery, even a chaotic, concept" (M. J. Smith, 2000: 4), and most 
concur with Raymond Williams's comment that it is “… one of the two or three most 
complicated words in the English Language” (Williams, 1976): 76). The problem that 
all analysts face is that culture is, in W.B. Gallie’s term, an “essentially contested 
concept” that no amount of definition, categorisation or elucidation can entirely 
resolve (Gallie, 1956).  Nevertheless, the literature on culture can be taxonomically 
ordered. Four categories of meaning are discussed in the following chapter, each 
with its own literature:  
(i) Culture in scientific anthropology;  
(ii) Culture in social anthropology;  
(iii) Culture as cultivation; and  
(iv) Culture as the arts, intellectual and aesthetic works.  
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These categories are important if usage of the term and its functions within 
government are to be understood. There needs to be differentiation between the 
study of culture and its associated approaches to research and interpretation, and 
the concepts of culture employed in government policy. Gray's 2010 paper "Analysing 
cultural policy" is unusual for taking on this complex topic but, for the purposes of 
this thesis, does not make this differentiation sufficiently clear (Gray, 2010). In 1995 
Oliver Bennett published an article in European Journal of Cultural Policy which 
implied these differences when categorising the key points of historic “government 
interventions in culture” as Royal patronage, censorship, support for the arts, the 
growth of subsidy, and the post-1945 developments (a period which includes the 
formation of the Arts Council) that "parallel" the Welfare State (O. Bennett, 1995: 
201). He then identified the “rationales for government support of culture” in a list of 
“recurring themes”: “laissez faire; national prestige; economic importance; the 
civilising mission; correcting the market; post-war reconstruction, and the Welfare 
State” (1995: 203). That article predated the New Labour government by two years so 
could not address its particular policies and their motivations, but his analysis is 
nevertheless valuable for its succinct summary of what was then a common view.  
 
Aspects of the rationales given by Bennett's "themes" could still be found with DCMS 
policy, but only residually. Even the claim for economic importance referred more to 
artistic activities as businesses than to the social concept DCMS had in mind. In 
other words, they refer to arts policy yet, by the period Bennett was writing, 
"culture" had come to have a socio-economic meaning in government of which the 
arts were just one element. He mentions this in his definitions, but the rationales 
given refer quite specifically to the arts - then still the principle meaning of culture 
within government.  
 
References to the arts pose a further problem that bedevils discussions of post-1945 
cultural policy; one cogently expressed by John Pick when arguing that, since 1945, 
the arts have come to be defined "as being those things which are in need of 
subsidy". As he explained: "In Britain virtually all publishing, most of the music 
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industry, the largest part of theatre, most of the visual arts world, the film industry, 
most crafts, the majority of the design industry and all that we call entertainment 
exists commercially" (Pick, 1988ix), yet within government, "the arts" almost always 
means those activities receiving subsidy. The target of Pick's criticism was the Arts 
Council rather than government directly, but he is nevertheless unusual among 
academics in making this point (see also the introduction to (Pick, 1980: 9-19)). Its 
significance becomes plain when discussing policies of "access" and "excellence" in 
the arts, given that the vast bulk of artistic output was unsubsidised and market-
orientated.  
 
Arguments for the intrinsic value of the arts centre around the idea that they are, as 
Redcliffe-Maud expressed it, "sheer necessities" (Redcliffe-Maud, 1976: 21); that they 
are "necessary because of what they are per se: the relevant 'first order' value is that 
the arts are intrinsically good" (Austen-Smith, 1994: 245). This is a dominant view, as 
will be evidenced in the course of this thesis, but it brings two basic problems. 
Firstly, there are strong arguments to question the presumption that the arts are 
essentially beneficial to the promotion of human values or that they provide social 
benefit (Belfiore, 2006a;  Belfiore and Bennett, 2007b, 2008), and, secondly, the value 
judgements that underlie this logic are, like so many once comfortable moral ideals, 
now impaled on the spike of postmodern relativism. The universal and absolute 
values that are presumed for the arts are selective, and that selection conditionally 
favours certain genres, artists, and subjective judgements. Matthew Arnold's 
exhortation to expose all to “the best that has been thought and said in the world” 
(Arnold, 1932: 6) is founded on a judgement that would now contentiously reject 
much popular artistic work as intellectually inferior (pop music and TV soap operas, 
for examples). 
 
Those issues aside, though, Bennett's summary neatly lists the well-argued and 
established rationales of governmental cultural policies. But when these are 
compared with New Labour's arguments for cultural policy, they appear to be only 
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partial, leaving unexplained the conceptual inconsistencies of DCMS policy, its 
ambitions in economic policy and its comparative disinterest in the arts per se. 
 
The History Perspective 
Historians of cultural policy are in even shorter supply than theorists, making it 
difficult, but even more important, to identify the historic strands of governmental 
interest in cultural policy both to contextualise and contrast with New Labour's 
policies. Two substantial monographs on the subject are particularly important for 
their research and rarity: Janet Minihan's The Nationalisation of Culture, and Tracey 
C Davis history of The Economies of the British Stage 1800-1914 (Minihan, 1977;  
Davis, 2000). Both are rich sources of information, although neither cover the 
modern period;  Minihan's history of government interventions in culture begins in 
the early 18th century and ends in 1945, while Davis concludes her study of British 
theatre in 1914. Together they construct a picture of governmental attitudes and 
traditions that can still be recognised today. Robert Hewison, in Culture and 
Consensus, addressed the relationships between politics and the arts "since 1940" 
(ending close to publication date of 1995) but does so through the perspective of 
social change and the differences in analytical theory over the period (Hewison, 
1995). He presumes throughout that culture essentially means the arts, formative of 
national identity and challenged more by "post-modern anxiety" than the 
construction of the soci0-economic culture then embryonic in New Labour (1995: 
312).   
 
A number of scholars from the field of Cultural Studies also refer to the origins of 
culture policy but their approaches tends towards a history of ideas more than a 
primary interest in the historical research of political facts. Miller and Yúdice include 
a chapter on "The History and Theory of Cultural Policy", interrelating those facts 
with ideational development from a global perspective but, tellingly, they recognise, 
as did Bewes and Gilbert, that: "....practitioners and theorists of Cultural Studies 
have rarely, if ever, addressed the precise question of the institutional and 
intellectual relationship between Cultural Studies and political studies" (Bewes and 
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Gilbert, 2000: 6). For all its theorising, cultural policy remains "the missing agenda" 
within Cultural Studies (McRobbie, 1996: 335), perhaps a result of its ontological 
foundations and critical mission. 
 
Instrumentalism and Evidence 
There does appear to be agreement among many authors that New Labour's 
interventions in the arts were most often for their instrumental value in achieving 
other ends. The exceptions may superficially appear to relate to arm's-length 
subsidies for the arts, but even these have been argued as mechanisms of control 
(Pick, 1988, 1980;  Brighton, 1999), or to satisfy vested interests (Witts, 1998;  
Hutchison, 1982), and always as instruments for the furtherance of social and 
economic policies (Oakley, 2006;  Strom, 2003;  Welsh Arts Council, 1998 among 
numerous others). Consequently, instrumentalism has been a consistent explanation 
for cultural policy and noted for its implied disregard for the intrinsic values of the 
arts (for examples see (Gray, 2007;  Jermyn, 2001;  Sanderson, 2002;  Bunting, 2008;  
Davies, 2008)). Belfiore placed instrumentalism within a long historical context: "We 
can only come to the conclusion that 'instrumentalism' is in fact 2,500 years old" 
(Belfiore, 2012: 104), while Clive Gray perceptively reversed the logic of 
instrumentalism to re-describe it as "attachment"; a device constructed to 
compensate for the negligible political value of cultural activity (Gray, 2002, 2008). 
Associating cultural works with issues of health, education, economic expansion, 
urban regeneration and the Welfare State can, it is argued, bring them back onto the 
government agenda. Both instrumentalism and attachment presume that the 
promotion of culture in its more traditional meaning as the arts were the purposes of 
policy; something this thesis will show was not the case. 
 
The serial logic arising from the instrumentalists' argument focuses attention on the 
research for evidence that the arts might have some effect on those politically 
stronger policies. Again, Belfiore's historical research, this time co-authored with 
Oliver Bennett, shows the long, complex and remarkably mixed attitudes to the 
social impacts of the arts with many "cons" among the well-rehearsed "pros" 
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(Belfiore, 2006a;  Belfiore and Bennett, 2007b, 2008). As with Bell-Villada's study of  
"art for art's sake" (Bell-Villada, 1996), monographs like this are rare but important 
tests of assumptions that lie behind popular notions of the nature and value of the 
arts.  
 
When it comes to the specific assertions of the beneficial social and economic effects 
of cultural activity the literature also becomes complicated by the nature and quality 
of the research itself. The arguments here fall into two related categories: (i) the 
quality of research, viz, research methodologies and the interpretation of data, and 
the (ii) the problem of advocacy in research. Bennett and Belfiore once again feature 
among the most incisive critics, along with Gordon Hughes, Sara Selwood, Paola 
Merli, Malcolm Miles and Calvin Taylor (Merli, 2002;  C. Taylor, 2006;  Hughes, 1989;  
M. Miles, 2005;  Selwood, 2002). A problem they identify is that research 
commissioned by parties interested in a particular result, (eg, DCMS or ACE) can 
lead to a wilful reading of data and hence weak evidence. When examining evidence 
for the effectiveness of its policies, it is significant that this weakness is one that New 
Labour either ignored or felt was insufficiently important to override its underlying 
motivations. In any case, what is largely absent from the research are convincing 
arguments for the rationales of the policy invented and opertionalised by DCMS. 
 
The Arts in Economics  
The power of cultural activity to further social and economic ambitions seemed 
never to have been doubted by DCMS, although there is little evidence that other 
government departments shared their conviction. Although recognition of the 
interconnectedness of society and the economy is as old as economic theory itself, 
with respect to modern cultural policy they became the subject of considerable 
attention with a much quoted book by John Myerscough: The Economic Importance 
of the Arts in Britain (1988). It followed several years in which the Arts Council had 
increasingly justified its funding for the arts on economic grounds (Selwood, 2010;  
Hughes, 1989). Myerscough's argument was different from the longer established 
economic analyses of artistic activities represented by the work of cultural 
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economists in the classical tradition such as William Baumol, Marc Blaug, Alan 
Peacock, David Throsby, Tibor Scitovsky and Ruth Towse (A. Peacock, Rizzo et al., 
1994;  Blaug, 1976, 2001;  Baumol and Bowen, 1966;  Throsby, 1994, 2010;  Scitovsky, 
1983;  Towse, 1997, 2006, 2010). Where Myerscough embedded the arts in the 
economy for their power to stimulate economic activity, even when loss-making in 
their own right, classical economists continued to measure and quantify artistic 
activity as businesses under utilitarian principles, taking no account of normative 
values. The inability of economists to achieve this ambition perfectly was noted by 
Ruth Towse: "... one of the strongest criticisms of economics is that it does not and 
cannot succeed in wiping out all value judgements" (Towse, 2010: 8). Given the 
aesthetic foundations of the arts and the subjective complexity of social relations, 
this is a devastating criticism.  As a result, economists have largely dodged questions 
of artistic value that lie behind public-benefit justifications for arts subsidies with 
references to "the market" (A. Peacock, 2000;  Baumol and Bowen, 1966;  Fullerton, 
1991;  Scitovsky, 1983;  Netzer, 1992). Subsidy itself has been deemed "a consequential 
act, undertaken for extrinsic or intrinsic reasons" (Austen-Smith, 1994: 240-247) but 
always based on the functional arguments of "market failure" or/and "market 
inefficiency".   
 
This idea distorts the place of the arts in the economy by misunderstanding two 
fundamental points. Firstly, it takes little or no account of the extent to which the 
arts are actually "supplied" by the unsubsidised, commercial sector (Baumol and 
Bowen, 1966;  Weiss, 1976;  Zimmer and Toepler, 1999) despite it being far larger. 
The arts are not defined nor consistent in their character as the idea of a social or 
economic good implies. In practice, the subsidised and commercial arts are both a 
mix of the popular and obscure, the profound and the superficial, without 
definitional boundaries. Secondly, economic arguments are essentially nomothetic: 
constantly in search for rules, formal relations, and predictability. Antithetically, the 
arts are resistant to the aggregated valuations necessary for economic algorithms, 
most especially in the face of postmodern relativism.  
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New Labour took a view that rejected (at least in part) both the classical economic 
model and the aestheticism of the arts, preferring instead the resurgent endogenous 
growth theory ("EGT"). By his own admission, this was a subject of considerable 
interest to Gordon Brown and plausibly responsible for much of New Labour's 
economic theory. The subject is discussed in some detail in chapter 5 but, in essence, 
EGT contains adjustments to classical economic models in order to account for 
growth resulting from ideas, knowledge, innovations and entrepreneurship. Its 
development can be traced from Joseph Schumpeter's concept of "creative 
destruction" (McCraw, 2007;  J. Schumpeter, 1939;  J. A. Schumpeter, 1934), but then 
flows most cogently through Robert Solow and Paul Romer (R. Solow, 1957;  R. M. 
Solow, 1994;  P. Romer, 1986, 1990;  P. M. Romer, 1994). The most comprehensive 
treatment of the subject is still Aghion and Howitt's Endogenous Growth Theory 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1999;  see also Aghion and Howitt, 1992). This literature has few 
connections to any traditional understanding of cultural policy and has not appeared 
in the cultural policy literature at all. Nevertheless, for its coupling with notions of 
social capital it is argued in the coming chapters to be central to DCMS policy. 
Whether this was "attachment" or entirely justified by its own theoretical integrity is 
a matter of argument, but at the time these concepts had considerable significance 
in the World Bank, the EU and the OECD, thereby seeming to authenticate their 
role in New Labour's socio-cultural policies (OECD, 2001;  Bebbington, Guggenheim 
et al., 2004;  Harriss, 2002;  World Bank, 2000). Its principles also share a great deal 
with social economics more generally (Swedberg, 1991;  Hunt, 2005;  Staveren and 
Knorringa, 2007: 113). 
 
Of the three best known proponents of social capital; Pierre Bourdieu, James 
Coleman and Robert Putnam, only Bourdieu developed a theory that did not draw 
on the rational choice logic that characterises most economic theory (Bourdieu, 
1993;  Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). For Bourdieu, social capital was knowledge 
directed by "habitus" within a "field" of relations in which individuals compete for 
power, recognition and cultural capital. Coleman also saw social capital as a 
description of social relations but one governed by the rationality of self-regarding 
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individuals (Coleman, 1988, 1986b, a).  Robert Putnam's works popularised the 
concept of social capital among the general public as much as with the polity, but his 
particular interest in "effective government" gave it a special significance in DCMS 
policy (R. Putnam, 1995, 2000, 1993;  R. D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994). Perhaps his 
best known work, Making Democracy Work, describes how networks of trusting 
relationships act "horizontally" to create a form of civic engagement with 
considerable economic power (R. D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994). The same 
arguments can be found in EGT and are easily connected to cultural policy as social 
policy (these arguments are also critically elaborated in: (Woolcock, 1998: 15-43;  
Schuller, Baron et al., 2000: 28;  Daly, 2005: 5, 12-14;  Field, 2008;  Coleman and 
Fararo, 1992;  Levi, 1996)).  
 
The assertion that the arts have considerable economic impact has additionally 
given them a role in urban regeneration. This topic draws extensively on theories of 
social and human capital, but also contentiously relates artistic activity with both 
economic and social amelioration. One outcome has been the development of 
theories of cultural regeneration and cultural economics as sub-disciplines. Comedia 
has published extensively on these themes having been formed in 1978 by Charles 
Landry to study and publish on the interconnectedness of culture, creativity and 
cities (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993;  Bianchini and Landry, 1994;  Landry and 
Bianchini, 1995;  Matarasso, 1997;  Landry, Greene et al., 1996;  Matarasso, 2003). 
Resulting from this trend, the development of cities is argued to be less 
geographically dependent (as was theorised by Jane Jacobs (Jacobs, 1970, 1961) but 
more reliant on people, their knowledge and their activities (an approach found in 
(P. Hall, 1999)). The arguments were most famously elaborated, extended and 
popularised by the American geographer Richard Florida in his influential book The 
Rise of the Creative Class (Florida, 2002). By the time New Labour took office, 
cultural factors in urban regeneration were the subject of numerous government 
reports, advocacy research, consultants' theories, economic analyses, theoretical 
arguments, and political statements, as well as within well-founded critical research. 
Even by 1992, several years before the explosion of this literature in Britain, a report 
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by Anthony Radich, for the National Endowment for the Arts in the USA, listed 
some 270 reports and papers on the economic impact of the arts, although most with 
reference to America  (Anthony J Radich, 1992;  see also Anthony J. Radich and 
Schwoch, 1987). Added to that list are studies on the workings of  creative 
individuals within commercial enterprises. In a reversal to the intent of Theodor 
Adorno's and Max Horkheimer's famous oxymoron "culture industry", these are now 
mopped-up in a loosely defined concept of the "creative industries" (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1979;  DCMS, 1998b). A 2007 literature review on the subject, 
commissioned by ACE, lists some 350 relevant works with only a handful written 
before the mid-1970s (O'Connor, 2007).  
 
Just why these should be matters for cultural policy is never explained in the 
literature. But DCMS not only latched onto these arguments but, under Chris 
Smith's direction, expounding them strongly. Smith's book, Creative Britain, 
attempted to unify the arts with creativity in industry, science and technology, 
claiming a role for the originality and quality he and others believed they had 
identified in artistic works. Expressed as "innovation", "excellence", and 
"regeneration", these were, he wrote, among the principle justifications for "state 
patronage" of the arts (C. Smith, 1998: 19). These words presaged a work whose 
author is said to have been one of Tony Blair's favourites (if book-cover blurb is to be 
believed): Charles Leadbeater. His book, Living on Thin Air, was important for how it 
defined an idea of "the new economy" (its subtitle) as one based on knowledge 
rather than physical processes. Although observing the "partly malign" prospects of 
the information age, Leadbeater embraced the social and economic changes of the 
time for their social and economic potential (Leadbeater, 1999). He defined both an 
attitude and an optimistic way of seeing the restless reinvention of relationships 
resulting from technological change. But, for just that reason, the book's content 
also has more in common with a voguish motivational rhetoric than objective 
analysis.  Critics of the regeneration arguments abound (among them Evans, 2005;  
Evans and Shaw, 2004;  Oakley, 2006, 2004;  M. Miles, 2005;  S. Miles and Paddison, 
2005;  Vickery, 2007) with most pointing to the lack of strong evidence or even the 
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impossibility of finding evidence to support the extensive claims made. Far from 
dislodging arts-led urban regeneration from economic policy, though, the traction of 
those arguments pulled along not only government bodies (such as the local urban 
regeneration companies) but also arts agencies, (and ACE itself) in search of power 
for their own ends through political relevance. Empirically, it seems that DCMS's 
efforts for recognition and significance within government had the same effect on its 
client NDPBs.  
 
Culture in Governance 
The shift from arts policy to a cultural policy that could envelop social and economic 
interests marked a profound change in the relations of the arts to the state. Under 
DCMS, the arts were generative activities for the national social and economic 
regeneration with which their work could be legitimated. This shift has been 
referred to as a "cultural turn" for its new emphasis on the socio-anthropological 
context of political action (L. Ray and Sayer, 1999;  and see Lawson, 2006 for an 
international view). This brings into relevance literature which analyses the nation 
state as an outcome of cultural practices, with the direct implication that 
governance, if not government itself, is dependent on cultural structures - 
undoubtedly areas of great interest to DCMS.  Perri 6 put the point bluntly in 1997, 
saying: “Culture is now the centre of the agenda for government reform, because we 
now know from findings from a wide range of research that culture is perhaps the 
most important determinant of a combination of long-run economic success and 
social cohesion” (6, 1997: 272). Perri 6 gives no references for these "findings", but 
William Ray provided the logic without noting the immanent contradictions, saying: 
"...the idea of 'culture' welds rational autonomy and the expression of individual will 
to the disclosure and production of a framework of rules, values, beliefs and 
practices" (L. Ray and Sayer, 1999: 2). Others authors have followed similar 
reasoning: Mark Smith argued that social interest is defined by culture (M. J. Smith, 
2000); Alan Finlayson that government and culture are, like structure and agency, 
reflective of each other, and that culture is a mode of government (Finlayson, 2000); 
David Lloyd argued a "convergence" of  "theories of the modern state and theories of 
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culture", as did Timothy Bewes and Jeremy Gilbert (Bewes and Gilbert, 2000: 25); 
while Larry Ray found the same idea in Gordon Brown's expression: "the power of 
the community" (Brown, 1994: quoted in;  L. Ray and Sayer, 1999: 259).  
 
It should be added that cultural governance indicates a much broader approach to 
the subject than the debates on governance within political studies as elaborated by 
Guy Peters, Mark Bevir, R A W Rhodes, Amit Ron and Chris Skelcher; arguments 
which compete around concepts of the "hollowed-out or "congested" state (for 
which see (Skelcher, 2000;  Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, 2003;  Bevir, Rhodes et al., 2003;  
Bevir and Trentmann, 2007;  Rhodes, 1997, 1996, 2012;  Ron, 2012;  B. G. Peters, 1993). 
In a literature review for the Cultural Office of the European Commission, Vesna 
Čopič and Andrej Sraker list works which cover the panoply of topics claimed under 
the title of cultural governance on the premise that cultural interventions by 
government effect the norms and practices of everyday life (Čopič and Sraker, 2012). 
In doing so they find a new relevance for a history of social theory as cultural policy 
but without any reference to the arts whatsoever.  
 
The influence of cultural governance might also account for changes in the 
normative balance between the public and private spheres. This line of thought leads 
to yet another sizable literature, for which the theories are well summarised by Colin 
Hay et al in an edited book on the subject (Hay, Lister et al., 2006). But two authors 
whose work coincidentally points towards the cultural policy triumvirate of the 
social, cultural and governmental are David Marquand and John Keane. The former 
referred to the "neoliberal trend towards populism" in the late 20th century as a 
source of legitimate power for governments. This argument links cultural shifts to 
the rise of individualism in the late 20th century that redefine the public domain. 
Reversing the direction of influence, that link also suggests that political action can 
change the cultural domains that are defined by the actions of individuals. For 
example, Marquand quotes Nigel Lawson saying that by selectively removing state 
controls he could "change the entire culture of a nation" (Marquand, 2004: 104). This 
tension between the private and the public points to an important paradox noted in 
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some literature on this topic. As John Keane argued, public domains are actually 
defined by individuals and it is their norms and practices that collectively constitute 
"culture";  it can never refer to singular or private actions despite being formed from 
them (Keane, 1998).  
 
While legislation was one way to influence a national culture (and with it the 
legitimacy of government actions), education offered a more subtle mechanism for 
cultural intervention and one that appears to justify DCMS's inclusion of education 
as one of its four policy themes. David Buckingham and Ken Jones make the point:  
 
"... the educational `work ethic’ of Labour was connected to a view of children 
less as inhabitants of a complex cultural space than as economic resources to 
be augmented or as social problems requiring a stronger disciplinary regime; 
and where culture figured at all, it had less to do with emancipatory 
possibility than with strengthening established norms of behaviour" 
(Buckingham and Jones, 2001: 2) 
 
These arguments run close to the logic of New Labour or, at least, DCMS's rationale 
for their adoption, yet none of their authors demonstrated their use in cultural 
policy. 
 
Government Policies and Data Sources 
The arguments presented in this thesis have drawn on aspects of all these debates 
but are fundamentally formed from the policies, political statements and legislative 
actions of government. Chapter 2 begins by describing the historical background to 
New Labour's cultural policies since the mid-18th century. It relies not just on the 
literature but extensively on Hansard and the documentation of government 
business. One particular source has never previously been examined in cultural 
policy research, or at least not in its entirety (that the author can discover): the 
Appropriation Accounts, published every year since the originating Bill of 1861. 
Within them, they show how funds have been allocated to governmental cultural 
endeavours, providing an institutional narrative that runs alongside the political 
actions, debates and public statements on policy.  
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Researching more recent years, particularly since the mid-20th century, the full array 
of Command Papers, Select Committee reports, policy statements (including party 
manifestos), and departmental reports have been exhaustively examined. The 
personal biographies and memoirs of relevant minsters give another perspective to 
this data, from which those of Jennie Lee, Hugh Jenkins, Roy Shaw (General 
Secretary of the Arts Council 1975-83), Edward Heath, Peter Mandelson and Tony 
Blair  have been particularly informative (Heath, 1998;  Blair, 2010, 1998;  Hollis, 1997;  
R. Shaw, 1987;  Mandelson, 2011;  Jenkins, 1979). Documents relating to the polices of 
DCMS are, of course, central to the research and are discussed in chapter 3 together 
with the critical literature that contributes to an understanding of political motives. 
Histories of the Arts Council have provided a perspective on these sources as, since 
1945, it was the principal organisation for the distribution of government fund for 
cultural activities. The Council itself published a history in 2004, but others, such as 
Robert Hutchinson, Richard Witts and Robert Hewison, have offered rather more 
critical views (Hewison, 1995;  Witts, 1998;  Hutchison, 1982). 
 
The above covers a large area of literature. It omits much but nevertheless describes 
the typological range that has been the subject of study in this research. It also leaves 
begging an explanation for New Labour's cultural policies. New Labour's indifference 
to traditional arts policies and their focus on social and economic policy have been 
noted in some of the literature but under-theorised and never rationalised. These 
matters cannot be explained through the study of individual policies but require a 
panoptic analysis in their historical, ideational and institutional context.  
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Research Methods 
 
The review of literature and sources indicates the considerable range used in this 
research, some of which has not previously been referenced in the cultural policy 
literature. To make sense of this breadth, research conclusions are derived from 
pragmatic methods and the "consilience" of evidence, in the sense that they are the 
points where evidence from different data converge (Whewell, 1847: vol2, 681;  
recently elaborated in E. O. Wilson, 1999). Responding to these multifarious sources, 
no single theoretical approach has been employed, following Andrew Sayer's 
argument that: “Theories are selective, one-sided, highlighting particular structures 
and properties; that is their strength, but also their weakness”; each approach can 
reveal something but what is revealed may be partial (Sayer, 2010: ix). Norman 
Denzin made a similar point: “...that multiple methods must be used in every 
investigation, since no method is ever free of rival causal factors...” (Denzin, 1970: 
26). In this respect, consilience is a process similar to "triangulation" (Olsen, 2004;  
Downward and Mearman, 2007;  Vanderstraeten, 2006), allowing “different 
disciplinary perspectives upon an issue” (Downward and Mearman, 2007: 81). 
However, that navigational metaphor implies greater precision than is achievable in 
most sociological research, hence the preference here for Whewell's more negotiated 
approach. 
 
The research plan was organised into two sections: (i) the historical context from 
which DCMS policies arose, and (ii) an examination and critical review of those 
policies. The latter include the specific research for the case study of the CBSO. 
Research methods have been similar in each, but the sources of data have varied in 
their availability and variety.  
 
1. The Historical Context 
The small amount of historical literature on the UK's cultural policies results in part 
from their nominative absence before DCMS. Except by implication, there were no 
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cultural policies before 1997. Arts policy (that is to say, continuous and planned 
support for the arts as a policy of government) developed from the work of CEMA in 
1939. Before the financing of CEMA and the subsequent creation of the ACGB  
concerns for the arts were manifested mostly in negative controls; for example, in 
censorship and licensing, rather than in their promotion. Nevertheless, several 
concepts important to an understanding of New Labour's cultural policy were 
formed in the 18th and 19th centuries: notably among them the principles of the 
market economy, laissez-faire, policy instrumentalism, perceptions of public and  
private values, and notions of l'art pour l'art. Institutions, attitudes and practices 
were also formed in earlier times and carried through to become a part of New 
Labour's inheritance.  The diachronic study of these origins has provided an 
illuminating historic context for the arguments that follow.  
 
That history has been researched through documents. In addition to tracing and 
expanding on cited sources within the literature, considerable use has been made of 
Hansard (while always conscious of its own methodological development over the 
period), Command Papers, Bills and other parliamentary papers and reports. Most 
were accessed online but several sessions at the Parliamentary Archive were 
necessary for sight of records still to be digitised or to trace others that had been 
incorrectly catalogued. 
 
Paper copies of the complete series of annual Appropriation Accounts, from their 
originating Act of 1861 to 2001, were acquired by library searches, with the remainder 
downloaded from the online Parliamentary Archives. These provided a great deal of 
detail on both the development of institutions and of particular events, 
complementing published written histories and, in the process, often revealing  
differences of factual reporting or secondary source interpretations. They proved 
particularly useful as another source with which to view the passage of 
parliamentary decisions as they evolved into administrative actions. Events 
discussed in the literature and statements in Hansard could often be substantiated 
with the accounts, while providing insights into events not otherwise explained 
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(reasons for delays in implementing policies, for example, were sometimes 
annotated in the accounts). Most importantly, they provided much detailed  
information necessary for process-tracing through an audit of institutional 
development. These accounts are rarely cited in the literature and no author has 
previously claimed to have followed the institutional narrative they provide.  
 
Archived material was researched on a number of occasions in order to trace 
important ideas back to their original intentions or, at least, to understand how and 
why they developed. The records of the Pilgrim Trust were inspected at the London 
Metropolitan Archive, rare books and pamphlets were obtained through the online 
archives at the University of Liège, Project Gutenberg, and the American Libraries 
Internet Archive. The V&A and the British Library online catalogues provided 
information on publishers and editions. Some publications were subsequently read 
at the British Library and the Bodleian Library (for example, Eduard Bernstein's 
monograph on Ferdinand Lassalle), and the Cadbury Research Library was the 
source of John Bowring's 1839 edition of Jeremy Bentham's letters. The National 
Archives were searched on several occasions for government records but in all cases 
the information sought was not available, either because it had not yet been 
catalogued or remained "closed" as an exception under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOI Requests are discussed below). Political party manifestos are available from 
several online sources, but samples were checked for accuracy with paper copies 
sourced in libraries. 
 
 2. New Labour's cultural policies 
Research for recent history, particularly since the mid-20th century, used the same 
sources as above but with three additions: the texts of public speeches, interviews, 
and Freedom of Information Requests. 
 
i) Speeches.  
The website www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org was a useful source for Tony Blair's 
speeches, as it was for those of earlier Prime Ministers (very little of which had any 
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relevance, as it turned out). With few exceptions, Chris Smith's early speeches 
(before 2001) had to be taken from newspaper reports and the revised versions 
published in Creative Britain. The exceptions were reports in Hansard and his 
representations published in Select Committee reports. The sources of quotations 
from the speeches of early ministers for the arts are all taken from similar secondary 
sources, as referenced in the text. 
 
ii) Interviews: 
Semi-structured interviews were recorded with Chris Smith (Minister of State for 
Culture Media and Sport from 2nd May 1997 to 8th June 2001, now Baron Smith of 
Finsbury), Alan Davey (who was then Director of Arts and Culture for DCMS and is 
now Chief Executive of the Arts Council), Michael Lyons (then an Advisor to the 
Treasury, author of the Lyons Report on local government, a past Chairman of the 
BBC and Chairman of the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra - the subject of a 
case study in this research), Helen Flack (then Director of Corporate Programmes for 
the Arts Council), Jill Robinson (then Director of the Regional, European and 
International Division of Birmingham City Council), and three interviews with 
Stephen Maddock (Chief Executive of the CBSO). The structured elements differed 
for each interviewee according to their position and their particular role in the 
formation and application of cultural policy. All, though, were targetted firstly at 
identifying how interviewees perceived the logic and the effectiveness of New 
Labour's cultural policies, and secondly how those policies related to their work. The 
interviews were recorded and notes taken, but only Chris Smith's was transcribed in 
order to enable some discourse analysis. 
 
iii) Freedom of Information Requests: 
FOI requests were made to the Cabinet Office, to DCMS and to HM Treasury. 
The CO were asked six questions about the minutes and other records of meetings 
concerning the DCMS, and for any unpublished reports relating to "the creation, 
naming, formation and funding of DCMS". They confirmed they held information 
relating to these questions but denied access on the grounds that they contained 
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"information relating to the formation of policy" and "ministerial communication". 
In other words, exactly the information sought was refused on the grounds of its 
nature. This response was appealed but to little effect. However, one important 
outcome from the ensuing correspondence was a statement that the Cabinet had not 
discussed the naming nor the responsibilities of DCMS. Comparing this fact with 
Tony Blair's statement in 2007 indicated a line of questioning that proved important: 
"Years ago", Blair stated, "... I said that we would make the arts and culture part of 
our 'core script'. In other words, it was no longer to be on the periphery, an add-on ... 
but rather it was to be central, an essential part of the narrative about the character 
of a new, different, changed Britain"  (Blair, 2007). Given DCMS's strenuous efforts to 
make cultural policy a central concern of government, the admission by the CO 
implied it may have been a departmental ambition rather than one of concern to the 
Cabinet, despite Blair's statement.  
 
The requests made to DCMS covered the same ground. More extensive replies were 
received, each falling into one of three categories:  those referencing published 
documents (all of which had already been acquired), those stating that relevant 
documents were no longer held by DCMS, and restatements of material already 
available on the DCMS website. The documents no longer held were said to be with 
the National Archives. However, in email correspondence an NA archivist claimed 
no knowledge of the records and assumed they were still in transit or awaiting 
cataloguing.  
 
Questions to HM Treasury were no more successful. They replied asking for the 
questions to be "narrowed", before claiming (on 17th November 2008), that 
answering the questions "would exceed the appropriate time limit specified in the 
regulations for central government and set at £600". On appeal, they suggested I 
name specific documents before they could respond further. 
 
Despite being largely fruitless in revealing new information (the exception being 
confirmation that the naming and brief for DCMS were not discussed at Cabinet), 
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the FOI process has been mentioned here as a method of discovery employed in the 
research. 
 
Interpretation 
New Labour’s cultural policies were often publicly predicated on deterministic 
arguments and on a reified concept of culture; culture as an object with definition 
and boundaries; as a thing with material characteristics and agential powers in its 
own right. In this sense, their use of the term “culture” is characteristic of the 
scientism behind other explanatory expressions (“nature” for example) used to imply 
that constructed concepts can have self-directing capabilities. Jack McConnell's 
statement that "culture ... can make Scotland a healthier place ..." typifies that 
tendency  (Scottish Cultural Commission, 2005). It is one of the fundamental 
problems of analysing cultural policy documents that the deductive proofs DCMS 
sought for its cultural policies are ontologically impossible;  that a “thing” called 
culture simply does not exist. It is not surprising then that the logic claimed for the 
policy rationales and the justifications set-out in government documents often 
lacked the deductive rigor necessary to support their claims. Theories of cultural and 
human capital, regeneration strategies, and claims for the economic power of the 
creative industries, all of which are now made by cultural agencies internationally, 
often fall into this category.   
 
These are clearly not nomothetic issues. This is one of the most complex factors to 
consider in interpreting the government documents about cultural policy. Without a 
viable and consistent definition of culture, identifying the real targets of policies 
within, say, the quantitatively defined PSAs between the Treasury and DCMS, is 
problematic. This also affects critical reviews of some of the reports and research 
studies commissioned by DCMS, many of which are formed on unquestioned 
assumptions of what "culture" actual means and, thereby, the effectiveness of 
cultural policies.   
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Extracting the logic of DCMS policy though the evidence of texts is further confused 
by the authorship of the documents themselves. Like nearly all government 
documents, they are the result of processes by several politicians or bureaucrats, 
each with their own, perhaps differing, responsibilities towards the published text 
and each dependent on the work of the others. Even a cursory analysis of Tony 
Blair's one-and-only speech on the arts (Blair, 2007 - referred to above) suggests it 
was written by DCMS; its arguments and phrasing unique to the Department's 
literature and never previously uttered by Blair. Like so much of the content of 
media comment and public debate, speeches can be second or third-order 
interpretations in themselves. At the same time, those media commentators and 
political adversaries that dispute the veracity or validity of ministerial rationales 
have their own motivations derived from multiple layers of interpretations. 
 
A defence by the authors of cultural policy could be made that it is the outcomes of 
particular actions or policies that concern the government; the possible meanings of 
its terms merely a squabble among academics. If this defence were made, it would be 
rejected. The relationship between nomenclature and policy can hardly be an 
accidental or insignificant matter. It is the very fact that certain policies are explicitly 
justified as “cultural” that raises the most basic questions. The evidence available for 
the analysis of those questions is inextricably embedded within the very statements 
and, thereby, the policies, that are in question.  
 
The thesis proceeds by first discussing matters of definition and interpretation 
before  introducing an historical perspective which contextualises New Labour's 
cultural policies. "Culture" then becomes further defined by its use in practice. This 
methodology builds on narrative, but also provides a background against which the 
rationales of New Labour's cultural policies stand in plain silhouette. Other readings 
of the same material might arguably produce different conclusions, although the 
coherence of the arguments presented here and their consistency with the available 
evidence does give the author confidence that they are essentially sound. 
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Chapter One 
 
Conceptualising Cultural Policy 
 
 
 
"Culture": concepts and usage 
 
 
The Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) was the first government 
department in Britain to include the word “culture” in its title. A number of sources, 
including DCMS (DCMS, 2008) and Chris Smith himself (C. Smith, 2009) have said 
this was no more than the preceding Department of National Heritage renamed. 
"Culture" for New Labour and the DCMS might, then, reasonably be taken to have a 
synonymatic relationship with the core responsibilities of that preceding 
department.  The Third Report of the National Heritage Committee, 1996, included a 
statement by John Major, the Prime Minister at the time, that summarised the aims 
of DNH; notably the word "culture" was not used: 
 
I strongly believe that man cannot live by GDP alone. A rounded life involves 
much more than economic security. A country can only be strong, healthy 
and contented if it burnishes its heritage, encourages its citizens to pursue 
excellence in sport, and cultivates widespread appreciation of the arts. I 
would like to see everyone in the country share in the opportunities that were 
once available to the privileged few.... It was in that spirit that I set up the 
Department of National Heritage. Its creation was a sign that Government 
should take such activities seriously. For millions of people, they are not 
optional extras: they are worth valuing in their own right” (National Heritage 
Committee, 1996: v). 
 
David Mellor, the first Secretary of State for DNH, added to Major's statement “that 
cultural values matter ... the cultural values of a nation are what endures” [sic] 
(National Heritage Committee, 1996: v). The innovative inclusion of sport had the 
effect of broadening the Department's work, but did not otherwise weaken the 
meaning of culture as being the arts.  Discussing the traditions of cultural policy in 
the United Kingdom, Oliver Bennett gave a straightforward definition for this usage: 
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“Culture is used to describe the product of intellectual, and particularly, artistic 
activity. It thus refers to music, drama, dance, painting, sculpture, literature, film 
and so in. The list may never be exhaustive” (O. Bennett, 1995: 201).  That had been 
the meaning employed by the DNH. Writing at the time, two years before the New 
Labour administration, Bennett noted that cultural policy in Britain “relates 
primarily to culture ... as an aesthetic or intellectual product” (O. Bennett, 1995). 
 
Intuitively, the public voice of the arts and heritage community that supported the 
Labour Party in the 1997 General Election (if the lobbying of the arts community and 
the output of left-leaning press was representative of that community) believed that 
New Labour would follow or strengthen policies in support of the arts. In fact, and to 
the dismay of many, central government funding for the arts initially decreased 
under New Labour, only to rise above the DNH awards in 1999/2000, leading a 
puzzled arts lobby to complain vociferously. An earlier Minister of State for the Arts, 
Grey Gowrie (1983 – 1985) summed-up the mood, calling Labour’s funding “niggardly 
and atavistic” (Gowrie, 1998), while Sir Peter Hall claimed a number of leading 
figures as members of his “Shadow Arts Council”- in effect an opposition lobby for 
more arts funding. Among them were Sir Tom Stoppard, Harrison Birtwistle, Julian 
Lloyd Webber, Harold Pinter, Sir Simon Rattle and Sir Richard Eyre (Sylvester, 1999;  
Glaister, 1999;  HL Hansard, 1999a: cols 141-3). They felt misled, it was claimed, 
having expected the continuation of Labour’s historically strong inclination to 
support their arguments. After all, the 1997 Labour Manifesto had declared:  
[The millennium] also provides a natural opportunity to celebrate and 
improve the contribution made by the arts, culture and sport to our nation ... 
The Department of National Heritage will develop a strategic vision that 
matches the real power and energy of British arts, media and cultural 
industries (Labour Party, 1997) 
 
In this extract, Labour appeared to share this tradition of culture as the arts, albeit 
with an interest in their economic potential. It was an understanding more than a 
century old and, as John Major’s statement attests, it was one generally shared across 
the political spectrum. 
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What New Labour meant by “culture” was, though, an alternative reading of this text 
in which the arts were an instrumental part of a much broader concept of culture. It 
was reinforced in other sections of their 1997 Manifesto:   
 
The arts, culture and sport are central to the task of recreating the sense of 
community, identity and civic pride that should define our country. Yet we 
consistently undervalue the role of the arts and culture in helping to create a 
civic society - from amateur theatre to our art galleries. 
 
Art, sport and leisure are vital to our quality of life and the renewal of our 
economy. They are significant earners for Britain. They employ hundreds of 
thousands of people. They bring millions of tourists to Britain every year... .  
 
Culture here was to be promoted for its functional values to social and economic 
change, not for its intrinsic qualities. New Labour’s proposals appeared to be an 
amalgam of the mercantilism of the previous Conservative government with a new 
socio-economic instrumentalism directed towards the formation of a cohesive 
society in which citizens share common economic interests. As its policies hardened 
in government, Labour would come to have an ever greater emphasis on these 
ambitions and take on a moral mission for the formation of the citizen within 
society; in Tony Blair’s words, “a new contract between citizen and state” (Dept of 
Social Security, 1997-8: v). This most significant statement is one that goes to the 
heart of the reinterpretation of culture under New Labour, integral with their 
concept of a “Third Way” and its manifestations in governance strategies. The targets 
of cultural policy were then no longer centred on the arts but rather on how culture 
might be used to reform the structures and norms of a particularly kind of economic 
society. In this reading culture was society and society formed the economy. In 
Fukuyama's words, "... [society] cannot be divorced from culture" (Fukuyama, 1995b: 
13), but by the same logic he might have added that culture cannot be divorced from 
the economy. 
 
At the time, these appeared as small differences of interpretation, almost lost in the 
overgrowth of political rhetoric.  Any macroeconomic function for cultural policy 
was little noticed outside of the general observation of an obvious instrumentalism, 
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particularly in social policy (defined by McGuigan as "cultural ventures and cultural 
investments as a means to attain goals in other than cultural areas" ((McGuigan, 
2004: 134-5), but see also (Mirza, 2006;  Gray, 2007;  Vickery, 2007)). This is not 
altogether surprising given that “culture” had been understood differently by 
governments, scholars, and in general usage for centuries. Its polysemic nature 
obfuscates meaning and, consequently, the rationales of policy. "Culture" then has to 
be understood by its history, context and its usage. As Fred Inglis put it, “[meaning] 
must rest, not on an imaginary distillation of a supposedly incontestable meaning 
but upon usage” (Inglis, 2004: 6). It is this last point that makes definition a central 
issue in investigating the rationales of New Labour’s cultural policies. How policy 
used reified forms of culture, and how that usage was understood by others, forms 
the groundwork upon which rationales can then be extricated from the rhetoric. 
These ideas will be explored in the sections below beginning  with a description of 
the roots and the usage of this most difficult word. 
The Problem of Definition 
 
"Culture" intrigues and taunts scholars, but still defies attempts to pin down its 
meaning.  It is not that a definition cannot be found for any particular circumstance, 
but that a single definition across all its uses is so elusory.  The challenge here is to 
discern typological differences in the use of the term by British governments, but 
these must necessarily be drawn from wider conceptual approaches. In various ways, 
“culture”, the word and the subject, has been of considerable academic interest in 
recent decades (Gray, 2010), but is also said to be found in the history of ideas 
stretching as far back as ancient Greece  (Lawson, 2006;  Belfiore, 2006b). The 
“cultural turn” of the late 20th century claims many post hoc cognates for what now 
has been variously characterised as a post-structuralist, contextualist and 
antipositivist concept. Among the contributors to this lineage, Stephanie Lawson 
lists Vico, Herder, Dilthey and Gadamer, but she might equally have added Cicero’s 
Tusculan Disputations or Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature, Weber’s interpretive 
sociology, Wittgenstein’s revelations on role of language, or the flood of works 
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arising from Tocqueville's tour of 19th century America. The list is now vast; 
impressive for its size and depth, yet still without settling on any fixed meaning for 
the concept of culture but, rather, establishing its complexity.  
 
Raymond Williams famously claimed “Culture” as “… one of the two or three most 
complicated words in the English Language”, noting its use “in several distinct and 
incompatible systems of thought” (Williams, 1976: 7), and justifying the assertion 
that it is  “...commonly awarded the accolade of being the most complex [word] of 
all” (Eagleton, 2000: 1). But this view was far from new; Johann Gottfried Herder said 
much the same thing 150 years earlier: “Nothing is more indeterminate than this 
word [culture], and nothing more deceptive than its application to all nations and 
periods” (Quoted in Barnard, 1969: 24). Writing a brief history of culture, Fred Inglis 
summarised its meanings since the late 19th century, noting its continuing semantic 
indistinction: “culture [then] became what it remains: protean, enormous, inclusive, 
bloodily disputed” (Inglis, 2004: 29). Meanings vary also with different 
methodological and theoretical approaches.  The works of early ethnographers bear 
little comparison with the Marxist cultural analyses of Theodor Adorno or Walter 
Benjamin, while the theories of those engaged in contemporary Cultural Studies can 
be difficult to reconcile with Friedrich Schiller's aestheticism. William Ray’s 
comment, that “It takes a certain amount of foolhardiness even to use the word…” is 
undoubtedly good advice for the unwary (W. Ray, 2001: ix). 
 
Raymond Williams’ etymological study of the word is an often quoted source of 
cultural definitions. Dismissing dictionary definitions as unable to help with words 
“which involve ideas and values”, Williams introduced a root meaning that preceded 
its use as 19th Century metaphor: 
 
“Before this period, it had meant, primarily, the ‘tending of natural growth’, 
and then, by analogy, a process of human training. But this latter usage, 
which had usually been a culture of something, was changed, in the 
nineteenth century, to culture as such, a thing in itself. It came to mean, first, 
‘a general state or habit of the mind’, having close relations with the idea of 
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human perfection. Second, it came to mean ‘the general state of intellectual 
development, in a society as a whole’. Third, it came to mean ‘the general 
body of the arts’. Fourth, later in the century, it came to mean ‘a whole way of 
life’, material intellectual and spiritual”. (Williams, 1960: xvi, his italics). 
 
Even a cursory examination of that summary shows its great breath and variety of 
meaning. It can never be reduced to “brute facts” (C. L. Becker, 1932: 9), but arises 
out of “shared mental modes” belonging to the ideas of a particular time and place 
(Denzau and North, 1994). Like all ideas, and the institutions that arise from them, 
those concepts also persist over time, adjusted and revised according to contingent 
circumstances. This results from their reflective nature, defining as well as defined 
by a “climate of opinion” (Whitehead, 1927: 3): “ ‘those instinctively held 
preconceptions in the broad sense, that Weltanschuuang or world pattern’, that 
characterises a particular time and place” (C. L. Becker, 1932: 5;  quoted in Ritter, 
1986: 459). Recent decades have seen a change that is now persistent and 
dominating:  the shift of meaning from its origins as an active process of cultivation 
to a noun, reified and objectified into “a thing in itself” with immanent powers - the 
"culture can ... " assertions noted in the opening paragraphs of this thesis. That 
change alone has multiplied both meaning and usage of "culture", invalidating  any 
single etymological genealogy with differences in meaning that cannot be fully 
reconciled but only noted, and its uses qualified.  
 
The definitions that follow attempt to identify, explain and exemplify those aspects 
of its meanings necessary to provide a vocabulary with which to construct arguments 
about New Labour’s cultural policies. As a consequence, only a few essential factors 
are discussed within each category of meaning. Cultural theorists may find much 
omitted in the history of ideas and in the scholarship they feel important for a 
complete understanding of their subject. Any criticism on this basis would, though, 
only be valid if any omission was essential to understanding culture in the political 
context of the New Labour government of 1997 as it is discussed in this thesis. 
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Approaches to Definition 
 
The approach taken here is to argue that it is possible to corral the polysemic aspects 
of  cultural concepts into four categories:  
 
(i)  Culture in scientific anthropology;  
(ii)  Culture in social anthropology;  
(iii) Culture as cultivation;  
(iv) Culture as the arts.  
 
A number of cultural theorists have simplified definitional differences even further 
by pointing to just two basic senses, separating those that refer to the arts from 
those that have, as Oliver Bennett notes, essentially “an anthropological meaning”;  
where it “refers to a whole way of life – as in Japanese culture, American culture, 
Black culture, youth culture and so on” (O. Bennett, 1995: 201). However, there are 
profound differences in the way in which anthropologists approach their work, 
characterised at the extremes by the positivism of scientific methodologies and those 
that are essentially interpretive and hermeneutic. Bennett's dualism also omits a 
whole area of meaning in which culture has a role in cultivation through pedagogy 
and self-enlightenment, relating culture atomistically to the individual.  Culture can 
also be synonymous with civilisation but as this relates to all five definitional 
categories, it is not discussed separately.  
 
(i) Culture in Scientific Anthropology 
 
The first edition of Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1869) was published at a 
time of considerable social and economic change in Britain (Arnold, 1932). The 
struggles of many (Carlyle, Morris, and Coleridge significant among them) to find 
beauty and security in the social upheavals of industrialising Victorian England and 
its “vast residuum” were provoked by the increasing pace of scientific thought and 
discovery (1932: xxiv).  Darwin’s On the Origin of Species had the unintended effect of 
further strengthening ideas of social determinism argued by Henri Saint-Simon and 
his student Auguste Comte, affecting, too, J.S Mill’s more developed theories of the 
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utilitarian social and moral philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and Mill's father, James.  
By the ideas of this new scientism, the underlying nature of human societies were 
argued to be universally consistent, predictably hierarchical and progressive. The 
culture of any society or group could be assessed and located accurately on a 
developmental graph of the progression of civilisation. In Morgan’s words: “It can 
now be asserted upon convincing evidence that savagery preceded barbarism in all 
the tribes of mankind, as barbarism is known to have preceded civilization. The 
history of the human race is one in source, one in experience, and one in progress” 
(L. H. Morgan, 2005 [1877]: v-vi).  The eminent anthropologist Edward Tylor was 
equally adamant: “[Evolution] is the great principle which every scholar must lay 
firm hold of if he intends to understand either the world he lives in or the history of 
the past” (Edward Burnett Tylor, 1881: 20). His belief was that "a general law can be 
inferred" from the observable facts of human behaviour and that those "facts 
collected seem to favour the view that the wide difference in the civilization and 
mental state of the various races of mankind are rather differences of development 
than origin" (Edward Burnett Tylor, 1878 [1965]: 3, 372). 
 
In a more recent study of the “Evolution of Culture” (1959), the anthropologist Leslie 
White argued his support for the evolutionary approach, saying it had been “so 
fundamental in the biological sciences, so fruitful in the physical sciences, where it is 
coming to be used more and more in astronomy and physics, and in the many social 
sciences” it would be “incomprehensible” if it “should not find a place in cultural 
anthropology” (L. A. White, 1959: viii-ix). The individual was, then, an atom of 
society whose aggregate behaviour could be understood and predicted with 
unalterable natural laws, whether those of the scientific materialism of Karl Marx, or 
through the self-interested individualism of utilitarianism, or other mechanisms still 
to be revealed by scientific investigation. In the possibility that human beings were 
just complex machines, if reflexive and thereby self-learning, lay the foundations for 
a new understanding of culture to be defined by the analysis of behaviour.  
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Anthropologists made culture an essential part of their lexicon, used as a summary 
description for traditions and practices and defined by exhaustive lists of the 
behavioural traits of particular human groups. Leslie White described culture as “an 
extrasomatic, temporal continuum of things and events dependent upon symboling. 
Specifically and concretely, culture consists of tools, implements, utensils, clothing, 
ornaments, customs, institutions, beliefs, rituals, games, clothing, works of art, 
language, etc” (L. A. White, 1959: 3). The recognition that objects may have symbolic, 
social, functions does, though, point towards a more interpretive approach. Edward 
Tylor has been claimed as among the first to seek an all-embracing notion of culture; 
one that encompassed both these social and physical manifestations. Unqualified, 
such a claim would, though, be misleading as he consistently preached a strong 
positivist element in all his work. In this example, from his 1874 book, Primitive 
Culture, Tylor is discussing the origins of one of culture’s claimed founding 
elements; mythology:  
 
“the study of the savage and barbaric intellect opens to us the study of 
mythology...With a consistency of action so general as to amount to a mental 
law, it is proved that among the lower races all over the world the operation 
of outward events on the inward mind leads not only to statement of fact, but 
to formation of myth”.(Edward B Tylor, 1874: vi, 446). 
 
Anthropologists’ taxonomic fervour appeared to reach its zenith in the 1937 
publication of the Outline of Culture Materials by the Cross-Cultural Survey 
(Murdock, 1961) which sought to classify cultures by seven basic criteria, among 79 
major divisions of cultural information and 637 subdivisions. Murdock used this 
survey in Social Structure, a work of “cultural anthropology”, in an attempt to find 
“natural laws” for the organisation of human society (Murdock, 1965). The American 
Psychological Association produced an abstract of the work that summed up its 
intentions:  
 
“It is shown that social organization in our society exhibits the same 
regularities and conforms to the same scientific principles as do comparable 
phenomena among other societies. The postulational method has been 
applied in this analysis and prediction of social phenomena” (PsycINFO 
Database Record, 2010).  
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An earlier work (1952) by the American anthropologists  Alfred Kroeber and Clyde 
Kluckhohn’s, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, is even now 
quoted as a source of cultural definitions, although none of its 164 definitions refer 
to concepts of culture that relate either to artistic concepts or to self-cultivation 
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952).  
 
Even the obvious move to see culture as a description for social norms, structurally 
reinforced and constantly reproduced through myth, beliefs and values, was 
insufficiently immutable for the scientists of anthropology. The value of aesthetic 
creations arising out of artistic autonomy was not denied, but argued merely to 
represent a cultural form in human progress that could be reduced and explained by 
cause and effect. “Cultural anthropology is that branch of natural science which 
deals with matter-and-motion, i.e. energy, phenomena in cultural form, as biology 
deals with them in cellular, and physics in atomic, form” (L. A. White, 1943: 335).  
 
This had some interesting implications. One that takes the concept of culture even 
further from notions of the autonomous artist or the self-improving person was the 
debate on the inclusion of any animal species into cultural definitions, particularly 
those that fall between primates and australopithecines. Ralf Holloway provoked a 
small storm of correspondence in Current Anthropology when he argued against this 
prospect, saying: “...that it is possible to give the concept 'culture' some force once 
again as something unique to man” (Holloway, 1969: 395). 
 
(ii) Culture in Social Anthropology 
 
In the development of anthropological concepts of culture, positivism was to prove 
something of a cul de sac. It left two fundamental problems unresolved: firstly, that 
human behaviour is so complex and so reflexive, changing constantly under 
endogenous and exogenous influences, that deterministic reasoning on 
parsimonious principles becomes a reductive, incomplete and artificial synthesis: an 
inadequate tool for the task. Secondly, that all semantic classifications require a 
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universalist concept of culture that must necessarily treat idiosyncratic or local 
behaviour as aberrations or exceptional flaws. The artist flouting convention or the 
philosopher challenging normative reasoning or the artist satirising their own 
situation would become oddities, mutations, and as such would appear to be 
excluded from the culture of which they are so obviously a defining part. An 
objective taxonomic approach would always be partial and unable to define the 
rationales and the fine variations in human societies that are inevitably under 
constantly reconstruction in contingent circumstances. It could never explain the 
causes and reasoning for the behaviour observed.  
 
The route around this developmental road block was to consider not just the 
behaviour and practices of human communities, but also the generative and 
normative influences, expressed in emotions, fears, beliefs and other essentially 
human motivations, that can then become provocations for the formation of 
behavioural rationales. The work of Clifford Geertz was a powerful force for this 
shift; his methodological principle being illuminated in the title of one of his most 
defining works, The Interpretation of Cultures, (Geertz, 1973).  In his obituary, the 
New York Times referred to Geertz as a “cultural anthropologist” (Yarrow, 2006), a 
term which unfortunately does little to differentiate his interpretivist and 
hermeneutic approach from the tradition already defined by Tylor, White and 
others. But it does point to a central theme of “the Geertz formulation”. His obituary 
explained: “the question to ask about cultural phenomena is not what they do, but 
what they mean. Mr. Geertz also argued against the idea that one could define the 
essence of humanity across all cultures”. As Ernest Gellner expressed it, Geertz 
distinguished “between the ‘structure’ and the ‘culture’ of a society” (Gellner, 1964: 
153), “culture being”, he argued “essentially, the manner in which one communicates, 
in the broadest sense”, and that “its importance resides in the fact that it reinforces 
structure – the style of being and expression symbolises, underlines the substance, 
the effective role, activities, relationships” (1964: 155). Then, in a phrase that has 
much significance for New Labour’s understanding of the word, he added: “In 
modern societies, culture does not so much underline structure: rather it replaces 
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it”. As will be argued below, under New Labour culture became a description of 
societal structures as amenable to manipulation as the national economy. 
 
The historic lineage of this interpretive approach to anthropology is commonly 
traced back to James George Frazier (1854 - 1941) and Frank Boas (1858 – 1942), but 
its passage through the latter part of the 20th century, via Alfred Kroeber, Margaret 
Mead, Ruth Benedict, Bronlislaw Malinowski, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and others, shows 
a highly complex and varied set of analytical principles. Writing in 1917, Alfred 
Kroeber expressed the challenge: “The forces and principles of mechanistic science 
can indeed analyze our civilization; but in so doing they destroy its essence, and 
leave us without understanding of the very thing which we seek” (Kroeber, 1917: 212). 
In his Introduction to Argonauts of the Western Pacific, a defining work for this 
trend,  Malinowski specifically expressed the need for anthropology to “grasp the 
native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world” 
(Malinowski, 1922: 25, original emphasis). In summary: “...the safe havens of more 
(nowadays) 'respectable' disciplines such as sociology and anthropology and their 
'tried and trusted' analyses of culture will get us nowhere at all”  (Morley, 1998: 479). 
The search for human motivations had to be found in meaning, whether conscious 
or subconscious, traditional or newly expressed, which in turn drew into analytical 
focus symbolism, psychology, philosophy, and the critical interpretation of creative, 
artistic, works.   
 
Anthropologists’ shift towards interpretative and qualitative ethnographic 
methodologies were, in the latter part of the 20th century, responding not just to 
wider intellectual movements (most particularly the decentring, fragmenting and 
relativistic elements of postmodern thought) but also to accusations of a declining 
relevance of older concepts of culture within traditional anthropological research. 
Sine Howell, a Professor of “social” anthropology at Oslo University,  summed up the 
argument, saying: “primitive society no longer exists”, and “post-industrialisation, 
postmodernism, consumerism and the capitalist globabilisation of culture are 
rapidly rendering previous anthropological questions, methods and theories void” 
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(Howell, 1997: 103). Eric Wolf described the change as rooted in a difference between 
the “materialists and mentalists” (Wolf, 1980) and the “practical reason and value 
culture” that “stems from the concerns of neo-Kantians in early nineteenth-century 
Germany, concerns that connect Kroeber and Sorokin with such predecessors as 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert and Max Weber” (Wolf, 1984: 393-4).  
 
In other words, anthropological concepts of culture were changing from a study of 
observed behaviour in search of “causal-functional integration” (Sorokin, 1967) to 
theories for constructed ideologies, myth-making, aesthetic and symbolic activities, 
all of which were thought to be “continuously in construction, deconstruction and 
reconstruction” (Wolf, 1984: 396).  Into this description, the arts, in all their 
variations, fitted comfortably: "According to this anthropological perspective, high 
culture, prestigious culture so to speak, is just the fragmentary expression of a much 
larger cultural entity, comprising eating-habits, clothes, work and entertainment, in 
sum 'all the habits and competencies learned by man by virtue of is belonging to a 
particular society'" (Charbonnier, 1961: 180;  quoted in Finkielkraut, 1988: 96)1. This 
brought anthropology into territory occupied by sociologists and of interest to New 
Labour's social engineers. 
 
(iii) Culture as Cultivation 
 
A quite different view of culture and its part in education relates to the Arnoldian 
notion of its improving power, morally and epistemically; what Arnold summarised 
as “sweetness and light 2:  
 
Culture is then properly described ... as having its origins in the love of 
perfection; it is a study of perfection. It moves by the force, not merely or 
                                                     
1 Finkielkraut gives the reference as Lévi-Strauss, but that is an error. 
2 The term “sweetness and light” appears to originate in Jonathan Swift’s Battle of the Books, in which 
the richness of classical aesthetics is argued by their allegory, the bee: “... whatever we have got has 
been by infinite labour and search, and ranging through every corner of nature ... we have rather 
chosen to fill our hives with honey and wax; thus furnishing mankind with the two noblest of things, 
which are sweetness and light”. Swift’s arguments for the values of classical literature were sure to 
have found favour with Arnold. See SWIFT, J. 1862. The selected works of Jonathan Swift. London, 
Hector Mclean. 
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primarily of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral 
and social passion for doing good (Arnold, 1932: 45, original emphasis).   
 
“Educators and literati of Arnold’s day linked culture to both a process of self-
education that culminated in a refined outlook and to literary masterpieces that 
embodied refinement...” (Kett, 1994: 143). Generating a moral discipline with deep 
implications for society as a whole,  Arnold’s view of culture belonged to a much 
older tradition which related artistic works, and most particularly poetry and 
literature, to educational instruction. Belfiore traced this back to the ancient world 
in which “amusement or instruction” were competing values of artistic works 
(Belfiore and Bennett, 2008: 114). They were related, Belfiore argues, to the Plantonic 
concept of paideia; the education of the young in the heritage of cultural ideals to be 
found in beauty, morals and the nature of liberty (Belfiore, 2006b: 238;  Gablentz, 
2005: 45). This argues a developmental path for a "social impact" of culture traceable 
from ancient Greece through Renaissance Italy and the 18th century German concept 
of Bildung, before reaching the “modern elaborations” of Gramsci, Cassirer, Read, 
and Spender. While there are undeniably ideas shared between these periods, 
locations and people, there are also fundamental differences. One is the distinction 
between civic, outward-looking, societal cultural ideals and those that are concerned 
with the internal development and self-discipline of the inner person. This gives a 
notional role for the place and influence of culture as Bildung in New Labour's 
policies for "active welfare" and citizenship (Adler, 2004;  Walker and Wiseman, 
2003). 
 
More than self-help or instruction, Bildung describes the formation or moulding of 
the person, in which an idea of culture plays a central role. Influenced by his reading 
of Kant and Schiller, Hegel took culture to mean cultivation as an amalgam of 
education, taste and judgement that could lead to the harmonisation of the self 
within society, of the soul and the mind, to form an Enlightened citizen standing 
“above both the nobility and the bourgeoisie” (Pinkard, 2000: 27 & 50). 
"Enlightenment", wrote Hegel to Schelling, "...relates to culture as theory does to 
praxis, as cognition to ethics"   (Hoffmeister, 1952;  quoted in Avineri, 1972: 2); 
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culture here was  idealistic and enlightened with a particular relevance to the 
structure of society in 18th century Germany (Bruford, 1975;  Abizadeh, 2005: 340;  
Pinkard, 2000).  
 
The early development of this ideal is most usually attributed to Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (Sorkin, 1983). There is, though, a fundamental difference between 
Humboldt’s morally self-centred and aristocratic concept of bildung and the 
nationalistic or, in recent times, social construct expressed in various ways from 
Plato through Fichte to Matthew Arnold. If bildung has a part in the contemporary 
meaning of culture, it is not in the form practiced by Humboldt, who was “...an 
individualist of the type so common in the age of German Idealism, self-centred 
from what seemed to be the highest motives” (Bruford, 1975: 22), and little 
concerned with, or understanding of, human society at large. If “culture” implies a 
shared set of values, Humboldt’s “... weeding of his mental and emotional garden, 
the Ciceronian ‘cultura animi’” focused on himself alone (1975: 14). In this sense, 
bildung could be argued as anti-social, for example when referring to the “negative 
connotations” of the “Bildungsbürger” in 19th century German society (R. Burns and 
Will, 2006: 311). What had been so popular in the coming-of-age bildungsroman of 
Johann von Goethe (“The Apprenticeship of Wilhelm Meister” being archetypical) 
became socially schismatic when associated with a wealthy and aristocratic elite in 
the context of a modern industrialising economy. 
 
J.S. Mill’s essay “On Liberty” was strongly influenced by German bildung and by 
Humboldt in particular. Mill made few references to culture in his early works 
outside of the literal context of agriculture, but by mid-life he began referring to 
“intellectual and moral culture”. It is a point emphasised by, among others, 
Alexander Brady introducing Volume 18 of Mill’s collected works (John Stuart Mill, 
1977: Ivi) and in Mill’s quoting in On Liberty from von Humboldt’s Sphere and Duties 
of Government. In fact Mill’s epigraph to On Liberty is also a quote from von 
Humboldt (John Stuart Mill, 1995). David Lloyd put it that: “the ideal of the 
individual for Mill, no less than for Arnold, is that which culture, in the large sense 
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of ethical and aesthetic development, alone can produce” (Lloyd and Thomas, 1998: 
121). In his pamphlets on Representative Government, Mill takes this argument 
further by relating culture as intellectual and moral development and the formation 
of the individual, to the responsible citizen in a democratic state (J S Mill, 1963). 
 
Matthew Arnold and JS Mill both described the process by which the development of 
the individual is projected into a moral and political social context through culture. 
Arnold said of it “…culture works differently” before adding, with a specific reference 
to Lessing and Herder in Germany, “This is the social idea and the men of culture are 
the true apostles of equality” (Arnold, 1932: 70, original italics). This is bildung  
Anglicized, culture as a social object; reified, universalizing and hegemonic in its 
presumptions of righteous power of benefit to all society, although still a tool of the 
autonomous, free-thinking individual of reason. Culture was something to be 
developed within each person for the benefit of the emerging emancipated 
community. It was achieved through education and a knowledge, understanding and 
experience of  “…the best that has been thought and known in the world…”, to repeat 
that telling phrase yet again. It is not anthropological and it is not particularly 
concerned with the autonomy of the artist, but instead is something available to all if 
they wish to participate in the process of self-realisation. It has strong relations to 
bildung but, in the minds of Mill and Arnold, culture was ultimately a tool for the 
formation of a cohesive citizenship.  
 
This argument was most explicitly developed in Self Help, Samuel Smiles’s self-
published book of 1859 in which he argued the virtues of hard work, training 
(physical and mental), education, and a constant striving for personal development. 
Along with the development of museums and art galleries during the nineteenth 
century (T. Bennett, 1995), it offered a popular message, expressing the Zeitgest of 
the century. In a reference to the concept of bildung, Smiles claimed “the highest and 
most effective culture of all resolves itself in Self-Culture” (Smiles, 1911 [1859]: 288), 
which he defined as “the education or training of all parts of a man’s nature; the 
physical and moral, as well as the intellectual” (1911 [1859]: 275). All this resolved into 
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“character” – “moral order embodied in the individual” (1911 [1859]: 351). Smiles 
summarised the rationales of 18th and 19th century political interventions while his 
arguments set out the logic by which the commerce of industrial Britain related 
directly to the culture of its citizens. Culture as cultivation had moved swiftly from a 
private mission to a public moral obligation. 
 
(iv) Culture as The Arts 
 
“Culture was thus born of art” said Remy Saisselin (Saisselin, 1970: 217) in a theory 
that the arts were the “manifestation of the human enterprise upon earth, a positive 
activity, indeed a new order interposed between the supernatural and natural order” 
(1970: 200). The arts began, he said, as merely a “divertissement” that became 
instructive before its elevation in the 18th and 19th centuries into something “... 
founded upon permanent values such as the true the good and the beautiful” (1970: 
210). Saisselin’s words expose a very great difficultly resulting from this definition of 
culture as it describes its meaning by things indefinable and indescribable. David 
Best put it that the nature of art cannot be rationalised; that the search for “bedrock 
propositions [for the “concept of art”] which are unquestionably true” is a “self-
defeating quest” (Best, 1985: 2-3). Rather, he argued, the arts arise from and provoke 
“natural” responses to its aesthetic creations for which rationalisations are then 
subsequently sought. To treat artistic work as objects with definable characteristics 
is, by this argument, to miss the very substance that is under investigation. The 
exchange between Monroe Beardsley and Douglas Morgan on the meaning of art 
typifies that pointless philosophical dance to which Best alluded (D. Morgan, 1961;  
Beardsley, 1961).  Fortunately, for the purposes of this thesis, the challenge here is 
not to define the arts or artistic works per se, but rather what people mean by culture 
as a collective word for the arts. Yet because the political need for a definition and 
for functional justification of art works profoundly conflicts with their nature, the 
reasons for this conflict do need some explanation. Post war political 
administrations had struggled with this problem, but DCMS almost entirely ignored 
it until it was reintroduced in a speech by Tessa Jowell's in 2004 (Jowell, 2004). 
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The voice of the arts lobby referred to at the beginning of this chapter is, to many 
people, quite incoherent. It makes passionate claims for the values of art works when 
they seem optional or, at best, little more than pleasing additions to routine life.  
Yet, until the New Labour government, ever-larger amounts of public financial 
support had been given annually to the arts since the formation of the ACGB in 1945. 
The logic behind this assumed a status for artistic endeavours that allowed them 
independence from government interference: the so-called “arm's-length principle”. 
This view is rooted in a belief that the arts have an immanent value beyond any 
measurable or assessable function that is profoundly important to the spiritual well-
being of mankind. Culture in this sense refers to the sublime nature of aesthetic 
works that are valued entirely and completely for their own sake. Removed from any 
functional value funding can only be justified in a closed referential system as l’art 
pour l’art – art for art’s sake.  
 
Although prefigured by the metaphysics of Alexander Gottlied Baumgarten, the 
origins of l'art pour l'art are said to be from Immanuel Kant. As his thoughts were 
paraphrased, argued and contested in conversations around Europe, Benjamin 
Constant made the first known written reference to the expression in his diary of 
1804, reporting a conversation with Schelling on Kant’s idea of, “L’art pour l’art, sans 
but, car tout but dénature l’art” 1 (Bell-Villada, 1996: 36;  Wilcox, 1953;  Egan, 1921: 11). 
Wilcox describes the initial spread of Kant’s late ideas on aesthetics as occurring 
initially through de Stael’s book on Germany, De l’Allemagne, which then provided 
easy source material for Victor Cousins’s popular lectures in Paris. Egan’s research 
suggests their primary route to England was then via Henry Crabb Robinson: “one of 
                                                     
1 The entry in Constant’s journal of 10
th
 February 1804 reads: “Schiller calls. He is a man of keen mind 
in his art but almost wholly the poet. It is true that the fugitive poetry of the Germans is of a 
completely different kind and depth from ours. I have a visit with Robinson, pupil of Schelling’s. His 
work on the Esthetics of Kant has some very forceful ideas. L’art pour l’art, without purpose, for all 
purpose perverts art. But art attains the purpose that it does not have”: MELAGARI, D. 1895. Journal 
intime de Benjamnin Constant et lettres a sa famille et a ses amis. Paris, Ollendorff. Quoted in an 
uncredited English translation in Wilcox, where he adds in a footnote, p363 : “A letter from Schiller to 
Goethe verifies that Schiller dined with de Staël (and Constant) on February 9
th
, 1804” WILCOX, J. 
1953. The Beginnings of l'Art Pour l'Art. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 11 (4 SI), 360-377. 
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the first to spread the doctrines of the Aufklärung in literary circles” (Egan, 1921: 12), 
before it passed into the hands of English romanticists and moralists equally 
appalled by the grim power of industrialisation.  
 
The interpretations of Kant’s conceptions may not have been accurate but even now, 
in partial and simplified form, they still define the idea so succinctly expressed in 
l’art pour l’art. The crude, popularised notions that give rise to that particular 
concept of art are mostly contained in the Critique of Judgement, a work that Roger 
Scruton described as “one of the most important works of aesthetics to have been 
composed in modern times; indeed it could be fairly said that, were it not for this 
work, aesthetics would not exist in its modern form” (Scruton, 2001: 97-99). It 
describes the aesthetic sense as something that can only be personal, yet gives rise to 
an idea of beauty (however that may be judged by the individual) that paradoxically 
implies a quality objectively and universally valid. The aesthetic experience must 
necessarily precede and transcend the objective world, yet our response to it is an 
interaction between the free play of imagination and rationality from which the 
mind constructs a unity of form and emotion. Separating aesthetic qualities from 
material form and aesthetic experience from rationality thus demands that art can 
only be self-referential; the very act of objectively assessing its character removes 
that character from the object. That in turn frees the artist from the normal 
strictures of worldly relations: "All l’art pour l‘art men are to be known by their 
common aspirations -  freedom for the artist, and order and beauty in his creations. 
Where these conditions exist in combination, true works of art are produced" (Egan, 
1921: Pt II, v). 
 
From a political perspective, the idea of l’art pour l’art defies the search for a 
measurable and assessable definition of culture that can nevertheless be built around 
the aesthetic content of art. The problem has teased and vexed British governments, 
particularly throughout the latter half of the last century, as they tried to rationalise 
funding policy for a form of national cultural development that is based on work that 
is definitionally without function or purpose.  Always the search has been for an 
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additional quality within a work of art that is not present in others. Even art that is 
of poor quality is defined by the absence of some quality perceived within good art 
(Ruccio, Graham et al., 1996: 62). 
 
Curiously less concerning has been that essential idea of the autonomous nature of 
the artist, which defines him or her as independent of all moral and social concerns. 
In its most positive form, it might be called “artistic liberty”; a subject more of 
interest to Schiller than it was to Kant. Friedrich Schiller is credited with expounding 
art as the “domain of the ideal” (Inglis, 2004: 18), specifically in his letters On the 
Aethestic Education of Man: a work he himself claimed drew strongly from Kant’s 
philosophical system (Schiller, 1954 [1795]: 24). Schiller promoted a moral idealism 
that united reason and artistic beauty with individual liberty and the autonomous 
character of the artist, in whom utility “bends a degraded humanity” for “Art is the 
daughter of Freedom, and must receive her commission from the needs of spirits, 
not from the exigency of matter” (1954 [1795]: 26). This liberty allows artists to act 
beyond political, social or moral direction even if those realms of discourse formed 
their creative motivations (Crowther, 1981). Although artists may receive both public 
support and funding, they occupy not democratic social space but “the republic of 
art” where their freedom of expression is as inviolable as religious belief and their 
validity is defined by their own constituents (Diffey, 1969;  H. Osborne, 1981: 4). This 
artistic right relates directly to the concept of l'art pour l'art: “Freedom for the artists; 
order and beauty in his creation, effective at one and the same time” (Egan, 1921: 17), 
or more pithily: “Art is the most intense mode of individualism that the world has 
ever known” (Wilde, 1912: 17); a characteristic Wilde tellingly praised for its value to 
anarchism.  
 
Concluding  Comments 
 
What has been described are ways of separating and categorising aspects of how the 
word “culture” is used in a political context. It is not intended to be definitive and 
can never be complete, but can nevertheless assist in illuminating the tacit and often 
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unconscious logic of cultural policies, statements and actions across government. Sir 
Peter Hall and his Shadow Arts Council had in mind a concept born out of l’art pour 
l’art, but his argument was with those in government who saw in culture the social 
mechanism of “causal-functional integration” found in social anthropology.  They 
were speaking of entirely different things. The historical precedents for these ideas 
are equally valid and, pace Raymond Williams, sometimes ran in parallel, being used 
in different ways even within the same sentence. Indeed, that is precisely the reason 
why the descriptions and categorisations above are necessary. 
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Explicit and Implicit Cultural Policy 
 
Differing aspects of political interests in culture are often overlapping and, when 
brought together for comparison, can appear inchoate. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, this problem arises particularly over definitions of what is cultural. No 
British government had nominal cultural policies until the formation of DCMS. 
Nevertheless, related strands of policy found their way across the centuries before 
finally attaining that label.   
 
These chronological difficulties are managed here in an exercise of retrospective 
reclassification. Following an idea of Jeremy Ahearne, the term “implicit cultural 
policy” is anachronistically applied to all those that lie at the historic roots of DCMS 
policy.  Ahearne suggested a differentiation between "explicit or nominal" and 
"implicit or effective" cultural policies. The former, he argued, "is any cultural policy 
that a government labels as such", whereas the latter  "is any political strategy that 
looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides" (Ahearne, 2004: 
114). A similar approach taken in the same year by Jim McGuigan when arguing that 
"Cultural policy 'proper' is rationalized explicitly, whereas the rationale for cultural 
policy as display  [e.g. as a symbol of status or national identity] is  most likely to be 
implicit instead of explicit" (McGuigan, 2004: 64). David Throsby recognised the 
underlying complexity covered by these simple definitions, but essentially followed 
the same idea, saying: "An explicit cultural policy is one that deals directly with 
culture, whether culture is defined functionally (as the arts) or in a constituent sense 
(as traditions, values and ways of living together)", whereas:  
 
An implicit cultural policy on the other hand is one that influences culture 
only indirectly, the overt intention of the policy being directed elsewhere. 
Almost by definition, implicit cultural policy is not delivered by culture 
ministries but arises as a result of action in other policy areas – it is focused 
on a non-cultural purpose but counts as cultural policy because it has some 
non-trivial cultural effect (Throsby, 2009: 179).  
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Ahearne was actually discussing French cultural policy in the 1950s when he gave his 
definitions but, in a later paper, he too gave them "wider uses" in the analysis of 
aspects of British cultural policy (Ahearne, 2009). By further extending their use to 
embrace the policies of the British government since 1753 the retrospective 
classification of past policy becomes a legitimate methodology for the inclusion of 
policies regardless of their nominal status.  
 
A related problem can be directed at defining the responsibilities of DCMS in the 
enlarged department. It raises the question of which policies were intended to fall 
within a definition of culture and which were not. Does the Department's title imply 
that culture is separate from media and sport or does it include them all within the 
same cultural concept (and more, given that arts, tourism, heritage, crafts, film, and 
the National Lottery were all among its responsibilities)? Chris Smith gave the 
answer unambiguously in A New Cultural Framework in which the conclusions to an 
earlier consultation document, A New Approach to Investment in Culture, were 
published following the department's Comprehensive Spending Review in 1997 
(DCMS, 1997, 1998c). The body of the report opens with the statement: "DCMS is at 
the centre of a complex structure which delivers money and supports activity in a 
range of sectors, all of which fall within the broad definition of 'culture'" (1998: 2), 
later referred to as a "family" of activity" (DCMS, 1999a: 8). Chris Smith's foreword 
offered a rationale for adopting this approach: 
 
 The activities that we sponsor and support as a Department have a 
fundamental impact on the quality of life for all our citizens. They provide 
enjoyment and inspiration. They help to foster individual fulfilment and well-
being. They help to bind us together as a community. They are important for 
the quality of education. They assist with the work of social regeneration. And 
in themselves, and with the allied importance of tourism, they form a crucial 
part of our nation's economy. (1998: 1) 
 
In a less all-encompassing statement, the question of what was included in Smith's 
cultural definition was also addressed briefly but distinctly in his speech to the Royal 
Television Society Biennial Convention in 1997. The department's title "... is not 
meant to convey any contradiction between culture and the media. I certainly regard 
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television as a key element - if not the key element - in our national culture" (C. 
Smith, 1998: 91, original emphasis). 
 
Two examples may help further clarify the question of explicit and implicit cultural 
policy in the context of this thesis. Government interest in the teaching of fine art in 
the 19th century was aimed at improving the design of manufactured products but 
that was not then considered an arts policy. Fine art and product design both still fit 
comfortably into New Labour's cultural policy, justifying its classification as cultural 
for the whole period of this study. A second example concerns the technology for 
wireless telephony. Within a few decades the technology in wires, valves and circuits 
of early radio transceivers led to national broadcasting and the creation of the BBC, 
both of which are now concerns of DCMS - and thereby matters for this thesis.  
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Culture, the Market Economy and Laissez-faire 
 
 
Any review of governmental relations to the arts over the last three centuries has to 
recognise that British society was, and still is, characteristically formed around 
libertarian principles, free markets, forms of laissez-faire, and a capitalist system of 
ownership and finance. While some think this undesirable (McGuigan, for example), 
it is argued here to be the unavoidable context in which cultural policy has 
developed in Britain and in which it has to be understood. 
 
Underlying the history of British cultural policy, implicit and explicit, is Britain’s 
uniquely long social history of free-market capitalism. Alan MacFarlane’s review of 
the historic research on this subject (Macfarlane, 1979) challenges aspects of the 
common orthodoxy of the “Great Transformation” in 17th to 19th century Britain 
(Polanyi, 2001 [1944]); one argued to mark the dramatic and socially transformative 
shift from an agrarian peasant society to one socially and economically constructed 
around capital and markets. In Polanyi's words: "the proposition holds that all 
economic systems known to us up to the end of feudalism in Western Europe were 
organized either on the principle of reciprocity or redistribution, or house holding, 
or some combination of the three" (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 57). Instead, MacFarlane 
contends:  
 
England was as ‘capitalist’ in 1250 as it was in 1550 or 1750. That is to say, there 
was already a developed market, mobility of labor, land was treated as a 
commodity and full private ownership was established, there was very 
considerable geographical and social mobility, a complete distinction 
between farm and family existed, and rational accounting and the profit 
motive were widespread (Macfarlane, 1978: 268).  
 
To differing extents, Marxist and neo-Marxist debates have taken the origins of 
capitalism to be derived from either Malthusian arguments or changes in power 
relations within agrarian economies (Aston and Philpin, 1987;  Brenner, 1976;  Katz, 
1993). These arguments have been contested, though, on the grounds of historical 
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inaccuracies and for an inappropriate selection of trans-European sources (Croot 
and Parker, 1987: 79-90;  Macfarlane, 1978, 1979). In support of this, a recent 
biography of Karl Marx places his work and his theories as more relevant to early 
19th century Britain than to any time earlier or later, which in turn suggests 
Brenner's well-known struggle to construct a trans-historical argument was 
misleading (Sperber, 2013;  Aston and Philpin, 1987;  Brenner, 1976). The point made 
here is that free-trade and mercantilism have a long tradition in Britain that 
preceded, and now succeeds, contesting ideologies.  Unlike in much of continental 
Europe, what we now call the arts and culture were as embroiled in that tradition as 
any other goods. It can be seen, for example, in the development of British theatres 
from the profits of music, dance, opera, drama, music hall and “variety” 1 (Davis, 
2000;  Minihan, 1977). By this view, the creators and the buyers of artistic works have 
been individuals in a free market since at least the 13th Century (Fukuyama, 2011: 230-
33). From libraries to opera, from painting to music hall, they existed less in a world 
of government patronage than one of private business. Even Shakespeare’s theatre 
career was largely commercial and stylistically owed a great deal to those demands. 
Parliament’s earliest debates on Britain’s cultural infrastructure demonstrate this 
point repeatedly, their default position being that theatre and music in all their 
forms were private matters in which government had no business to interfere. This 
norm expresses the universalism of the liberal state in its relationship with the 
individual within civil society which has now become characterised as laissez-faire. 
This idea was to become a significant factor in rationalising cultural policy after 1945 
under the “arm’s-length” principle.  
 
Laissez-faire 
The expression  laissez-faire has contested origins but is generally said have been 
coined in France by the merchant, M. Le Gendre, in response to a question from the 
                                                     
1
 Most London theatres and many through the British regions owe their existence to commercial 
investment. There are presently 51 theatres in London’s West End of which only 4 are subsidised. 
Another 56 theatres can be found around the capital, and a further 28 have been “lost” over the last 
100 years or so (on the latter point, see (MANDER, R. & MITCHENSON, J. 1968. The Lost Theatres of 
London. London, Rupert Hart-Davis.)) 
60 
 
famously dirigiste minister of finance under Louis XIV, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. "Que 
faut-il faire pour vous aider?" he asked, only to receive the blunt response, "laissez-
nous faire" (Franklin, 2012 [1836]: 401;  Handman, Usher et al., 1931: 3;  Kennedy, 
2008-9). Its English form and use appears then to have been imported by George 
Whatley (a friend of Benjamin Franklin), or Jeremy Bentham (Kennedy, 2008: 249) 
in the late 18th century. While the original phrase implied a defence from 
government interference, laissez-faire has ironically come to mean a policy of 
government rather than the absence of one. In any event, it is generally seen as 
integral with the neoliberal economic paradigm; one that proposes "...human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual human entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade" (Harvey, 2005: 2). 
 
For its asserted prioritising of the individual over the state1, laissez-faire has often 
featured as an accusation with critical intent; as a symptom of neo-liberal policy 
extremes.  Within the arts, any market-based policies were, and often still are, seen 
as an attack on artistic integrity, countering the presumed intrinsic value of artistic 
activity as well as its social and community (i.e. public) benefits.  This view is, 
though, essentially contradictory, seeming to argue for the preservation of individual 
artistic autonomy for the benefit of the national community, while suggesting this 
cannot be achieved within an economic paradigm that seeks to minimise state 
interference in favour of the individual. In consequence, laissez-faire has also 
become a phrase that obfuscates the rationales of the cultural policies. In part, this 
arises from a failure to separate individuals acting freely within restrictive structures 
defined by laws, rules or even inducements, and those of unrestrained rational 
maximisers where any interference from the state is perceived as an offense against 
libertarian principles. Laissez-faire can be said to exist in both, but in practice there 
is no option for unrestrained action within a society that operates by virtue of a 
                                                     
1
 Notably, GWF Hegel applied the principle, although not the term, when arguing for the separation 
and roles of civil society (the individual) and the state (the universal). The subject is discussed lucidly 
in AVINERI, S. 1972. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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social contract if the basic rights of citizens are to be maintained equally. Indeed, 
some restrictive measures will inevitably be required just to maintain the principles 
of laissez-faire itself, among them the use of subsidies for selected artistic and 
cultural forms in order to maintain a measure of autonomy for their creators.  
 
John Maynard Keynes' starkly and unambiguously entitled a short book based on his 
1924 Sidney Ball lecture: The End of Laissez Faire (J. M. Keynes, 1926). That title, at 
least, gives some support for Janet Minihan's assertion  that "By the turn of the [19th] 
century, the heyday of laissez-faire economic and social theories had unmistakably 
passed" (Minihan, 1977: 138). There are two particular problems with this: the first is 
that the justification for the claim rather depends on the characteristics thought to 
define laissez-faire, and the second that it can be read to imply that social policy is 
objectively separate from economic policy, so each can be electively pursued 
independently of the other. Both can be contested. Even in its extremes, as in the 
early Physiocrats view that the state was parasitical on society, or in the arguments 
of Friedrich Hayek that integrated the concept with foundational principles of 
liberty and the incompetence of the state as economic governor, laissez-faire was 
never a single, defined concept but an approach to policy that gave guiding 
arguments for presumptions and priorities. More commonly, even its early advocates 
proposed only a general principle that "government should leave things alone unless 
by exception special reasons existed why it should intervene" (Viner, 1960: 56). The 
notion that the "allied and seemingly indomitable intellectual forces ... [of] 
individualistic, anti-statist Benthemite Utilitarians", together with the "rigidly free 
market economics of the Classical School" (Paul, 1980: 1) produced an era 
characterised by laissez-faire was, in J. Bartlet Brebner's words, "conceivably ... a 
myth" (Brebner, 1948: 60). The free market regulated by an "invisible hand" (A. 
Smith, 1991: 399) was always operationally dependent on an arm of state to intervene 
for the maintenance of law, security, currency, the prevention of monopolies, and 
even for the preservation of non-profitable enterprises that are thought to have 
special public value.  
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Jeremy Bentham, an arch proselyte for laissez-faire, insisted that government had a 
duty to intervene in many areas of social and economic life, categorising "agenda" 
and "non-agenda" actions into "classes" (Bentham, 1839 [1789]: 35). Falling into the 
government agenda he argued to be those factors:  
 
... which are conducive either to the increase of the national stock of the 
matter of wealth, or to the application of it in the most efficient mode, to any 
of its three uses, viz subsistence, security [under which he included defence] 
and enjoyment; and which ... are not to be expected to be performed by the 
spontaneous exertions of the individual" [or "sponte acta", as he named them] 
(1839 [1789]: 41).  
 
"[T]he most efficient mode" of the free market, Bentham believed, had to be 
managed to ensure it could function effectively in finding the "natural" and "just" 
price of commodities, which critically included labour. This was to be achieved 
commutatively through the balance of supply and demand; accordingly: "not human 
beings and natural resources only, but also the organisation of capitalistic 
production itself had to be sheltered from the devastating effects of a self-regulating 
market" (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 138). This is not just a reference to social concerns 
though; monopolies, contractual abuses, unstable currency and other market 
distortions have to be managed positively in order for the marketplace to work 
effectively. In Alvin Hansen's words:  
a free market presupposes contracts and the authority of the state to enforce 
these contracts. And contracts cannot be entered into and enforced without 
definitely regulated measuring rods. There must be a legally established 
yardstick, pound, gallon, etc. There must also be a legally established unit of 
value. And ideally a free market presupposes that the unit of value must be 
stabilized just as are the units of measurement (Handman, Usher et al., 1931: 
8). 
 
Keynes's reflections on laissez faire make divisions comparable to those of Bentham, 
separating "technically social" government services from those that were "technically 
individual", justifying the former as those which were not already being fulfilled by 
private individuals but instead "fall outside the sphere of the individual" and are 
made by "no one if the State does not make them" (J. M. Keynes, 1926: 46, original 
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emphasis). This creates what Polanyi called "the double movement" of "two 
organisational principles": one that supports economic liberalism and free, self-
regulating markets, and the other "social protection" aimed at "the conservation of 
man and nature as well as productive organization" (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 138). These 
are not contrary or independent movements but are causally related, articulated, 
arising from the social nature of economics and the need for a healthy, legal, secure, 
structured society in which individual transactions constitute a thriving free market. 
 
Despite the uncompromising title of Keynes small book, he too accepted this double 
movement, albeit differently balanced between social and market forces: "For my 
part, I think Capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for 
attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight... Our problem is to 
work out a social organisation which shall be as efficient as possible without 
offending our notions of a satisfactory way of life" (J. M. Keynes, 1926: 52-53). The 
principles of the right of individual ownership and its disposal that predicate the 
existence of a free market require governments to default to legislative quietism, 
stepping in only to maintain its mechanisms and to offset any offending 
consequences. This is a presumption for laissez-faire which exists now as it has since 
at least the days of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham.  It is also one 
that can be applied to the excesses of social policy as much as economics. In writing 
about the comparatively ungoverned world of labour relations in the 1960s, Edward 
Heath took exactly this view, calling it "collectivist laissez-faire" (Heath, 1998: 327), 
 
As will be argued below, the "double movement" can also be seen in governmental 
treatment of the arts throughout the second half of the 20th century, its two forces 
strengthening and weakening along with broader social change and dominant 
political philosophies. Always, though, was the normative presumption among 
governments (differentiated from the views of individual politicians) that the British 
economy must always operate within global, capitalist, free markets, however the 
effects of those markets might be adjusted and compensated nationally.  The "arm's-
length" relationship of the Arts Council from government was itself an outcome of 
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the principal of free markets and laissez-faire policy. It has been confirmed as 
sacrosanct by every government since the Council's formation in 1945. In opening 
the first debate on "The Needs of the Arts" after the formation of the Arts Council, 
Peter Thomas, MP (Conway), exemplified this by moving: "That this House 
welcomes the increasing interest of the people of Great Britain in the arts; endorses 
the principle that artistic policy should be free from Government control or 
direction..." (HC Hansard, 1959: Col 559).  
 
To avoid directly interfering in the judgements by which financial support for the 
arts are allocated, government has supported legally independent organisations to 
fulfil its policy interests. Oliver Bennett's comment that "...key elements of the 
laissez-faire approach persisted into the twentieth century, and right up until our 
own time" (O. Bennett, 1995: 203), and a page later that "The 'arm's length' principle, 
as it came to be known, persists as a potent symbol of laissez-faire traditions" are 
uncommon perceptions of this structural foundation in a literature dominated by 
socialist idealism.  
 
The grants made to the Arts Council by the government can in themselves be seen as 
one of the compensating mechanisms of laissez-faire. In the Arts Council's Annual 
Report of 1952/3, its Chairman, Sir Ernest Pooley, expressed the view that: "If the arts 
are to survive somebody must pay for them, and if the burden of subsidy, purchase 
or guarantee has become too heavy for the private patron it must be shouldered by 
the public". He then went on to compare the obligation of the taxpayer "to 
contribute to the upkeep of the necessities and amenities of the Welfare State" to the 
need for them also to support the arts (Blaug, 1976: 108). It was a view repeated in 
Parliament a few years later, when Ronald Bell, MP (Buckinghamshire South) 
seconded a motion supporting the "Needs of the Arts":  
 
when the arts depended upon private patronage, this problem did not exist, 
because there was such a multiplicity of patrons, even though some of them 
might be small, that there was no danger of any attempt to control or to 
canalise the artistic expression of a country. Nowadays, when high taxation 
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has almost, though not quite, destroyed private patronage, we have nothing 
with which to replace it without exposing ourselves to the risk of control of 
the arts, which has been such a terrible feature of the first part of the 
twentieth century. (HC Hansard, 1959: col 567)  
 
This argument misses the historic dominance of private enterprise but, with respect 
to the need for government to correct market imbalances, it was later reinforced by 
Lord Goodman in his introduction to the 1966/7 Arts Council Report: "The fiscal 
policies of every government in our memory have contributed to a situation where 
private bounty or investment is now totally inadequate to sustain a civilised ration of 
music and theatre, of poetry and picture" (quoted in Blaug, 1976: 109). His words 
argue with clarity a preference for private patronage of the arts now made impossible 
by the taxes levied to support the Welfare State. In other words "the Arts Council 
exists to give back what the Inland Revenue has taken away" (1976: 109), making arts 
subsidies, by this argument anyway, an unintended consequence of welfare policy 
although not of the Welfare State.  
 
In the inaugural paper for the Social Market Foundation, which rather weakly 
describes itself as "pro-market" as distinct from "free-market", Robert Skildelsky 
discussed the position of the state in a market economy:  
 
... the state is, for practical purposes, a necessary condition for a market 
system. Only the state can guarantee a non-coercive environment for market 
exchange. However, the state is also the greatest danger to the market system. 
Hence the constitutional order must be such as to limit the coercive power of 
the state ... . The market economy thus depends on a general environment of 
freedom, which it reinforces. (Skildelsky, 1989: 10, original emphasis). 
 
Neelands et al, after Nancy Fraser, added to this argument by referring to market 
corrections as "affirmative" actions, differentiated from "transformative" action that 
would require more profound structural change along Marxist lines (Fraser, 1995: 87;  
Neelands, Freakley et al., 2006: 94); an approach more akin to Alan Peacock's 
analysis of the "market failure" argument (A. Peacock, 2000). This kind of "social 
market formation" is concerned more with social justice than either "the centralising 
economics of socialism" or the "free market economics associated with neo-
66 
 
liberalism", but relates more to the particular "species" (Neelands, Freakley et al., 
2006: 95) of social democratic thought associated with the Giddens/Blair working of 
the "3rd Way" concept (Blair, 1998;  Giddens, 1998, 2000).  Alex Callinicos argued 
forcefully that the Blair government was as determined as his conservative 
predecessors to maintain and enlarge internationally the dominance of capitalist 
markets, quoting one of the Third Way's most powerful advocates, Bill Clinton, as 
saying :"I think we have to reaffirm unambiguously that open markets and rules-
based trade are the best engine we know of to lift living standards, reduce 
environmental destruction and build shared prosperity" (Callinicos, 2001: 105).  Open 
markets were then the necessary condition for the innovation, creativity and 
entrepreneurship exhorted by Chris Smith as intrinsic to cultural activity (C. Smith, 
1998;  Leadbeater, 1999). This was exactly Jeremy Bentham's argument for laissez-
faire made 250 years earlier in his letter to Adam Smith entitled Defense of Usury in 
which he defended the principles of self-determination and the rights of "projectors" 
not to be restricted by the interventions of the state. Bentham's "projectors" were "all 
such persons as, in the pursuit of wealth, strike out in any new channel, and more 
especially into any channel of invention (Bentham, 1839 [1787]: 20-21). In New 
Labour's terms, these are the people with the ability "to innovate, to think anew, to 
be creative" (Blair, 2007), and were highly prized by the New Labour government as 
the source of economic growth. It was this connection that Chris Smith used to 
construct a cultural policy for economic effect. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Historical Context 
 
 
1753-1939: The Origins of Cultural Policy 
 
 
A study of the history of governmental relations with culture, implicit and explicit, 
reveals the origins of institutions, traditions and attitudes that have endured. At the 
same time, it exposes clearly the shifting ground between the public and private 
spheres and, thereby, what are perceived as falling within the responsibilities of 
government. New Labour's policies cannot be fully explained without recognising the 
norms developed and demonstrated by this history. 
 
The discussion that follows is in two parts. In the period from 1753 to 1939 
governments moved from almost complete disinterest in cultural matters, creating 
practices and institutions that then continued through the centuries. Action was, 
though, ad hoc; formed in response to specific concerns. After 1939 a consistent and 
developing policy for the arts was established with the formation of CEMA and then 
the Arts Council of Great Britain.  The New Labour government inherited 
responsibility for all the resulting institutions, supportive structures, and normative 
viewpoints. Some were then rejected, others sustained, while many were reformed for 
different purposes. 
 
Arts, “manufactures”, and the ideal citizen 
 
Before 1753 Parliament had almost no interest in cultural matters. Artistic works were 
principally commissioned by private individuals, the church or the monarch. The 
concept of national cultural institutions open for public benefit at the cost of the tax 
payer was unknown.  The significant policy precedent that set a path that future 
governments were (eventually) to follow resulted in cultural structures that have since 
endured. It arose from the Last Will and Testament of Sir Hans Sloane, written in 1739 
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and effective on his death on January 11th 1753. In it he asked that his vast collection of 
objects be offered to “the King for the nation” for the sum of £20,000. According to 
Edmund Howard, Sloane’s “gardener and general factotum”, it was said to contain 
40,000 books, 50,000 volumes in folio, 32,000 shells, 2,275 metals and mineral ores, 
and thousands of other miscellaneous items (E. Miller, 1973: 39-40;  Home 
Department, 1928: 12). George II’s response, given on his behalf by the Earl of 
Macclesfield (later to become President of the Royal Society) to Sloane’s dutiful 
trustees was to the point: “he [the King] doubted if there was money sufficient in the 
Exchequer” (E. Miller, 1973: 43). Undeterred, a petition was then made to Parliament 
on March 6th 1753 (HC Journals, 1753: 647). Despite Henry Pelham’s1 dismissive 
comment that “there was little money available to spend on such ‘knick knackeries’”, 
the ensuing debates inside and outside the “parsimonious House” (E. Miller, 1973: 43, 
45) ended with the purchase of the collection, and with it the amalgamation of several 
great but neglected libraries2. Altogether they came to form the British Museum and 
the British Library. The committee appointed by the House of Commons to decide the 
matter had resolved: “That the museum of Sir Hans Sloane, by him bequeathed to the 
publick, is of much greater intrinsick value than the sum of twenty thousand pounds 
by him required to be paid for the same” (HC Journals, 1753: 747). The implication that 
the decision rested not on a broader concern for social, intellectual or cultural benefit 
but on its low price - on a good deal - reinforces the impression of, at best, reluctance 
on the part of Parliament to award financial support for any purpose that could not be 
reasoned commercially. Even so, the money eventually came not from the Treasury 
but from a national lottery formed for the purpose and which raised £95,194-8s-2d to 
buy both the collection and Montague House. That figure was well below the £300,000 
actually raised as a result of a fraud by the organiser, Peter Leherpe (Ashton, 1893: 69-
70).  
 
                                                     
1 Then Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
2
 Principally the libraries of Sir Robert Cotton, Edward Harley and the Royal Libraries (MILLER, E. 
1973. The Noble Cabinet: A History of the British Museum. London, Andre Deutsch. pp 28-36) and 
HOME DEPARTMENT 1928. Royal Commission on National Museums & Galleries, Interim Report. 
Cmd 3192 HMSO p 11. See also MARTIN, P. 2008. Samuel Johnson: A Biography. London, Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson. p185. 
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Sixty three years later, the debate over the acquisition of the “Elgin Marbles” 
contained more considered and complex arguments, but the underlying rationales 
had hardly changed.  The speech by the writer and politician, John Wilson Croker, 
then Conservative MP for Downpatrick and in the middle of an illustrious career, 
gave a concise summary of arguments: 
 
It was singular that when 2,500 years ago, Pericles was adorning Athens with 
those very works, some of which we are now about to acquire, the same cry of 
economy was raised against him, and the same answer that he then gave 
might be repeated now, that it was money spent for the use of the people, for 
the encouragement of arts, the increase of manufactures, the prosperity of 
trades, and the encouragement of industry; not merely to please the eye of 
the man of taste, but to create, to stimulate, to guide the exertions of the 
artist, the mechanic, and even the labourer, and to spread through all the 
branches of society a spirit of improvement, and the means of a sober and 
industrious affluence (HC Hansard, 1816: cols 1019-1040). 
 
All three of the rationales posited for political interventions into cultural concerns 
can be found in that speech, even an intimation of l’art pour l’art that was only to 
grow in importance in the latter part of the century. Significantly, though, the 
differences appear elided, such that each element was just a part of a single, if 
somewhat meandering argument that embraced art and artists, economics, 
manufacturing, education, international glory, and what we might now call 
entrepreneurship.   
 
Much the same reluctance was evident in appeals for a national public art gallery.  
More than fifty years passed from John Wilkes’ demands that Sir Robert Walpole’s 
art collection be purchased for the nation as the founding collection for a national 
gallery before Parliament finally agreed, in 1824, to allocate £60,000 for the purchase 
and display of the pictures of the late John Julius Angerstein. Even then, this was 
initially to be a responsibility of the British Museum rather than of an independent 
organisation. As the MP for Middlesex, Joseph Hume, expressed it, the vote rescued 
the country “from a disgrace which the want of such an establishment had long 
entailed upon it” (quoted in Minihan, 1977: ref 19-25). Comparison with the galleries 
of continental neighbours and notions of the civilizing effect of the classical arts had 
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also been part of the debates on both the British Museum and the National Gallery, 
even if they were not registered so strongly in Parliament’s final decisions. Croker’s 
speech in the House in 1824, for example, argued the “works of art were especially 
calculated to civilize and humanize the public at large” (HC Hansard, 1824: col 1474). 
Minihan summed up the point succinctly: “In an age that relished cock fighting, bear 
baiting, and public executions, the arts stood for manners, grace, refinement and 
humaneness – in short, for civilization” (Minihan, 1977: 26). In their ancient classic 
petrified beauty, the Elgin Marbles epitomised a patrician ideal of civilisation.  
 
Nevertheless, the perceived benefits to manufacturing remained the dominating 
rationale.  Hansard (still then using secondary sources) reported the speech by 
Angar Ellis 1 :  
He trusted that the present would form a new era in the history of the arts in 
this country, and that the advantage which was now given to our own school 
of painting, by placing before it first-rate models, would tend to advance its 
character and renown. If there were any gentlemen in that House who 
disapproved of the expense to which these pictures were putting the country, 
he would ask them, whether they might not be productive of emolument to 
the nation, even in a pecuniary point of view?...” (HC Hansard, 1825: cols 96-
146). 
 
Following this logic, “Arts and Manufactures” became a common expression across 
Government, one that served to summarise the breadth of trade and manufacturing 
businesses across the nation. It was not surprising, therefore, that this was the name 
given to the 1835 and 1836 Select Committees reporting on “the Arts and their 
Connexion with Manufactures”. Its purpose was: 
 
... to inquire into the best means of extending a knowledge of the Arts and of 
the Principles of Design among the People (especially the manufacturing 
Population) of the Country; and also to inquire into the constitution, 
management and effects of the Institutions connected with the Arts” (Arts 
Select Committee, 1836: iii). 
 
                                                     
1 An elected Fellow of both the Society of Antiquarians and of the Royal Society who, at the time, was 
the MP for Seaford. 
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The Committee's final report argued strongly for government support for the fine 
arts for all the reasons given, but the central rationale of improving the quality of 
manufactured products was still dominant: 
 
“Yet, to us, a peculiarly manufacturing nation, the connexion between art and 
manufactures is most important; - and for this merely economical reason 
(were there no higher motive), it equally imports to encourage art in its loftier 
attributes; since it is admitted that the cultivation of the more exalted 
branches of design tends to advance the humblest pursuits of industry, while 
the connexion of art with manufacture has often developed the genius of the 
greatest masters in design” (Arts Select Committee, 1836: iii). 
 
As the purpose of the Select Committee itself attests, the arguments that now ran 
freely between the arts as an important part of commerce and education, whilst 
being also cultivating and civilising, are posited as essentially interrelated. The 
potential benefits were to be seen, it was argued, in international comparisons:  
 
It appears that the great advantage which foreign manufacturing-artists 
possess over those of Great Britain consists in the greater extension of art 
throughout the mass of society abroad (1836: iv). 
 
The committee noted in particular the advantages of the French and Prussians, 
comparing public accessibility to art works and, in some detail, their systems of art 
education. Moral concerns were not expressed in the conclusions to final report but 
occasionally featured in the evidence. George Foggo1 made a point touched on by 
several others: “I am also strongly impressed with the notion that they [the fine arts] 
should tend to a general improvement of the morals of the people as well as of their 
intellect” (1836: Pt 1, 56-57).  
 
Theatre, Music, and Literature 
 
This admixture of motivations for the encouragement of artistic experience and 
practice still had no place for the performing arts. As a comparison, while the French 
National Theatre had its origins in the formation of the Comédie-Française in 1680 
                                                     
1 George Foggo (1793-1869), a painter of historical scenes and events, with a particular interest in art 
education. 
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by a decree of Louis XIV, and the Deutsche Nationaltheater can trace its history back 
to 15th century Weimar, Britain only formed a “national” company in 1963. 
Parliaments throughout the nineteenth century principally considered only fine art 
skills which could contribute to “manufactures” as justifications for financial 
support. Even though the intrinsic aesthetic and artistic qualities of sculpture, 
painting, drawing and design were voiced, usually in service to education and moral 
improvement, the theatre arts were rarely a part of political considerations outside 
censorship and copyright. Indeed, to a significant degree they were perceived as the 
antithesis of fine art; corrupting and degenerate. In a debate on marriage, Lord 
Auckland expressed his views on those great and historic French and German 
theatrical traditions:  
 
It had long been the object of French writers, as it is at this day the object of 
German Theatre, to give fascinating portraits of adultery, in order to corrupt 
the institution of marriage; to confound all consanguinity, ranks, and 
descents [sic]; and to destroy that respect for parents which is essential to 
good education” (HL Debates, 1800: col 617).  
 
This viewpoint was less in evidence during the debates on the Theatres’ Regulation 
Bill of 1843, short though they were. Although moral standards and public behaviour 
were important and related issues, the quality of theatrical works was the focus of 
concern.  Sir James Graham expressed the view:  
 
... that the bill was brought forward with the intention to improve the 
dramatic art. He believed, that the best course that could be pursued was to 
place the power of making regulations for the drama in the hands of one 
responsible person, and to afford opportunities for having dramatic 
performances of a respectable character (HC Hansard, 1843: col 232). 
 
The Lords amendment to the Bill gave powers to the Lord Chamberlain whenever “it 
was necessary for the promotion of good manners and decorum, or the public peace, 
to forbid the performance of any stage play, farce, etc.” (HL Hansard, 1843: col 690). 
It formed a legal foundation for a flow of legislation affecting the performing arts, 
from theatre toilet provision to the censorship of scripts (Davis, 2000). 
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Parliament also offered no direct support for music composition or performance. 
Aside from its inclusion in copyright acts, music performances and publishing relied 
on commercial impresarios and theatre managers for its presentation until the 
second half of the 20th century.  There was some justification for this as music and 
theatre performances were often profitable. It has already been mentioned that the 
great majority of London’s theatres, and many in regional towns and cities, were 
mostly built in the 19th and early 20th centuries to meet commercial demand. Even 
the presentation of what we now refer to as classical music was once largely 
profitable. For example, the oldest music festival in England, the Birmingham 
Triennial, was founded in 1768 to raise money for the new General Hospital, and 
continued to do so successfully for many years, commissioning works from Sullivan, 
Bruch, Gounod, Dvorak, Mendelssohn, Elgar, and others, in the process (Elliott, 
2000).  Even in the present day, the majority of music performances do not have, nor 
require, public financial support. 
 
Literary arts were generally in much the same position. Just as today, a few writers 
became wealthy from their work; for most it was either a secondary occupation or 
penury. In a novel that catches the circumstances of the time, George Gissing 
described London’s literary society at the end of the nineteenth century as struggling 
between artistic integrity and the commercial marketplace (Gissing, 1968 [1891]). As 
with fine art, Government was only concerned for how objects could be used in the 
pursuit of their policy objectives. Writers, like artists, were not individually 
supported but their work was, selectively, perceived as valuable to the civilising 
mission and to manufacturing design; as for fine art in galleries and museums, so for 
books in libraries.  The development of a policy for public libraries fits into this logic. 
The background to the creation of public libraries lies in the 1834 Select Committee 
inquiring into: 
 
 ...the extent, causes and consequences  of the prevailing vice of Intoxication 
among the labouring classes of the United Kingdom, in order to ascertain 
whether any legislative measures can be devised t0 prevent the further spread 
of so great a national evil (Select Committee, 1834).  
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Among its twenty three remedies was one that proposed: 
 
The establishment...of district and parish libraries, museums and reading 
rooms, accessible at the lowest rate of charge; so as to admit of one or the 
other being visited in any weather, and at any time; with the rigid exclusion of 
all Intoxicating Drinks of every kind from all such places, whether in the open 
air or closed (1834: 322).  
 
This was related to another of the Committee’s proposals for “A National System of 
Education” which might instruct “all ranks and classes of the people” as to the 
“poisonous and invariably deleterious nature of ardent spirits” that destroy or 
obscures: 
 
 that faculty of reasoning, and that consciousness of responsibility, which 
chiefly distinguish Man from the Brute, and which his Almighty Maker, when 
He created him in his own image, implanted in the human race to cultivate, 
to improve, and to refine - and not to corrupt, to brutalize and to destroy 
(1834: 323).  
 
The religious underpinnings of moral responsibility are specific and precise. The 
appeal made to Parliament was to a responsibility that transcended the economic 
philosophy of laissez-faire or even prudent financial parsimony, providing it with the 
power (and the excuse) of agency to fulfil God’s will as much as to resolve a serious 
civic problem. Indeed, not to do so would be an affront to the “Almighty Maker”, and 
if that required the cultivation of Man then the appropriate mechanisms must be 
provided. 
 
The 1834 Select Committee report led eventually to the Public Libraries Act of 1850. 
The groundwork for this was laid by another Select Committee, in 1849, formed to 
propose “the best Means of extending the Establishment of Libraries freely open to 
the Public, especially in Large Towns, in Great Britain and Ireland.” (Select 
Committee, 1849). The Act, which also replaced the Museums Act of 1845, provided a 
mechanism for financing the future development of libraries and museums. In 
boroughs with populations of 10,000 or more local authorities were given the right to 
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increase the local rates by a maximum of ½d in the pound specifically and solely for 
these purposes. In doing so it institutionalised the arguments of the many apostles 
of, and proselytes for, libraries, assuring their future place in British cultural and 
social life. Libraries had become public goods with their value only partially 
measured by their contents. 
 
Despite the dominance of commercial arguments for interventions into matters of 
fine art, museums and libraries, the concerns of parliamentarians were far wider. It is 
possible to argue that public goods, including art works, were already privately 
supplied within the marketplace and Government had no need nor, according to the 
prevalent philosophy of laissez-faire, then the “philosophy of the natural order” 
(Usher, 1931), any right to interfere in those markets. But this was more than just 
economic policy; it followed the normative principles of “individualism” and “natural 
liberty” and what Isaiah Berlin later termed “negative liberty” (Berlin, 1969). On the 
other hand, war, revolutions and public unrest across Europe, pressure from 
Chartism and the uncertainties of what might result from the outcomes of the 
Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 gave a particular urgency to the progress of civil 
reform.  The complex interrelations between the promotion of trade, education, art, 
and societal restructuring brought cultural and social matters into public and 
Parliamentary focus.  The choice between “Culture and Anarchy” posed by Matthew 
Arnold could be settled, it was argued, though education and the arts (Arnold, 1932). 
A conflation of arguments resulted; those that promoted manufacturing 
competitiveness with those that might aid the cultivation of moral standards and 
artistic sensibilities, thereby forming an educated and civilised citizenship.  
 
Institutionalising Policy 
 
In the year that Barry’s and Pugin’s new Palace of Westminster opened for business, 
Queen Victoria’s “most Gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament” contained a 
paragraph of seminal importance to the British Government’s interest in cultural 
matters:  
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The advancement of the Fine Arts and of Practical Science will be readily 
recognized by you as worthy of the Attention of a great and enlightened 
Nation. I have directed that a comprehensive Scheme shall be laid before you, 
having in view the Promotion of these Objects, towards which I invite your 
Aid and Co-operation (HL Hansard, 1852: col 19). 
 
Lest this should sound very much like support for “the Fine Arts” for their own sake, 
in Seconding Lord Lovain’s reply to the Gracious Speech, E C Egerton explained:  
 
Her Majesty calls the attention of the House to the question of extending 
education by the advancement of the fine arts and of practical science. Sir, it 
has long been matter of experience, which was fully confirmed by the late 
Great Exhibition, that, unbounded as is the energy of our manufacturers, and 
unrivalled as are the productions of our artisans in many cases, yet that in 
some branches of art, which require mechanical skill and taste, they have 
been excelled by the artisans of foreign countries, where greater facilities are 
given for instruction in the more scientific branches of trade. It is to remedy 
that, to put the Englishman on the same footing with the foreigner, and to 
give a more enlightened instruction with respect to some branches of trade, 
that Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to put this paragraph in the 
Speech (HC Hansard, 1852: cols 67-68).  
 
Nevertheless, the inclusion in the Queens speech was significant. Up to this time 
Government support for cultural activities and institutions had been largely ad hoc, 
in the form of legislative and financial facilitation for external organisations rather 
than seeking the direct involvement of Government. This was now to change. As has 
been noted, Parliamentary debates and the reports of Select Committees and Royal 
Commissions had noted the potentially self-improving nature of artistic objects, 
particularly those of classical antiquity, but these were never the dominant 
arguments nor the decisive factors in achieving Parliamentary support. Always 
present was a requirement for the training of artists “calculated to make their 
acquirements useful to the manufactures of the town” (Office of Government 
Schools of Design, 1851: 23), responding to what became the primary object of the 
succeeding Department of Practical Art: “General Elementary Instruction in Art, as a 
branch of national education among all classes of the community, with the view of 
77 
 
laying the foundation for correct judgement, both in the consumer and producer 
manufactures” (Dept of Practical Art, 1853: 2). 
 
The pace of progress along this path was largely forced by Sir Henry Cole with the 
powerful support of Albert, the Prince Consort. Cole’s predominant interest was in 
art education, while the Prince’s wider vision also encompassed the sciences. 
Between them they enlarged the 1847 and 1849 industrial exhibitions at the Royal 
Society of Arts into the Great Exhibition of 1851. In formal terms, it was overseen by a 
Royal Commission (appointed in January 1849), of which both were commissioners, 
that was charged to take forward the work of the Royal Society of Art’s work for the 
“great benefit of Arts, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce” (Commissioners 
for the Exhibition, 1851: viii). Although a national exhibition on the international 
stage, the Board of Trade was determined that “no public money would be called for” 
(HC Hansard, 1850: col 780), a view confirmed by the Prime Minister, Lord John 
Russell1, “that it had never been in contemplation to ask for any grant [from the 
Government] for the purpose of the exhibition” but that it would rely on 
subscriptions and entrance charges “to pay the expenses” (HC Hansard, 1850: col 
782). The Commissioners did a good job as the six million entrance tickets bought 
over the period of the exhibition (1st May to 15th October 1851) produced a surplus 
over expenditure of £168,000.  
 
Seen in retrospect, the Great Exhibition was also a force for extending the ambit of 
self-help and self-cultivation beyond concerns for manufacturing into a wider 
interest for the work of intellectuals. Henry Cole and Prince Albert were powerful 
agents in that process, building institutions and promoting values that established a 
path that progressively widened and strengthened. It was, though, the profits from 
the Great Exhibition, rather than any change in Parliament’s view, that enabled this 
policy to be furthered in the form of a new Government department with its public 
face in the new museums at South Kensington. 
                                                     
1
 “Lord” was a courtesy title. As the younger son of the 6
th
 Duke of Bedford, The Right Honourable 
The Earl Russell was not a peer so entitled to sit in the House of Commons. 
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That “comprehensive scheme” referred to in the Queens Speech, entailed the 
formation of the first government department to carry the word “Art” in its title: the 
Department of Science and Art. Due mostly to the tireless efforts of Henry Cole, it 
began life in 1853 as a subdivision of the Board of Trade where there was already a 
department concerned with technology and design. Three years later it moved to the 
Education Department where it was given considerable autonomy. The availability 
of profits from the Great Exhibition made possible an equally great ambition for its 
work. The Exhibition Commissioners “... were of opinion that the best mode of 
applying the means at our disposal [i.e. those profits] would be by furthering the 
general objects of the Exhibition those objects having been the advancement of 
human industry, and the promotion of kindly international feelings”, and that any 
scheme “ought to be one which in its general character might serve to increase the 
means of Industrial Education, and extend the influence of Science and Art upon 
Productive Industry” (Commissioners for the Exhibition, 1852: 9). The 
Commissioners argued for new and extended museum facilities, pointing to a site 
“very nearly opposite the site of the Exhibition Building, [that] is best known by the 
name of the ‘Gore House Estate.’" (1852: 36). Essential support for an additional 
£150,000 was given by Disraeli’s administration for locating the Science & Art 
Department and its collections to the new Kensington site. Cole’s creation, the 
Museum of Manufactures, was eventually to become the Victoria and Albert 
Museum, sitting alongside what are now the Natural History Museum and the 
Science Museum. The route from a privately funded venture to a public facility 
defined an important institutional development in Britain. 
 
To a significant degree, the interests of Government in culture had now become 
institutionalised into the Department of Science and Art. It was responsible for 
funding an increasing number of national organisations and, through that 
mechanism, had a measure of control over a form of national cultural policy. As an 
institution, its work also became less dependent on its formative agents, but forged a 
developmental path of its own that was to sustain for a remarkably long time, almost 
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unchanging under Whig, Liberal and Conservative governments for the remainder of 
Victoria’s reign. Appropriation Accounts for the period show the department’s work 
as divisible into: 
 
(i) the construction and care of buildings (for example, the British Museum, 
the Natural History Museum, and the various National Galleries in 
England, Scotland and Ireland) and national monuments (those of 
Wellington, Palmerston, Gladstone, and Salisbury among them);  
(ii) support for the activities and acquisitions for those institutions, and 
providing support for “Learned Societies”;  
(iii) grants for individual events and international exhibitions. As part of the 
Education Department it also had a continuing concern for fine arts 
training and arts education more generally.  
In an example of evolutionary institutional momentum, the department appeared to 
be oblivious to the artistic agonism of the period, in which artistic ideologies 
contested social and political thought as much as the value of the art works they 
produced. One thinks of the contrasting characteristics of the Arts and Crafts 
movement and impressionism, or how Pre-Raphaelite romanticism ran abrasively 
alongside neo-classicism and modernism. Whistler’s famous legal suit against Ruskin 
is evidence for exactly these profound conceptual differences1. The religious and 
moral values that formed the substantive certainties of human life were similarly 
being dislodged by profound intellectual works, most notably those of Charles 
Darwin, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. But the Department of Science and Art 
remained unmoved, hardly changing in its responsibilities throughout the century. 
By 1870 it had awarded general support to five other legally independent cultural 
institutions: the British Museum, the National Galleries of England and Ireland, the 
                                                     
1
 Criticising Whistler’s Nocturne in Black and Gold: The Falling Rocket in 1877, Ruskin wrote that "I 
have seen and heard much of Cockney impudence before now but never expected to hear a coxcomb 
ask two hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public's face."  Whistler sued and won 
damages of one farthing – then the smallest coin of the realm. 
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National Portrait Gallery, and five Learned Societies – all of them Royal Societies 1 . 
By the end of the century, thirty years later, only the National Gallery of Scotland 
and the Wallace Gallery had been added to the list, although the Learned Societies, 
now renamed in Appropriation Accounts as “Scientific Investigations, &. (United 
Kingdom)”, had grown to include seven more organisations 2.  
 
The Pressure for Policy 
In her history of Government and the arts in the UK, Minihan introduced the 
“changing perspectives” of the new century, the 20th century, with the assertion that 
“the heyday of laissez-faire economic and social theories had unmistakably passed” 
(Minihan, 1977: 138). Perhaps; but as far as the arts and culture are concerned the 
case for this was more in evident in “theories” and public debate than it was in 
government policy. Nevertheless, it is incontestable that there was a growing 
concern for the consequences of industrialisation. The irresistible logic for an ever-
widening franchise had energised social policy and its accompanying legislation; the 
introduction of national insurance, old age pensions, a growing concern for the 
health and well-being of the working population – and other foundations for a new 
“welfare state”. Pressure came too from the nature of the new electorate; a growing 
urban proletariat that found a voice through unionism and what was to become the 
Labour Party. The development of cultural policy in this context has been described 
as a “a component” of the welfare state (Zimmer and Toepler, 1999: 34) and that it 
“parallels” its development (O. Bennett, 1995: 203), but the limited extent to which 
there was an increase in governmental intervention in cultural matters makes 
uncertain any connections with welfare state rationales and, as will be discussed in 
the next chapter, even less with the logic of laissez-faire.  
 
                                                     
1
 The Royal Society, Meteorological Committee of the Royal Society, the Royal Geographic Society, the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh, and the Royal Academy of Music. 
2 Royal College of Music, Marine Biological Association, Edinburgh Observatory, Scottish 
Meteorological Society, Royal Irish Academy, Royal Irish Academy of Music and the Royal Zoological 
Society of Ireland 
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Voices urging the state to instigate cultural development were certainly heard 
increasingly in Parliament, but the old arguments and institutions persisted. The 
Department of Science and Art became fully integrated in the Board of Education in 
1899, reaffirming their function as essentially educational, yet its work continued 
much as before; funding a select group of national institutions and organisations in 
the sciences and the arts.  Nevertheless, pleas for financial support for the creation of 
a national theatre in some form finally made it to a Motion in the House of 
Commons in 1913. Moved by Sir Halford John Mackinder, an English academic (a 
geographer) he begged: “That, in the opinion of this house, there should be 
established in London a National Theatre, to be vested in trustees and assisted by 
the State, for the performance of the plays of Shakespeare and other dramas of 
recognised merit” (HC Hansard, 1913: 453;  Minihan, 1977: 142-8). The debate was 
particularly interesting, firstly because it ranged around reasons to support the 
performing arts and literature rather than just museums and galleries, and secondly, 
it was a rare airing of arguments for Government intervention into a specific area of 
activity that would have been rejected out of hand not many years earlier (albeit that 
the lobby for a national theatre had been longstanding). Mackinder summed up his 
arguments in this way:  
 
In conclusion, I believe that a small Grant made by the State would have the 
effect, in not a long term of years, of stimulating the drama throughout the 
country by, in the first place, cultivating the public, in the second place, 
training actors, and in the third place, holding up a high standard. I believe 
that these are functions in which the State may legitimately take the lead, and 
with that object I have brought forward the Motion which I now beg to move 
(1913: 465-6).  
 
Among the more cogent opposing arguments was one from Ellis Ellis-Griffith (later 
to be knighted, and then MP for Anglesey), who made his own summary of the 
proposition: 
 
As I understand it, the position put by those who support the Resolution is 
that the State recognition and endowment of the drama is justified in the 
same sense as the State recognition and endowment of music, painting, and 
sculpture in the universities and in other institutions of a similar character. 
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[...] As I understand it, the national theatre is to produce plays to which, if 
they were produced by private enterprise, no one would go (1913: 481). 
 
The house was quite well attended. 128 voted - 96 Ayes and 32 Noes but, through a 
technicality (in the Speaker’s words: “because it was not supported by the majority 
prescribed by Standing Order 27" 1), the debate stood adjourned; in effect lost 
through lack of Parliamentary time.  Arguments for social, intellectual or economic 
benefit of a national theatre company were few, although, by implication at least, 
there was a concern for international prowess judging from the many examples given 
of national theatres in other European countries. Most thought the whole 
proposition too expensive for the government and could be provided privately. 
Arguments in support of learning, moral improvement and personal advancement 
were all but absent.  
 
Two points of particular interest can be found in the debate. The first is the use of 
the word “culture” in a phrase used by Ellis-Griffith: “people of culture” (HC 
Hansard, 1913: 482), clearly meaning people of education with an understanding and 
appreciation of artistic works. This use of the word was still quite rare (although 
note Disraeli’s use quoted earlier). On the few occasions it had been used, it 
generally referred to culture as cultivation; the process of personal improvement and 
specifically to the part that fine art could play in that process, as in Mackinder's 
words "cultivating the public". Ellis-Griffiths, though, was referring to an already 
cultivated person; someone deserving of fine things to meet the level of their hard-
won sophistication. This accorded with the personal, rather than civic argument; one 
less concerned with the development of the British citizen, even though that was 
still given as a rationale for funding museums and galleries. The second point 
concerns a view expressed by Arthur Ponsonby, MP and Private Secretary to Queen 
Victoria:  
 
                                                     
1
 SO 27 stated that “Questions for the closure of debate or selection of amendments under standing 
order ‘Closure of Debate’ shall be decided in the affirmative, if, when a division be taken, it appears by 
the numbers declared form the chair, that not less than 0ne hundred members voted in the majority 
in support of the motion”: PARLIAMENTARY PAPER 23rd July 1912. HC 276 . 
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The day is passed, I think, when the arts are merely looked upon as trivial and 
frivolous adjuncts of our ordinary life. The arts have come to be part and 
parcel of our lives, and nobody's education is complete without the arts. It is 
time in this country that we should have a Minister of Fine Arts who should 
be responsible for pictorial art, for music, and for the drama (HC Hansard, 
1913: 491). 
 
This is the first reference in Parliament to the prospect of a “Minister of Fine Arts”. It 
was, in fact, only in 1964 when Jennie Lee was appointed Minister for Arts (but 
without the “Fine”) in Harold Wilson’s Labour Government that the arts had 
ministerial, although not Cabinet, representation.  
 
The debates around the national theatre confirmed the long-standing view of 
Parliament that theatre was essentially a private sector concern. Even where it had 
some interest to contribute financially, it still expected the private sector would 
contribute a large proportion of the costs. The development of the Old Vic 
(originally the Royal Victoria Coffee Music Hall), was a case in point. Emma Cons 
founded the enterprise in the 1880s as “decent amusement for the Lambeth poor”; 
“an outgrowth of her work for housing and temperance reform” (Minihan, 1977: 150). 
Its programmes initially featured “decorous family entertainment” (1977: 151) but 
over decades moved increasingly to include opera and then serious drama. It was 
quite a successful enterprise although, because of its very low ticket prices, it still 
needed the support from philanthropists including, by the 1920s, the City Parochial 
Foundation. In a debate in the House of Commons in 1929, John Scurr, Labour 
member for London’s Mile End, made a plea for support for the Old Vic with this 
argument:  
 
Everyone knows the remarkable work which has been done by the Old Vic, 
and while we may argue with one another about the merits or demerits of a 
municipal theatre, it is a custom in this country to proceed, in matters like 
this, by voluntary methods at the beginning. These methods continue until 
the time comes when it is impossible to raise the necessary means, and when 
the thing is valuable the community has to step in and take control (HC 
Hansard, 1929: 1150). 
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Reluctance to subsidise the theatre arts revolved around their history as private 
ventures countered by perceptions of their potential for social amelioration. Even 
the educational rationales behind support for galleries and museums were tempered 
by the preference of government not to get involved. A Royal Commission 
examining the role and needs of museums and galleries in 1929 noted the alternative 
“continental systems” of managing museum and galleries, by which they meant 
centralised and direct governmental administrations, and advised: “Such a system is 
alien to the traditions under which our National Institutions have developed. 
Examined as separate entities, each Institution has abundantly justified its existence 
and been well served by its governing authority and by its expert advisers” (Home 
Department, 1929: 69). This reinforced a point made earlier in the report, accepting 
that:  
 
The Treasury is, in the majority of cases, the only Department with which the 
authorities of the Institutions have direct relations, and it is certainly not the 
function of the Treasury to play the part of a benevolent or solicitous parent 
(1929: 11). 
 
Parliament's preference for the arts to remain private matters became increasingly 
difficult to maintain in the face of the 20th century's  technical, commercial and 
artistic developments. The advent of a radio, the growth of the film industry, and the 
creation of the BBC were among the challenges to rationales that separated the 
public and private realms. Government responded quite differently to each but in 
doing so still demonstrated characteristics consistent with resp0nses since the 
petition to Parliament by Hans Sloane’s trustees more than a century and a half 
earlier. 
 
Film and Broadcasting 
British film production was initially quite successful even by comparison with its 
principle competitors in the USA and France. By 1910, British films were popular in 
the USA, taking 15% of the market (Select Committee on Communications, 2010: 11) 
and constituted 50-60% of all films shown across in Europe (Bakker, 2000: 29). But 
just four years later this had dropped dramatically such that, even in the UK, British 
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films represented something closer to 5% of the market (Bakker, 2008: 188). 
According to the Labour MP Glenvil Hall, the British film industry was then 
“practically dead” “at the end of the last war [WW1]" (HC Hansard, 1942: 699;  also 
quoted in Minihan, 1977: 198).  
 
Contrasting governments' attitudes and actions between Britain, France, and the 
USA is telling. America promoted its new industry strongly, appointing a trade 
commission in Europe and collecting data on competition through forty-four of its 
foreign offices and three hundred consulates. Import tariffs were imposed and, in 
1926, Congress voted $15,000 to support the industry through the Department of 
Commerce. France, like Britain, had little money to support industry after WW1 but, 
instead, imposed import tariffs and quotas on foreign-made films from 1921 in the 
proportion of one French film for every seven made elsewhere (Ulff-Moller, 1998). 
Britain finally imposed initially a 5% quota, later rising to 25% (Bakker, 2008: 245), 
but not until the Cinematograph Films Act of 1927, by which time the vertically-
structured American film industry dominated the market in making, distributing 
and showing their products. In short, British governments were comparatively slow 
to act. Despite this, the quota system was quite successful in ensuring the British 
made “Quota Quickies” (Bakker, 2008: 245); that is to say films cheaply and quickly 
made to play alongside major, usually Hollywood made films, kept the industry alive 
and helped develop a considerable technical expertise. In retrospect, many now 
judge that the system did also produce some good films (Chibnall and MacFarlane, 
2007).   
 
The initial approach of Parliament was to see film not as a new industry but as an 
extension of live theatre and subject to the same system of censorship to be applied 
by the judgement of the Lord Chancellor.  A joint Select Committee (of both 
Houses) in 1909 reviewed the censorship of stage plays. In giving evidence to the 
committee, the influential actor-manager and playwright, Granville-Barker, 
described his thinking: 
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... I may point out to the Committee, if they will allow me, the case which is 
now arising of the performances at what are known as cinematograph 
theatres. Very soon, if it does not take place already, it will be possible to have 
a play performed by the action being shown on the cinematograph and the 
dialogue being given by a gramophone. Whether or not that will be a 
performance of a stage play I do not know, or whether a stage play licence will 
be required for it, but it is quite certain that we may have over here, very 
soon, as they have now, I believe, in Germany and the United States, various 
so-called theatres put up all along the street, at which those performances 
may take place (Select Committee (joint), 1909: 76). 
 
 
The commercial value and cultural importance of the industry only became apparent 
to Parliament over time. Responding to the protectionist policies of the USA in the 
1920s, James Seddon MP asked of the President of the Board of Trade, Sir William 
Mitchell-Thompson: 
 
 ...whether, in view of the potent influences of the cinema on the commercial, 
educational, and political life of the people, some means can be found to 
counteract the threatened Americanisation of the British people which is 
being brought about by the overwhelming preponderance of American films 
exhibited in this country (HC Hansard, 1921: cols 679-680).  
 
By this argument, the laissez-faire preference was compromised by the realities of 
international competition and the conviction that the national character required 
protection. Indeed, national protection was a duty of government that even Bentham 
noted should take priority over a predisposition for non-intervention.  
 
Although the British Government was slow to recognise the commercial potential for 
cinematography the same was not true of broadcasting which, right from the start, 
encompassed the strong commercial interests, the unwelcome prospect of a 
commercial monopoly, and powerful agents manifested by the combined forces of 
equipment manufacturers. Wireless telephony in the form of radio broadcasting 
began to replace wired telegraphy among commercial, military and, unofficially, 
hobbyists, early in the twentieth century, using equipment based on patents mostly 
owned by the Marconi Company. As a consequence, the contractual arrangements 
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between Government, represented by the Post Office, and Marconi set the structure 
within which wireless services eventually became available to the general public1.  
 
During 1903 and 1904 questions increasingly arose in Parliament, both in reports and 
debates, that pressed for the conclusion of negotiations with Marconi that would 
allow wireless technology to be used for the benefit of merchant shipping and the 
Navy (see, for example HC Hansard, 1903: cols 123-271). The result was the Wireless 
Telegraphy Bill of 1904, the purpose of which was defined in the Bill’s explanatory 
memorandum:   
 
The development of wireless telegraphy during the past few years and the 
prospect of its further development and extended use in the near future have 
rendered legislation on the subject essential in the interests of the naval and 
military requirements of the Empire ... it is essential that the control of this 
method of communication should be in the hands of the Government (1904: 
1).  
 
The Bill itself proposed “for administrative reasons ... that licences [for broadcasting 
rights] should be granted by the Postmaster-General” (1904: 3), although conditional 
upon Admiralty, War Office, and Board of Trade consent. Unlike the older wired 
telegraphy, what could not be controlled was who could receive broadcast messages. 
While a problem for the military, this characteristic offered new commercial 
prospects for rights holders of the technology, such that, by 1922, the Managing 
Director of the Marconi Company, Godfrey Isaacs, was arguing for a national public 
wireless service for which it would “supply instruments to the householder on hire” 
(quoted in T. Burns, 1977: 3).  
 
This uncomfortable relationship between government and Marconi nevertheless 
resulted in a system of beneficial control at both ends, viz, of the technical 
transceivers and of the rights to broadcast, thus saving Britain from the mess that 
uncontrolled broadcasting had created in the USA. It also satisfied Parliament's 
laissez-faire instincts and, indeed, spurred them to seek a greater measure of 
                                                     
1
 Wired telegraphy was well established though. An estimated 90 million telegrams were sent through 
the Post Office in 1902 HC HANSARD 1903, 8th June, Series 4, Vol 123: 271  
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collaboration with commercial manufacturers. Recognising the problems that had 
arisen in the USA, Frederick Kellaway, then Postmaster-General, addressed the 
House of Commons, announcing:  
 
I have decided to allow the establishment of a limited number of radio-
telephone broadcasting stations ... Permission for these stations will only be 
granted to British firms who are bonâ fide manufacturers of wireless 
apparatus ... . What I am doing is to ask all those who apply ... to come 
together at the Post Office and cooperate so that an efficient service may be 
rendered and that there may be no danger of [commercial] monopoly and 
that each service shall not be interfering with the efficient working of the 
other. ... There will be certain regulations in regard to the character and 
classes of news which these agencies will be allowed to transmit, but on that 
head I have not yet come to a final decision (HC Hansard, 1922: col 1601). 
 
That "coming together"  took place on May 23rd of that year. Present were The “Big 
Six” manufactures and rights holders1 (smaller companies were represented by 
Burndept Ltd). They met again the following day. Despite differences and 
difficulties, a meeting minute records: “It was decided first to work out a plan on the 
basis of one Broadcasting Company for the whole country...” (quoted in Briggs, 1985: 
31). By the end of the year the British Broadcasting Company (not yet a 
“Corporation”) was formed - not directly by government but by the commercial 
owners of broadcasting technology. Neither the government nor the commercial 
owners expressed any cultural or social concerns. 
 
Clearly, Parliament believed sufficient control could be applied over the use of 
wireless technology through licensing and civil contract. To control what was 
broadcast (the “content”, as it is now called) would require some regulation for 
“prior restraint”. Powers were then given to the Post-Master General who could, and 
often did, exercise strict controls on BBC programmes, much as did the Lord 
Chamberlain over the privately operated theatres. Once wireless technology had 
moved from telegraphy and telephony to public broadcasting, new mechanisms of 
                                                     
1
 The Marconi Company, Metropolitan-Vickers, the Western Electric Company, the Radio 
Communication Company, the General Electric Company and the British Thompson-Houston 
Company.  
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control were required that allowed opinion, entertainment, and information to be 
freely available under arrangements that respected traditional liberal values, yet still 
placed the government’s hand on the “off” switch.  This was achieved through 
arrangements of “calculated imprecision” to facilitate the “accommodation politics” 
(T. Burns, 1977: 9, 20) necessary to permit the BBC to have executive control while, 
in the background, the Postmaster-General defined a content policy by his approval 
or rejection (1977: 11-16).  
 
A challenge to this arose briefly in the Report of the 1936 Ullswater Committee 
reviewing the work of the BBC, reporting just as its initial charter was about to 
expire. Whilst recommending the continuation of the arrangements under which:  
 
minor issues, measures of domestic policy, and matters of day to day 
management should be left to the free judgement of the Corporation; 
 
The report further proposed: 
 
That the Minister responsible in respect of broad questions of policy and 
culture should be a selected Cabinet Minister in the House of Commons, free 
from the heavy departmental responsibilities and preferably a senior member 
of the Government ... but that the technical control should remain with the 
Postmaster General (Postmaster General, 1935: 43-44). 
 
Despite a lengthy intervention by Sir Stafford Cripps in the Parliamentary debate 
that was strongly critical of the BBC, this recommendation was rejected, leaving BBC 
programming at arm’s-length from direct political control (HC Hansard, 1936: cols 
972-981). Cripps was, though, also expressing a view of many who had found John 
Reith’s management of the BBC to be abrasively uncompromising and determined in 
pursuit of his personal vision. Reith’s dedication to the Corporation and constant 
vigilance on every detail that effected its ability to act with independence was in 
stark contrast to bodies, such as the Post Office, that more willingly and 
procedurally incorporated the wishes of Parliament. It was Reith, though, that 
ensured the cultural status for the BBC that is now profoundly institutionalised 
(Stuart, 1975;  McIntyre, 1993). 
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Opera 
 
 A quite different pressure for Government support for culture, implying a prior need 
for policy, concerned appeals for a national opera company. Parliament’s long-
established disinterest in supporting the performing arts combined with their view 
that opera and ballet were “thoroughly un-English” (Minihan, 1977: n234) made 
support unlikely. Nevertheless, some interest was shown in the subject when 
Parliament asked British Diplomatic and Consular officers to assess the extent of 
“Financial support given from state or municipal funds to dramatic, operatic, or 
musical performances in foreign countries” (Miscellaneous No 6, 1904). Reponses 
were listed from twenty-seven countries across Europe, the Middle East, 
Scandinavia, the Americas, and many cities within each. The picture revealed was 
quite mixed, as would be expected, but showed the British attitude to subsidy for 
theatre to be more in line with Argentina, Italy and the USA than with the remaining 
twenty-three countries investigated, and in quite stark contrast to our near 
neighbours in France, Germany, Belgium and Spain.  
 
There appears to be no clear explanation as to why Balfour’s Government 
commissioned this report, but perhaps it was in the hope of finding others unwilling 
to provide supporting funds. In any event it made little or no difference. Opera, like 
all theatre, remained a private interest, and the difficulties experienced by the 
National Opera Company, "registered in 1855 and quickly abandoned" (Davis, 2000: 
264), the Carl Rosa Opera Company (formed in 1873 and still going), the Moody-
Manners Opera Company (formed in 1898, closed 1916 (Oxford Music Online)), Sir 
Thomas Beecham’s Opera Company (formed 1915, bankrupt in 1920 (Reid, 1962)) and 
its offshoot, the British National Opera Company (bankrupt in 1929 (Minihan, 1977: 
193)), all of which staged opera in Britain with varying, but always difficult, financial 
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results, simply added pressure for Government support1. Sir Ellis Hume-Williams  
(Conservative, Bassetlaw) asked a question that was increasingly being voiced:  
 
I think England is the only country in the world where the opera and State 
theatres do not receive some kind of subvention. In France, in Germany and 
other countries dramatic art is looked upon as of such educational 
importance that State theatres receive a State subvention, and such assistance 
is accorded to the opera as well. In England there is nothing of the kind (HC 
Hansard, 1926: 98-99). 
 
Beecham tried again in 1927, forming “The Imperial League of Opera”, which aimed 
“to build and endow an opera house in London and to assist in the building and 
endowing of opera houses in some of the leading provincial cities” (The Imperial 
League of Opera, Undated). It .benefitted not just from his own reputation but also 
those of his fellow trustees and advisors named on its promotional pamphlet2, 
although the initiative failed both to raise the necessary funds or directly change the 
Government’s views.   
 
Change finally came in 1931 under Ramsey MacDonald’s National Labour 
Government when financial support was given to “The Grand Opera Syndicate”, an 
organisation that managed what was to become the Royal Opera House in Covent 
Garden. Yet it did so under arrangements that suggested the Government was still 
reluctant to set a precedent or to be seen subsidising theatre, particularly during 
economically difficult times. A Supplemental Agreement between HM Postmaster 
General and the BBC set-out the mechanism and the contractual terms for this 
subsidy. In summary, the Postmaster General agreed to “contribute to the cost” of 
the BBC, supporting the Grand Opera Syndicate to produce opera performances that 
it, the BBC, could then broadcast (H. M. Postmaster General, 1931). Accordingly, it 
allowed the Postmaster General to increase its funding to the BBC for a series of 
                                                     
1
 For a more detailed summary of attempts in the 19th century to sustain opera in Britain, see DAVIS, 
T. C. 2000. The Economics of the British Stage: 1800 - 1914. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp 
262-267 and passim. 
2 Given as Sir Thomas Beecham Bt (Founder); Sir Ronald Landon (advisor); Frederick Austin 
(advisor); Sir Eric Hambro KBE (trustee); Lord Islington GCMG GBO DSO PC (trustee); and Sir 
Vincent Henry Penalver Callard DL (trustee). (Op Cit). 
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payments over five years starting 1st January 1931. As this in turn required Parliament 
to increase payments to the Post Office, the Government then became a sponsor of 
national opera.   
 
Against a persistent barrage of criticism in Parliament for this expense, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer gave the defence that “it will involve no increase of 
taxation. It will not add one penny to the burden on the British taxpayer but will 
bring in a net revenue to the State” (HC Hansard, 1931: col 590). The Sydney Morning 
Herald summed-up an alternative reading of these events: “If Great Britain 
subsidises opera, a policy recently announced by Mr Snowden, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, this will be the first time in British history that this has been done, 
though similar subsidies have long been paid on the Continent” (Nolan, 1931). The 
Agreement was allowed to lapse at the end of its term. 
 
 
Some Conclusions 
 
Reviewing the rationales expressed within Government for action or, more often, 
inaction on cultural matters since 1753 exposes some fundamental characteristics: 
 
1. The absence of any overall concept of the arts or culture to which policy 
should be applied. Each issue was dealt with ad hoc. With the exception of 
initiatives relating to education and cultivation, there was a profound 
reluctance to engage with broad societal concerns.  
2. All governments of the period adopted laissez-faire economic principles and a 
normative inclination for non-intervention, maintaining a clear 
differentiation between the private and public spheres.  Exceptions were 
argued as matters of national interest (primarily security and international 
competition) or moral concerns for the well-being of citizens.   
3. Institutions at arm's-length from direct government control were formed 
which then continued, increasing slowly in number and in the range of their 
interests. 
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4. The absence of any general concern for artistic or creative works per se was 
notable. The concept of l’art pour l’art had been in circulation across Europe 
since early in the 19th century, but apparently had not yet entered in to the 
reasoning of British Governments.  
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1939-1997: New Labour's Inheritance 
 
 
The development of implicit cultural policies from 1939 featured a continuing 
narrative of institutional expansion, substantial increases in state financial 
interventions and, in the latter decades, an administrative reorganisation that 
progressively brought together the increasing breadth of cultural concerns within 
one ministry. Most importantly, it marked the creation and growth of an explicit 
government policy for the arts and culture. From the middle of the 20th century the 
non-partisan belief that the arts should be promoted and supported by the state 
grew steadily, its course of development remarkably consistent in direction and 
rationales, even under the polarising Conservative governments under Margaret 
Thatcher. Indeed, the policies of Conservative and Labour governments before 1997 
differed only in their views on the most effective means to achieve the same ends, 
and this usually came down simply to money distributed under the "arm's-length" 
principle. This, with the addition of the fine grain of quotidian political events, and 
the continuous heterogeneous discourse among cultural commentators on the rights 
and wrongs of arts funding policy (what to subsidise and how to make those 
judgements), is how the story is usually told; linear, seemingly logical, morally 
progressive, and with a tacit disregard for, or perhaps disinterest in, earlier 18th and 
19th century traditions and norms1.   
New Labour's Inheritance 
 
On the day that Chris Smith, MP for Islington South and Finsbury, became Secretary 
of State at the Department of National Heritage he renamed it the Department for 
Culture Media and Sport. Smith was an intellectual; Cambridge and Harvard 
educated, with a PhD from research on Coleridge and Wordsworth, and seemed 
ideally suited to the brief. The Prime Minister announced the Department's new 
                                                     
1 Versions of this narrative can be found in the historical summaries of British cultural policy 
published by Compendium at www.culturalpolicies.net, and by the European Institute for 
Comparative Cultural Research at www.ericarts.org 
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name in the Commons that same afternoon of July 14th 1997 in a written answer to 
Gerald Kaufman's question: what plans do the Government have for the Department 
of National Heritage; and will he make a statement? Tony Blair's answer indicated a 
significant change of policy for the arts and, in its wider socio-economic form, 
culture:  
 
The Government have decided to refocus the Department of National 
Heritage to play a major part in the regeneration of our country for the future, 
working with the cultural industries, local government and the private sector 
to support creativity and also to create wealth and employment. As an 
expression of this change, the Department will be renamed the Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport, and its responsibilities widened to include the 
music industries, which contribute some £2.5 billion to gross domestic 
product each year. My right hon. Friend, who will be known as the Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport, will develop a new and dynamic 
approach to the 'creative industries'. He will carry through the Government's 
commitment to a strategic vision for the British arts, media and cultural 
industries that matches their real power and energy (HC Hansard, 1997: col 
44). 
 
Heritage was not named in this new policy, despite it taking more than 20% of the 
department's budget (Department of National Heritage, 1996/7). Instead, its 
principle objectives were expressed as regeneration, wealth and employment. The 
arts were now to be subject to a strategy to exploit their "real power and energy". 
Economic scientism was to be the driving rationale, contributing to McCloskey's 
well-argued case that, to quote Richard Wilk: "economics has become a cultural 
artefact of logical positivism" (McCloskey, 1990: 363;  Wilk, 1996: 67); but now it was 
culture itself that was the agar in which economic life could grow. Chris Smith had 
already written to the "Members and Staff" of his department that morning, 
informing them not just of the change of name but of his ambitions for the 
department, saying: "These developments, coming on top of the valuable work we 
are already carrying out across our sectors - in particular heritage and tourism - 
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place the Department at the centre of the country's economic life and regeneration" 
(C. Smith, 1997a)1.  
 
The significance of these changes was both confirmed and denied in an interview in 
2009 when asked about changing the department's name.  Smith gave several 
answers:  
 
The original Department for National Heritage was formed originally of 
course by John Major really in order to fit David Mellor’s interests.  He was a 
guy who was passionate about music, about the arts and about sport, in 
particularly football and so the various bits that were put together for what 
later became DCMS, it was really an ad hominem construct when it was first 
started.   
 
But he then added:  
 
I was determined to do three things.  One was to change the name, because 
heritage is obviously a very important element of what DCMS does, but it’s 
only one element amongst a huge number and the name simply didn’t reflect 
the spread or the modernity of what the department was about ... the things 
that it was engaged in, television, lottery, the arts, sport and these were all 
things that mattered hugely to citizens and yet it had been sort of languishing 
in the doldrums very much at the edge of Government, so I wanted to put it 
more centre stage. But I also, thirdly, wanted to give it much more of a sense 
that it was part not just of the aesthetics of society, but of the economy of 
society, that the importance of the creative industries was something that 
Government needed to wake up to.  Oh, and there was a fourth thing I 
wanted to do, which was to give it a very clear sense of what it was there for 
and which is why I developed the four pillars that DCMS was all about - 
which were excellence, access, education and the creative economy - and 
those four things I just drummed into the department (C. Smith, 2009).   
 
The process by which the department's remit was reconceived was informal but 
nevertheless stayed with the tradition asserted in the 1995/6 National Heritage Select 
Committee in which the responsibilities of the department were said to be "a matter 
                                                     
1 The Statutory Instrument (No. 1744) by which the name of the department was formally changed 
and related documents amended was made on 22nd July 1997, then laid before Parliament on August 
1st before coming into force on 22nd August of that year. 
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for the Prime Minister" (National Heritage Committee, 1995/6: vii and 42). In Chris 
Smith's words:  
 
I had to get agreement in principle first, to changing the name of the 
department.  I wanted it to be the Department for Culture full stop. The 
Prime Minister wasn’t having that, he thought that sounded too arty farty, 
insisted on including sport in the title. I thought, well, if we’ve got culture and 
we’ve got sport we might as well just make sure that we hang on very firmly 
to media, which is how the name emerged (C. Smith, 2009). 
 
In response to the question "Why not also tourism", his reply was a dismissive quip: 
"But you can't put everything in"  (2009). It was the same argument Smith had made 
to the new department's first Select Committee report, although the Committee took 
the issue rather more seriously:  
 
In July 1997 it was announced that the Department was to be re-named the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Mr Smith said that the old name 
was 'backward-looking and did not do justice to the range of work we cover'. 
The new name was more suited to a 'Department of the future' which was 
"about creativity, innovation and excitement". He denied that any significance 
could be attached to the omission of tourism from the title: 'it was not 
included in the title of the Department simply because we cannot include 
everything in the title of the Department'. (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b: 
viii) 
 
This explanation was in part prompted by a view the Committee had expressed 
earlier in the report: 
 
We are, therefore, deeply concerned that, in policy statements by the 
Department and in public statements by Ministers, tourism is subordinated 
in favour of more glamorous and trivial matters. We recommend that the 
Department's economic objective should be to foster the tourism, creative 
and sports industries. (1998b: vi) 
 
Later Adding: 
 
Concentration on "creativity" also leads to a perceived undervaluing of 
tourism. The switch from a symbolic to a descriptive title for the Department, 
while understandable, has led to the omission of tourism from the title. 
Although the Department has only recently been re-named, we believe that a 
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new name should be found for it which combines euphony with a more 
comprehensive description of its responsibilities. (1998b: ix) 
 
The criticism was clearly driven by a hope for a change in policy more than a 
concern for the Department's name. The government's 1997-8 Appropriation 
Accounts, show that just under 5% of DCMS's expenditure had been allocated to 
tourism (£45,095,000), falling to 4.69% by 2001 (£48,214,000). Significantly, the arts 
were not considered anywhere in the discussion about the name (Comptroller & 
Auditor General, 1860 to 2001), yet this was the subject that had been at the heart of 
cultural policy (excluding ad hoc interventions) since the mid-20th century.  
 
The impression that the renaming of the Department was a relaxed, informal and even 
little-considered process is how Smith told it in 2009 (C. Smith, 2009); though no 
doubt revised by memory and the effects of many trying experiences behind him (the 
Millennium Dome dramas among them). As will be discussed later, a considerable 
literature had also been published refuting the validity and cogency of a number of the 
principles on which DCMS founded their policies. Nevertheless, in 1997 DCMS was 
immediately and integrally involved in the Treasury's theories of social economics and 
in Tony Blair's desire for a pliable electorate encouraged to abandon the traditional 
Manichean poles of British politics in favour of a conflated, uncontentious middle: the 
Third Way.  
 
The radical change in the rationales of policy that came with the change of name has 
been something largely ignored in political and cultural studies literature and, in 
effect, denied by government.  In response to a Freedom of Information request 
concerning the method, mechanism and rationales for the change of name, the DCMS 
merely reported: "It came about as a name change to the Department for National 
Heritage which was created in 1992" (DCMS, 2008). In the light of the historical 
developmental path (Mahoney, 1999) of arts and culture within government 
departments, and particularly during the period since 1939, that contention is one of 
several disputed by the arguments that follow. 
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Tracing the path (1): Departmental Development 
 
Neither the Labour nor Conservative administrations developed a policy for the arts 
before 1945, although funding for national museums, galleries and other cultural 
institutions was continuous from their first appearances in the 1867/68 Appropriation 
Accounts until they were incorporated within the responsibilities of the Department 
of National Heritage. The Appropriation Accounts resulted from a Bill passed on 22nd 
July 1861: "To Provide for the preparation, Audit, and presentation to Parliament of 
annual Accounts of the Appropriation of the Moneys voted for Revenue Departments" 
(Revenue Accounts Department, 22nd July 1861). Some initiatives, like support for the 
Royal Opera House and later the CEMA (discussed below), are not shown as separate 
items but these are rare exceptions. Generally the accounts are full of fine detail. They 
provide a route by which spending can be traced in a way not possible by looking at 
departmental history or policy narratives, and can provide insights into policy 
relations, policy development, departmental performance, and the extent of 
bureaucracy required to administer their programmes. Taking this long view through 
the accounts is also another way to place the DCMS in a context that, by comparison 
with preceding policies, distinguishes its paradigms more plainly.   
 
In Table 1 below, funding for the Arts Council (originally the Arts Council of Great 
Britain, then reformed as the Arts Council of England in 1994) has been used to trace a 
budget line backwards from its place in the DCMS accounts to its first appearance in 
the 1938/9 Appropriation Accounts under "Scientific Investigations, &c.". That same 
account "service", albeit without the inclusion of the Arts Council, then continues 
backwards to 1869/7o under the similar heading of "Learned Societies & Scientific 
Investigations".  Along the way, its cultural companions in the accounts remained 
remarkably consistent: among them the National Gallery, Natural History Museum, 
British Museum, National Gallery, Wallace Gallery, music academies, national libraries, 
and several other cultural institutions.  Notably, they were categorised with science 
within the "Education" budget class from the earliest entries. Even as late as 1938/9 the 
accounts show them sharing the service item with various Royal Societies, the Royal 
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Geographical Societies, the Solar Physics Observatory, the Agricultural Research 
Council, the North Sea Fisheries Investigation, and the Scott Polar Research Institute.  
 
The parting of the accountancy ways was not until 1984/5 but the arts still remained 
departmentally linked to libraries, as they had been departmentally since 1975.  The 
creation of government departments with ministers responsible for arts dates only from 
1964 with the appointment of Jennie Lee, initially within the Ministry of Public Building 
and Works within Harold Wilson's Labour Government (Hollis, 1997: 245-58). However, 
it was the preceding Conservative Government that, in 1962, separated "Museums, 
Galleries and the Arts" within the accounts. There may well be some significance in this 
change, but, alas, the research required would be a distraction from this thesis. In any 
case, this move was then reversed in 1974/5 under Labour when reintroducing an earlier 
association by placing the arts within the Department of Education and Science. Under 
the Conservative Government led by John Major, the arts then became a part of the 
National Heritage accounts before finally being shown separately in 1993/4, although 
still with their old 19th century cultural companions. Once passed to New Labour in 
1997, the account entry simply reads "arts", separate from Museums and Galleries, 
Libraries and Sport but still associated with budgets of National Heritage through the 
"Arts Sponsorship Scheme" and with the "Government Arts Collection" which appeared 
alongside. 
 
From the following table, it is notable that: 
 In either the Budget Class or Service Item, the funding of national museums, 
galleries, libraries and other cultural institutions (under "Arts" since 1970) 
were categorised with science until 1985; 
 Funding for arts and science institutions fell within the general ambit of 
education policy for 115 years: from 1870 until 1985; 
 Although a broad concept of culture was used in political discussion since at 
least since the 1964 paper A Policy for the Arts, the idea or concept of 
"culture" does not appear anywhere in the Appropriation Accounts until the 
formation of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.   
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Table 1:  Tracing the Institutional Path 
 
Years 
ending 
Comments Budget Class Service Service  
Item 
1870 to 
1899 
Within the Department 
of  Science and Art 
 
Education, 
Science & Art 
 Learned Societies & 
Scientific 
Investigations 
1900 to 
1927 
Now under the Board of 
Education  
Education, 
Science & Art 
 Scientific 
Investigation, &c 
1928 to 
1938 
 Education  Scientific 
Investigation, &c 
1939 to 
1948 
For the first time, 
includes the Arts Council 
of Great Britain. The 
Board of Education 
became the Ministry of 
Education in 1944/5. 
Education & 
Broadcasting 
 Scientific 
Investigation &c 
1949 to 
1962 
 Education & 
Broadcasting 
 Grants for Science & 
the Arts 
1963 to 
1966 
 
The first Minister for the 
Arts appointed 
Museums 
Galleries & the 
Arts 
 Grants for the Arts 
1967 to 
1974 
Direct from the Treasury Museums 
Galleries & the 
Arts 
 Arts Council & Other 
Grants for the Arts 
1975 to 
1980 
Under the Department of 
Education & Science 
Education & 
Science, Arts & 
Libraries 
 Arts: Arts Council 
and Other Grants 
1981 to 
1984 
 Education & 
Science, Arts & 
Libraries,  
 Arts, Arts Council & 
Other Institutions, 
the National 
Heritage & Govt Art 
Collection 
1985 to 
1988 
Now split from Education 
and Science 
 
Arts & Libraries  Arts, Arts Council & 
Other Institutions, 
the National 
Heritage & Govt 
Picture Collection 
1989 to 
1992 
 Office of Arts & 
Libraries 
 Arts & Heritage 
1993  National Heritage 
& Arts & Libraries 
 Arts 
1994 to 
1995 
 National Heritage  DNH: Arts 
1996 to 
1997 
 National Heritage DNH: Prog, 
Exp & Admin 
Promotion of the 
Arts: Grant in Aid 
1998 to 
2001 
 Culture, Media & 
Sport 
CMS Prog,  Exp 
& Admin 
Arts 
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It would be possible to draw too much by implication from the accounts, but it is 
reasonable to argue that the machinery of government, institutionalised with 
entrenched civil service practices, will generally respond pragmatically, if not 
quickly, to the policy changes of elected Parliamentarians. In this way they provide 
an insight into more deeply rooted trends, smoothing the graph of change such that, 
whilst no doubt lagging behind shifts in social practises, the direction of change may 
appear consistent.  Change is rarely sudden in the administration of government nor 
in the society that is its object of concern. Its mechanisms are too complex; social 
structures, practises, and normative beliefs too strongly reproduced to be cast aside 
with a statement of policy change or of the government itself. The search for the 
developments of a cultural policy is then also a search for the "emergent properties" 
that arise from the "complex interchanges that produce change in a system's given 
form, structure or state" (Archer, 1982: 458), (see also arguments by P. A. Hall and 
Taylor, 1998;  Archer, 1996;  Giddens, 1979;  Hay and Wincott, 1998;  Jessop, 1996). In 
the period from 1945, that search for the trends of ideational change in governments' 
constitutive concepts of culture leads to three developments: (i) the 1964 White 
Paper A Policy for the Arts, (ii) the development of the Arts Council, and (iii) the 
process of consolidation of government departments into the Department of 
National Heritage and then, later, to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.   
 
The White Paper: A Policy for the Arts: The First Steps (Office of Arts & Libraries, 
1965) 
 
Jennie Lee's appointment as a Parliamentary Under Secretary of State with "a loose 
responsibility for the Arts" within the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works was  
Harold Wilson's way of moving arts spending out of the Treasury, which should not, 
he thought, "be a spending department" (Hollis, 1997: 255)1. Lee later became a 
Minister of State for the Arts within the Department of Education and Science in 
February 1967. The move followed a Labour Party document, The Quality of Living, 
                                                     
1
 Hollis quotes the source of the quotation as "H. Jenkins, contribution to the Revised Policy 
Statement on the Arts RD561/Nov 1963". 
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published in May 1964, five months before the General Election, updating its earlier  
publication Leisure for Living, which was said to be "the first major statement ever 
made by a British political party on the use of  leisure and the support for the arts" 
(Harris, 1970: 153-4). However, Labour Party manifestos, as with those of the other 
two major parties, actually made only brief references to arts before the late 1980s. 
Its inclusion was often as part of  policies promoting "Quality of Life" (Con 1964), 
"Amenities" (Lab 1966), or "Leisure" (Lab 1983).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 :  
 
Mentions of "art(s)" and "culture" in party manifestos. 
Gen 
Election WIN Labour Conservative Liberal 
Years 
 
"Arts" "Cult." "Arts" "Cult." "Arts" "Cult." 
  
            
1900 - 1935 Con 0 0 0  0 0  0 
1945 Lab 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1950 Lab 2 1 0 1 0 0 
1951 Con 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1955 Con 0 1 1 1 0 0 
1959 Con 2 0 1 0 1 0 
1964 Lab 1 0 4 0 0 0 
1966 Lab 7 1 2 1 1 0 
1970 Con 5 1 7 0 0 0 
 Feb 1974 Lab 0 0 4 0 0 0 
 Oct 1974 Lab 4 0 2 0 0 0 
1979 Con 6 0 2 0 0 1 
1983 Con 8 0 3 0 1 0 
1987 Con 4 1 8 1 10 0 
1992 Con 1 0 18 1 16 0 
1997 Lab 11 5 7 5 5 3 
2001 Lab 18 5 9 6 20 8 
  
            
Totals 
 
69  16 68  16 54  12 
Combined 
 
85 84 66 
 
NB: This simple table does not define the extent to which subjects are 
discussed within the manifestos, nor the contexts in which they appear. 
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The central rationale of A Policy for the Arts is a broad argument, going well beyond 
earlier ideas of the place of the arts and their relations to "everyday life":  
In any civilised community the arts and associated amenities, serious or 
comic, light or demanding, must occupy a central place. Their enjoyment 
should not be regarded as something remote from everyday life. The 
promotion and appreciation of high standards in architecture, in industrial 
design, in town planning and the preservation of the beauty of the 
countryside, are all part of it. Beginning in schools, and reaching out into 
every corner of the nation's life, in city and village, at home, at work, at play, 
there is an immense amount that could be done to improve the quality for 
contemporary life (Office of Arts & Libraries, 1964/65: 6). 
 
The themes of commerce, design, and education, then at least a century old, were 
still there but now amalgamated with a much wider concern "to improve the quality 
of contemporary life". Lee also made references to the Royal College of Art, echoing 
of the old Department of Arts and Manufactures, claiming its work had influence 
"not only on the standards of individual artistic achievement but on the quality of 
design in commerce, fashion and industry". The White Paper welcomed, too, "the 
encouragement that the [Council of Industrial Design] are giving to good industrial 
design in a wide range of products in everyday use at home and at work" (1965: 15). 
Throughout, it collects a broader range of concerns within the word "culture", used 
several times, stating that "diffusion of culture is now so much a part of life that 
there is no precise point at which it stops. Advertisements, buildings, books, motor 
cars, radio and television, magazines, records, all can carry a cultural aspect and 
affect our lives for good or ill as a species of 'amenity' " (1965: 15-16). This only needs 
the addition of sport for it to suggest an early argument for the DCMS. The one 
major policy proposed was for a substantial increase in the funding of artistic work 
through the ACGB. 
 
Changes arising (or emerging) from the dialectic between agents and the structures 
within which they operate are often marked in analytical literature by dates or 
events,  what Barry Buzan called "benchmarks" (Buzan and Lawson, 2013), which 
punctuate otherwise gradual shifts in normative attitudes (Finlayson, 2007). Lee's 
White Paper could be categorised in this way, although little changed immediately. 
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Even Arts Council funding increases of 45% in 1966/67 and a further 26% the 
following year were modest compared with those in the 1970s. There was a 
noticeable effect on government policy, demonstrated by the increasing references 
to the arts in the election manifestos of the three main parties, but it was not 
immediate and it was not consistent. The ideas expressed in the White Paper are to 
be found more in changes in the widening public discussions of arts, but it 
nevertheless "benchmarked" the start of a policy shift in government policy from the 
arts towards a broader idea of culture. 
 
Tracing the Path (2): CEMA and The Arts Council 
 
The Committee for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) arose out of 
concerns for the anticipated social consequences of the 1939-45 war. It is often 
referred to as the predecessor of the ACGB, but in two important respects that is 
misleading: first, its interest was in community well-being rather than the arts per se 
and, secondly, it was to a significant extent an initiative of the private sector - The 
Pilgrim Trust. In both respects, CEMA was related more to a late 19th century 
attitude to the arts as a social palliative to be administered as a civic responsibility.  
 
The Pilgrim Trust was founded by Edward Harkness, an American philanthropist, 
with an endowment of £2 million. Following a meeting in Claridge's Hotel on May 
5th 1930, Lord MacMillan became its first Chairman, with trustees Sir James Irvine (a 
long-time friend of Harkness) and Lord Tweedsmuir (The Pilgrim Trust, 1939). The 
minutes of the Trust recorded it as: "a proposal for the encouragement in war-time 
of amateur music and drama, combined with the assistance of unemployed 
musicians and producers" (The Pilgrim Trust, Dec 14th 1939). In operation, it would 
"... help amateurs to carry the best of the arts to the provinces and to Scottish 
villages, and to Welsh mining districts" (Leventhal, 1990: 292). Its work was carried 
out through existing voluntary organisations. The Trust's purpose reflected 
Harkness's "admiration and affection for Great Britain", requiring that his gift be 
used for "some of  her (Great Britain's) more urgent needs", and that "it may assist 
106 
 
not only in tiding over the present time of difficulty but in promoting her future well 
being" (Quoted in: The Pilgrim Trust, 2011: 6).  
 
Between 1939 and 1942 the Pilgrim Trust granted £25,000 towards the work of the 
CEMA, an amount then matched by the HM Treasury1. The Trust categorised their 
grants as "Welfare Work for the Civilian Population", part of its "War Services 
Grants" (The Pilgrim Trust, 27/11/1941). Although its work had a notable impact on 
British cultural life and was reportedly effective in achieving its aims, it could have 
remained simply a war-time phenomenon with little relevance to the later life of the 
nation and of minor importance to the development of cultural policy. In retrospect, 
though, it provided a pivotal link between past and future rationales for government 
interventions in cultural matters, and a harbinger of the social aspect of cultural 
policy that was later to develop. As Leventhal explained: "Until 1939 public 
expenditure to subsidize the performing arts in Great Britain was widely perceived as 
objectionable" (Leventhal, 1990: 289). CEMA undoubtedly dislodged that attitude, 
both within government and among the public. 
 
In 1941, at the Pilgrim Trust meeting on November 27th, Lord Macmillan announced 
his resignation from CEMA, effective from March 31st 1942, the date on which the 
Pilgrim Trust's contributions to CEMA ended (The Pilgrim Trust, 27/11/1941: 896). 
His successor was to be John Maynard Keynes. Keynes was to become the leading 
protagonist in the formation of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) and, by all 
accounts, would have been its first Chairman had he not died in April 1946, four 
months before King George VI granted ACGB its Royal Charter. The core remit for 
the ACGB was essentially defined by Keynes when Chairman of CEMA, in part 
justifying the claim that CEMA was the predecessor of the ACGB  (Hollis, 1997: 247;  
Hutchison, 1982: 9, passim). This was later confirmed by the ACGB itself when giving 
                                                     
1
 However, Treasury contributions were initially to remain "largely unofficial"  (LEVENTHAL, F. M. 
1990. 'The Best for the Most': CEMA and State Sponsorship of the Arts in Wartime, 1939-1945. 
Twentieth Century British History, 1 (3), 289-317.: 292 (quoting his reference as a letter from Lord De 
La Warr to Dr. Thomas Jones, Secretary to the Pilgrim Trust, on 13.12.1939 - PRO ED 136/188B. Indeed, 
payments to CEMA do not appear in the Appropriation Accounts from the period. 
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evidence to the  Select Committee on Education, Science and the Arts on May 13th 
1981, when they confirmed: "The Arts Council grew out of the Council for the 
Encouragement of Music and the Arts  ..." (Education Science & Arts Committee, 
1981-82). Nevertheless, that assertion is misleading.  
 
During the formation of CEMA Lord De La Warr, President of the Board of 
Education, declared his intention that the government might continue intervention 
in the arts after the war, an idea later repeated by his successor, R.A.B. Butler, when 
tempting Keynes into CEMA's Chairmanship, saying "CEMA might evolve into 
'something that might occupy a more permanent place in our social organisation'" 
(Skidelsky, 2000: 286) 1. Keynes had held strong views on CEMA for some time 
before becoming its Chairman, both supportive and critical. Two aspects of his 
philosophy were to be seminal in defining the government's relationship with the 
arts in Britain. The first was  independence from the Treasury, CEMA's only funder 
after The Pilgrim Trust ended its contributions. CEMA has, Keynes wrote in the 
Times, "an undefined independence, an anomalous constitution and no fixed rules, 
and is, therefore, able to do by inadvertence or indiscretion, what obviously no one 
in his official senses would do on purpose" (L. Keynes, 1943). This distancing from 
Government suited both Keynes's imperious style and the historic traditions of 
Government. They were the foundations for what was later defined as an "arm's-
length" relationship with the ACGB. The second was Keynes's insistence that he 
would be, as Sinclair put it, "a patron of the arts rather than a teacher of the masses" 
(Sinclair, 1995: 38). His aim was to control CEMA centrally from a London office and 
then to reduce or remove grants to community organisations and amateurs. As early 
as 1941, Keynes had warned Butler that he had "only limited sympathy with the 
principles on which it [CEMA.] had been carried on hitherto" (quoted in Skidelsky, 
2000: 287)2. Mary Glasgow had similar recollections (CEMA's senior executive): "He 
[Keynes] wanted to know why the Council [CEMA] was wasting so much money on 
                                                     
1
 Skidelsky's reference for this quote is a letter: "KP:PP/84(1) R.A. Butler to JMK 17 Dec 1941." 
2
 Skidelsky gives his reference as GLASGOW, M. 1975. The Concept of the Arts Council. In: KEYNES, 
W. M. (ed.) Essays on John Maynard Keynes. London: Cambridge University Press.: 262. 
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amateur effort ... It was standards that mattered, and the preservation of serious 
professional enterprise, not obscure concerts in village halls" (2000: 287). The 
founding policies of CEMA were quickly abandoned by Keynes and replaced with 
metropolitan professionalism.  
 
This then became the starting point for the Arts Council: "The Arts Council 
developed exactly the opposite policy [from CEMA]. It saw itself as promoting 
excellence, safeguarding standards, especially of the performing arts like opera 
which could not survive on box-office receipts alone" (Hollis, 1997: 284), see also 
(Hutchison, 1982). It had become a policy of government (although the Council's 
own policies were not), joining the illustrious list of beneficiaries of Treasury support 
entered into the annual Appropriation Accounts and that, as separately incorporated 
organisations, acted according to will of their boards. At the time, the closest model 
was the University Grants Committee, established in 1919 as:  "... an unelected body 
of university men, appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on whose advice 
the Government of the day asked Parliament each year to vote money for 
distribution, without strings, to each university” (Redcliffe-Maud, 1976: 24).  
 
The ACGB appeared to be awarded comparatively large sums as grant-in-aid. As a 
comparison, in 1945/6 the British Museum received £159,815 compared with the 
£235,000 granted to the Arts Council; but bearing in mind the latter had clients that 
included the Royal Opera House its grants were in effect really quite small until 
much later in the century.  
 
Arising from Keynes's original concept, the ACGB was, right from the start, more like 
a club of patrician oligarchs interested in promoting their own particular interests 
than an extension of government bureaucracy. As Robert Hutchison pointed out, the 
organisations that benefitted most from its grants were governed by the same people 
who governed the ACGB. As an illustration, the boards of the Royal Opera and the 
Arts Council had many members in common over many years (Hutchison, 1982: 27). 
In the same vein, the ACGB also had no interest in "crafts", as they were called, nor 
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in amateur activities, something emphasised by Lord Goodman (Chairman of the 
ACGB from 1965-1972) when addressing the House of Lords: "We are concerned with 
the Arts. This business about amateur theatricals, the crafts and the like, is 
something about which one needs to be very sceptical indeed" (HL Hansard, 1972: 
col 728).  "I speak for the Arts; I do not speak for amateur theatricals" (1972: 734).  
 
In a detailed and amusing examination of the Arts Council's history, Richard Witts is 
succinct, referring to the "smug, self-reflective image [that] engaged the Arts Council 
for forty years", adding: "At root, a record of the personalities that have determined 
and driven the activities of the Arts Council is a history of the British intellectual, 
which is truly a scatterbrained and disenchanting saga" (Witts, 1998: 123). The 
absence of a democratic constitution or any accountability for their decisions; their 
relative disinterest in most things outside London; and the dominance of policies in 
support of their own personal artistic preferences were among many aspects of the 
ACGB that were criticised for decades, with only reluctant adjustments slowly 
resulting. In concept, legal formation, and operation policy, the ACGB had little in 
common with CEMA. Rather, it defined a new strand of cultural policy more akin to 
those of Germany and France in which the high arts were valued as traits of an 
advanced civilisation. It was modernist and elitist, and a diversion from the 
traditions of which CEMA and, later, the 1964 White Paper were a part.  
 
The Arts and Commerce 
 
In the formation of the Arts Council, Keynes had deliberately rejected the traditional 
British relationship between the arts and government. The state was now not only a 
patron by policy, but, in an echo of Matthew Arnold, a patron of the arts as "the 
finest achievements of the human spirit in all ages" (Bridges, Annan et al., 1959: 13). 
Commerce and the amelioration of social problems were not the underlying 
rationales. AP Herbert had satirised that idea with a verse quoted in the Commons 
in 1959: "Once people start on all this Art, Goodbye, moralitee!" (Herbert, 1978: 224;  
HC Hansard, 1959: col 636;  Harris, 1970: 157), a view older even that that satirised by 
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the fictional Sir Humphrey Appleby when insisting "Subsidy is for art, for culture. It 
is not to be given to what the people want. It is for what the people don't want but 
ought to have. If they want something, they'll pay for it themselves" (Jay and Lynn, 
1983).  
 
The policy appeared to define a point of separation in the trajectory of British 
political attitudes towards arts funding. But seen retrospectively it is now clear that 
traditional norms had not been entirely abandoned but, rather, continued weakly, if 
agonistically, in parallel. These two ideas became increasingly adversarial under the 
Conservative governments of 1979 to 1997 with their insistence that the arts justify 
themselves in financial terms and move away from state patronage towards financial 
independence. The presumption was that money would not be forthcoming from the 
Treasury unless the arts could prove their value in the manner of commercial 
investments. Financial  support, it was supposed, depended on arguments that were 
pragmatic, rational and financially justified quantitatively. Writing in the Observer 
in 2003, Nicholas Hytner, then Director of the National Theatre, said of the period: 
"We tried talking the Thatcher government's own language: it made tremendous 
economic sense to invest in the arts because it was an enormous invisible earner, 
pulling in the tourists, regenerating inner cities, earning back a fortune in VAT, the 
lot" (Hytner, 2003). A quite risible Arts Council Annual Report of 1985 went as far as 
presenting their case in the style of a business prospectus: “The arts have an 
excellent sales record, and excellent prospects. Customers are growing in number 
and, with increased leisure one of the certainties of the future, use of the arts will 
intensify” (Arts Council of Great Britain, 1985).  
 
A report by the 1982 Education, Science & Arts Select Committee appeared to 
support this view with the recommendation that the economic importance of the 
arts justified the creation of a cabinet ministry (Education Science & Arts 
Committee, 1982: xxxviii). Then John Myerscough set the academic ground with his 
book: The economic importance of the arts (Myerscough, 1988) effectively 
establishing, as Sara Selwood put it: "...economic impact assessment as a form of 
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advocacy [for the arts] in the UK" (Selwood, 2010: 75). Enthusiasm for this new line 
of evaluation produced more contestable results when applied to social change. 
Francois Matarasso’s paper on this subject, for example, was heavily rounded upon 
by academic sceptics (Merli, 2002;  Matarasso, 1997).  Translating artistic activity 
into economic performance was regaining credibility but arguing its place in social 
policy was still uncertain ground.  
 
The arguments of the arts community were, though, often reductive, partial or ill-
conceived. Claims that cuts had been imposed on Arts Council funding by the 
Thatcher government were evidence, it was said, of  a " 'The New Conservatism',  as 
essentially a macro-economic strategy to reduce inflation by reducing the supply of 
money to both private and public sectors of the economy", and, worse, as "laissez-
faire economic liberalism" (Beck, 1989: 363). Like many at the time, Tony Beck 
accused the Thatcher government of "a reduction in the rate of increase of its [the 
Arts Council's] grant in recent years, year by year, until the rate is below that of even 
official figures for inflation" (1989: 364) in order to force arts organisations to raise 
money through commercial activity and sponsorship. Beck supported his arguments 
with a table showing the funds granted to the Arts Council from 1979 to 1992. The 
inflation figures Beck uses are, though, are higher than those published by the Bank 
of England, and the grants to the Arts Council are, in some cases, lower than those 
shown in the government's Appropriation Accounts. Furthermore, that argument 
does not take into account the many government grants made to artistic and 
cultural bodies other than by the Arts Council (principally local authorities, private 
trusts, and commercial sponsors). But examining just Arts Council grant-in-aid with 
figures from the Appropriation Accounts, and using inflation figures from the Bank 
of England, the graph below shows rates of increases were actually little different 
under the Conservative government than under the previous Labour government, 
with the biggest annual increases being in 1986 to 1987 and 1989 to 1993.  Structural 
changes in the Arts Council and changes in the number and types of organisations it 
funded account for some of these increases but the raw data itself does not establish 
that the Thatcher government was less concerned with arts funding. Rather, the 
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evidence suggests more a policy intention to force a structural shift towards multiple 
funding sources, including commercial activity by the arts institutions themselves. 
This was in line with the government's  belief that funding should be a wider 
responsibility of society and not fall simply on Government budgets; a version of the 
private-not-public argument of earlier years. It may be also have been another way of 
opposing the Arts Council's position as the dominant arts patron; a pertinent 
argument against monopolies that had long existed.   
 
Figure 1  Grants-in-Aid to the Arts Council 
 
NB: the drop in grant in 1994/5 was in part a result of splitting the ACGB into separate Arts Councils 
in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The amounts thereafter refer to Arts Council 
England which still retained responsibilities for some costs within the devolved nations. 
Data source: Appropriation Accounts published by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
 
In all these debates, the value of unsubsidised activity by artistic and cultural 
organisations was rarely assessed. The 1994 Department of National Heritage Annual 
Report includes a rare comparison of the private and commercial sectors with the 
subsidies provide by government. Concerning the arts, the report says: "DNH 
funding matches that of local authorities but is small in relation to a sector 
estimated in 1988 to have a turnover of around £10 billion". The DNH budget for Arts 
that year was £236 million. The report makes similar comparisons for tourism, for 
which "DNH represents less than 0.2% of an industry valued at £30 billion a year", 
for film, where its contributions amounted to "less than 10% of box office revenues" 
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which "local authorities spend about £1¼ billion per annum ... while the 
Department's expenditure in 1994-95 will be £54 million" (Department of National 
Heritage, 1994: para. 1.10). Public debates on cultural funding, particularly of the arts, 
were (and often still are) inclined to present them as dependent on the public sector, 
but the robust and historic commercial sector remained dominant. 
 
Tracing the Path (3): National Heritage to Culture, Media and Sport 
 
By early 1994 the Conservative government had largely accepted a wider role for 
DNH and, in doing so, formally widened its remit beyond the arts, media and 
national heritage, to encompass the new National Lottery, sport, architecture, royal 
parks, tourism, and film. The DNH sought to bring together many related interests 
previously spread across government departments into the single ministry; an 
ambition supported by its examining Select Committees  (National Heritage 
Committee, 1995/6;  Dept of Social Security, 1997-8). The combined effect of cabinet 
representation and the agglomeration of interests brought a considerable increase in 
power and influence for the DNH. With this came the first serious challenges to the 
traditional, if ill-defined (and, for many, sacrosanct) arms-length relationship.  
 
The NH Select Committee expressed the view that: “We believe that the Secretary of 
State should not be inhibited from intervening in the operations of funded bodies. If 
this cannot be done through the funding agreement now being negotiated, we do 
not rule out the possibility that specific powers of direction may be necessary.” 
(1995/6: xii). “Culture” was  now moving from being a political side issue that 
operated in virtually unchallenged areas of artistic and intellectual values and where 
the principle of “hands off” as much as “arm's length” was largely accepted by 
government. Government was, in effect, pulling back from the implicit autonomy of 
"art for art's sake" by strengthening its control of policy. Once again, the arts were 
required to play a part in national economic development. “Arms length” was now to 
be, as the Minister of State for National Heritage, Virginia Bottomley, agreed: 
“Hands on” (44, para 194). In a significant change to the policy laissez-faire that had 
114 
 
continued since 1945, the DNH proposed instituting  "Funding Agreements" with the 
Arts Council as one of its funded NDPBs. The 1996 DNH Annual Report explains that 
"Funding Agreements will encapsulate what the Department and its non-
Departmental public bodies are trying to secure for the money the taxpayer 
provides" (Department of National Heritage, 1996: 66). The first of these was 
planned to be introduced later that Parliamentary year, but the process was 
overtaken by the general election of 1997.   
 
Consolidating Departments and Cultural Policy 
 
Chris Smith's colourful explanation for the DNH as an "ad hominem" construction 
around David Mellor's interests (C. Smith, 2009) contrasts with the desiccated 
version in the Select Committee's report into the Department's "Structure and 
Remit":  
 
The Department of National Heritage was established after the 1992 General 
Election. It subsumed the Office of Arts and libraries, and also took over 
responsibility for sport (from the Department of Education and Science), the 
built heritage (Department of the Environment), broadcasting, press 
regulation and the lottery (Home Office), film and export licensing of works 
of art (Department of Trade and Industry) and tourism (Department of 
Employment). Responsibility for charities and the voluntary sector was 
transferred on 1 May 1996.(National Heritage Committee, 1995/6: v) 
 
Answering questions from the NH Committee, the department's Permanent 
Secretary, Hayden Phillips, first called the new responsibilities: "a rather peculiar 
collection", before later contradicting himself by praising their "remarkable 
coherence" 1:  
 
I hope and believe that in terms of the work of the Department, we have 
begun to draw together many of the interconnections that link what we do. 
On the face of it, to put sport together with other activities might not look 
sensible, but we have a broad cultural interest and sport is integral to that in 
this country. Equally we have found it quite valuable to have the connection 
between broadcasting media and the arts in general...". Secondly, there are a 
                                                     
1
 It is tempting to speculate that Phillips's political masters may have required a change of mind. 
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number of areas...where there is a particular important interface between 
what we do and what another department does... (6). 
 
Phillips's answer raised the prospect of even more responsibilities being transferred 
from other department in the future. The Committee took this as an invitation to 
discuss the possible inclusion of the Internet and telecommunications, the British 
Council, and the BBC World Service. Once the process had begun, it appeared to 
have its own logic. James Mahoney summarised the point concisely:  
 
Once contingent events initially select a particular institution, functionalist 
logic identifies predictable self-reinforcing processes: the institution serves 
some function of the system, which causes the expansion of the institution, 
which enhances the institutions' ability to perform the useful function, which 
leads to further institutional expansion and eventually consolidation. 
(Mahoney, 1999: 519) 
 
What is striking, though, is the way in which Jennie Lee's vision of culture, by which 
she meant amenities, the environment (built and natural) and social activities that 
enhance the quality of life, were now appearing to accrete around "heritage".  The 
rationale for this institutional expansion provided by Hayden Phillips was 
administrative efficiency, but the necessarily enlarged budget brought with it an 
increase in political interest across government.  
 
Superficially the rationales for this progressive institutional expansion appeared to 
continue under the DCMS. In a brief run-through of  "the evolution of cultural 
support in the UK since 1945", Rod Fisher (writing as Director of International 
Intelligence on Culture, and Director of the European Cultural Foundation) argued 
that the creation of the DNH was the precursor of the DCMS, a view that placed him 
alongside those who believe the latter to have been just a departmental name change 
(Fisher and Gordon, 2010: 211 & 213). As will be argued, though, the Select Committee 
had identified another, more political reason, for enlargement; one which was later 
seized upon by Chris Smith when conceptualising the DCMS: "The department takes 
seriously its ability to champion its sectors with other parts of the Government, and 
to ensure that the needs of those sectors are taken into account in the framing of 
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policies" (National Heritage Committee, 1995/6: 3). While the Secretary of State for 
DNH argued the need for "coherence across the sectors" (1996/7: vii), the Select 
Committee under Gerald Kaufman had in mind the power and influence of the 
department.  
 
The National Lottery 
 
The advent of the National Lottery provided a considerable boost in public profile, 
budgetary power, and, potentially, political influence for the DNH. It was an 
institution whose importance to the British arts and cultural sectors has been 
compared with the formation of the Arts Council: (Creigh-Tyte, 1997: 321). But only 
under the DCMS and with the support of Tony Blair would its influence be exploited 
across government.  
 
The keyword here is National. Although lotteries were illegal in Britain after 1826, 
following a series of fraud scandals (one of which was mentioned earlier with respect 
to the funding of the British Museum) and changes in attitudes to gambling, they 
had been responsible for financing several great infrastructure projects since their 
inception in 1569  (P. G. Moore, 1997: 169;  DCMS Select Committee, 2001: para 7-13;  
Creigh-Tyte, 1997: 321-22). The views of an 1808 Parliamentary Committee on 
lotteries brought their character starkly into the political spotlight: "No mode of 
raising Money appears to Your Committee so burdensome, so pernicious, and so 
unproductive; no species of adventure is known, where the chances are so great 
against the adventurer, none where the infatuation is more powerful, lasting, and 
destructive" (Committee on the Laws relating to Lotteries, 24th June 1808: 12). This 
view had been common even a century earlier and notably satirised in a song from 
The Lottery, written and first performed by Henry Fielding at the Drury Lane 
Theatre on January 1st 1732: 
 
A Lottery is Taxation 
Upon all the Fools in Creation; 
and Heaven be prais'd 
it is easily raised, 
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Credulity's always in fashion. 
For Folly's a Fund, 
Will never lose ground, 
While Fools are so rife in the Nation 
(Ashton, 1893: 2) 
 
Their return into British life was formalised in the Betting and Lotteries Act 1934, but 
only at a local level. A national lottery only followed the 1978 Royal Commission on 
Gambling. Given suitable controls, the Royal Commission believed that public 
opinion had changed sufficiently that they could safely be reintroduced (Royal 
Commission on Gambling, 1978: 163-64). A strong argument had been found by 
comparison with lotteries in other countries that had shown great potential to aid 
national "good causes" (1978: 213-227). The eventual result was the National Lottery 
etc Act of 1993. 
 
In line with the laissez-faire tradition, the regulatory regime adopted was to licence a 
private "supplier" through a public body, OFLOT, empowered as regulator working 
within the DCMS. However, other than by the power to appoint its Director General, 
DCMS claimed to have no involvement in OFLOT's activities (Creigh-Tyte, 1997: 323-
24). Tenders were sought from potential operators, with the first seven-year contract 
being awarded to the Camelot Group, a consortium comprised of five large 
international corporations: Cadbury Schweppes, De La Rue, Racal Electronics, ICL 
and GTech. Their bid was assessed as potentially providing the largest amount to 
good causes over the contract period. Lottery ticket sales were to be split as follows: 
 
Figure 2:  
Percentage Distribution of National Lottery Ticket Sales 
 
50% 
 
28% 
 
12% 
 
5% 
 
5% 
 
       Prizes                                     Good Causes                  Tax          Retail-Commission Camelot 
 
118 
 
The 28% allocated to good causes was passed to five distributing bodies, listed in the 
following table:  
 
Table 3:  
Grants Announced by the Distributing Bodies to 30 July 1997 
 No of Awards Value in £m  
Arts Council  7,488 922.1 
National Lottery Charities Board 8,852 506.4 
Heritage Lottery Fund 1,169 684.7 
Millennium Commission 6,653 1,012.9 
Sports Council 3,303 657.2 
 
Totals 
 
27,465 
 
3,783.3 
Sources: (Creigh-Tyte, 1997: 527;  DCMS Select Committee, 2000b: 130) 
 
The financial impact of the Lottery was immediately clear. Taking the Arts Council 
as an example, the total of its grant-in-aid from government received since the 
Lottery was created in 1994 came to £562,911,000, compared to its receipts from the 
Lottery of £922,100,000 - a 64% increase (less costs) in its funding receipts over the 
period. An associated effect was to enhance considerable DCMS's power. That alone 
may explain Smith's revision of lottery history in his speech to the Lottery Monitor 
Conference in 1997 (C. Smith, 1998: 114-5). Tony Blair, though, saw the Lottery as 
powering more than cultural policy. In his address to the Party Conference in 2000 
he referred to the use of Lottery money by Sport England, saying:  "Today we set out 
plans to invest £750 million of lottery money in schools and community sport as part 
of a £1 billion investment over three years. ... this is not just a sports policy. It’s a 
health policy, an education policy, an anti-crime policy, an anti-drugs policy" (Blair, 
2000;  DCMS Select Committee, 2000a). The concept of culture here was not sport 
per se and certainly not the arts; it was one that reached across the social policies of 
government, embedding DCMS and the Lottery within New Labour's mission. DCMS 
appeared to have invented a cultural policy that fitted the wider ambitions of the 
New Labour government. What these policies were and how they integrated across 
government policy is the subject discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
New Labour's Cultural Policies 
 
 
Policies, Networks and Control 
 
Chris Smith had never disguised his ambitions for the DCMS. Whilst his personal 
interests in the arts showed through in speeches and policy statements, he made his 
political interests clear the first day in office: stating that their work "places the 
Department at the centre of the country’s economic life and regeneration” (C. Smith, 
1997a). This was hardly realistic with a small department that had never been other 
than at the periphery of government and with only a marginal relationship with 
economic policy. It necessarily required more than an extended concept of culture; 
the core idea of culture itself had to be reconceived. The brief study of the British 
government's interventions in cultural matters, given above, reveals the trajectory of 
changing attitudes towards an increasing interest in the public value whilst 
operationally maintaining a respectful distance. At no point had culture, by any 
definition, had a role "at the centre of the country's economic life..." (emphasis 
added). What Smith intended in declaring this ambition can only be assessed in 
retrospect and through the actions and policies of the DCMS. As will be shown, 
DCMS became primarily concerned with structures rather than with individual 
objects or actions. Culture, in this concept, became the soft osteological framework 
on which social and economic policy could be formed, although always containing 
normative and moral elements that had accreted around cultural institutions since 
their formation (Mahoney, 1999); forming, reforming and reproducing over time. 
 
These claims are supported empirically by the policies of DCMS in the context of a 
cross-government agenda, and it these that are now examined. When historically set 
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against governmental interest and action on implicitly cultural matters over two and 
half centuries two characteristics become apparent:  
 
1. In one dramatic shift, DCMS moved politically from the peripheral locus of its 
antecedents into an apparently central role in cross-government policy;  
2. and that, in contrast to the tradition of British governments' interventions in 
cultural affairs, "culture" under New Labour became a collective, ideological, 
expression for a socio-economic structure of social relations out of which a 
particular ethos of civic society could be engendered.  As Tony Blair himself 
asserted, the citizen and the state required a new relationship (Dept of Social 
Security, 1998: v) which was to be practically achieved through controls over 
associational civic life and with fiscal, legal and welfare changes that 
purported to coerce rather than demand change. In short, it was "governing 
by culture" (6, 1997) . 
This is not to suggest that New Labour's parliamentarians were knowingly and 
collectively pursuing these ideas as they are expressed here; the doxa of politics "in 
the wild" (Finlayson, 2012: 751) was never so planned. For most, their constant 
attention was on the implications of that word "New" in the light of Labour's long 
period out of office. Even New Labour's fractious triumvirate of conceptualisers; 
Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson, were engrossed in their own career 
interests and the overriding need to be re-elected.  Andrew Rawnsley put it that: 
"Whatever else happened to New Labour in government, one thing has remained 
constant. The Project was still controlled by less than a handful of men, each 
consumed with maintaining his grip on power" (Rawnsley, 2000: 392). Nevertheless, 
by joining the policy dots (particularly those drawn by Gordon Brown) marked by 
rhetoric, the claims of legislative programmes, methods of budgetary control, public 
defences of policy, and what the Audit Commission referred to as the "Delivery 
Chain" (Comptroller & Auditor General, 2006: 1), the general assertion made above 
not only makes sense, but accounts for many of the paradoxes and rhetoric of New 
Labour's cultural policy initiatives.  
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The Cultural Policies of the New Labour Government 
 
Looking back over the time since the government first facilitated the acquisition of 
the collections of Sir Hans Sloane, it has been shown that the rationales for 
government action in implicit and explicit cultural policies could be categorised as 
commercial advantage, moral development, education, national prestige, and 
entertainment (O. Bennett, 1995: 201). Chris Smith's rationales for policies that 
furthered the combined interests of DCMS were partially formed from those historic 
strands of policy. The following table makes those links by comparison with the 
language used by Chris Smith in his foreword to DCMS's foundational policy 
document, A New Cultural Framework: 
 
Table 4:   Comparing Rationales  
Past Rationales 
 
New Labour's Rationales 
Competitive advantage: "the importance of tourism" 
"the nation's economy" 
 
Health and Moral development: "social regeneration" 
"individual fulfilment and well-being" 
"social regeneration" 
 
Education: "the quality of education" 
 
National interest: "together as a community" 
 
Entertainment: "enjoyment and inspiration" 
 
 
The title of that first major policy document also suggests, though, another story. As 
a "Framework", its emphasis was on structural policies while its rationales took 
British cultural policy into the political territory of state governance for the first 
time. To explain this, the policies of DCMS are categorised in this chapter as either: 
 
(1)  New structural innovations, or  
(2) Policy directives imposed on funded NDPBs.  
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Underlying them both are four foundational "themes" or "pillars" (in Chris Smith's 
words) upon which "A new role for the DCMS" was to be built: 
 
 the promotion of access for the many not just the few 
 the pursuit of excellence and innovation 
 the nurturing of educational opportunity; and 
 the fostering of the creative industries  
(DCMS, 1998c: 2;  C. Smith, 2009) 
 
These themes, to which all policy was intended to relate, were repeated consistently 
by DCMS and Chris Smith personally in reports and interviews. They are very clearly 
aligned with New Labour policies more generally and appear to be directed less at 
cultural matters in their traditional meaning but more towards Smith's stated 
objective to give the department greater importance within government. By the time 
the department's 1999 Annual Report was published (its first full report) the 
language had hardened, extended and clarified into specific policies. The Report 
claimed that the £290 million increase in the DCMS's budget following the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) "represents a clear message that money 
spent on culture, in its widest sense, can play an important part in achieving 
Government objectives". Accordingly, the policies supporting the themes were 
adjusted closer to cross-government concerns: "DCMS is first and foremost about 
improving the quality of people's lives. But in doing that we shall also help improve 
education; to promote social inclusion; to improve economic performance; and to 
promote equal opportunities and access for all to the high quality public services" 
(DCMS, 1999a: 8). The Annual report then repeated word for word the themes 
written into the policy Framework document, prefaced with the statement that 
DCMS "will be at the heart of the 3 year programme of modernisation and social 
renewal set out in the overall public expenditure plans" (1999a: 8).  
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(1) New Structural Innovations: the Cross-Government agenda 
 
DCMS's 1999 Annual Report set-out "New DCMS aims and objectives" arising from 
"the main results of the Comprehensive Spending Review". Together with the policy 
detail and new institutional support, they represented its "New Approach to 
Investment in Culture" (1999a: 16). The table below gives a summary: 
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Table 5: New Approaches to Investment in Culture 
 
Arising from the CSR 
(quoting from the 
2009 Annual Report) 
 
Explanations  given in the Report 
 
"New DCMS aims and 
objectives" 
Although they are listed separately, it is not clear what 
differentiates "aims" and "objectives" but together they 
follow Chris Smith's "four themes" or "four pillars" mantra 
of "excellence, access, education and the creative economy" 
(C. Smith, 2009;  1998: 2).  Additionally, the Report makes 
specific an "objective" to "create an efficient and 
competitive market by removing obstacles to growth and 
unnecessary regulation so as to promote Britain's success in 
the fields of culture, media, sport and tourism at home and 
abroad". It further introduces the Department's new 
interest in urban regeneration "in pursuing sustainability 
and in combating social exclusion" (17).  
 
"A new framework of 
investment, rather 
than mere subsidy, 
designed to link public 
expenditure to specific 
outcomes" 
"Investment", the Report explains, refers to funds that 
ensure that the Department and its client bodies meet the 
requirements of the Public Service Agreements (PSAs) with 
the Treasury. In this sense it is not physical objects or 
infrastructure but "investment" in the means to pursue the 
policy objectives set by the Treasury when awarding 
departmental budgets. 
 
"A new body, QUEST, 
to help promote 
efficiency and good 
practice within that 
framework " 
The Quality, Efficiency and Standards Team - a new 
"watchdog" created and effectively controlled by DCMS. It 
is discussed separately below. 
 
"A new DCMS 
organisation, designed 
to support strategic 
aims..." 
 
The "sectoral" interests inherited from the previous DNH, 
itself formed "from bits of other Departments", were to be 
retained, but new Departmental Units were to be formed to 
"perform across DCMS various common executive tasks". 
They included a Central Appointments Unit, and Education 
Unit, the Creative Industries Unit and the Strategy Unit 
(given the lead on "access and social exclusion"). There was 
also to be a new Local, Regional and International Division  
of DCMS to work with local authorities in the UK as well as 
with other countries internationally.  
 
Explanatory text in the Report also referred to 
"streamlining" the department's work for improved 
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"efficiency and effectiveness". In practice this meant 
making policy and operational changes to its funded 
NDPBs, combining and creating new bodies. Although a 
significant issue, the legal independence of most of these 
bodies is not referred to, perhaps on the assumption that 
the Department's control's over finance and board 
appointments allowed them to make changes as they 
wished. (18). This subject is discussed below in category (2) 
- policy directives to funded NDPBs. 
 
"New Regional 
Consortia to develop 
the cultural element in 
regional bodies' and 
Government 
programmes" 
These were to bring together "DCMS' NDPBs, local 
authorities and representatives of other regional interests 
including the creative industries". Their task was to advise 
Government and to "influence, interpret and integrate 
notional sectoral strategies in the light of the individual 
region's needs". (20)  
 
"DCMS staff in 
Government offices in 
each region to 
promote DCMS aims 
across the country" 
 
Each of the nine Government Offices in the English 
Regions were to have a "senior DCMS official (grade 7)" to 
"ensure that the regional agenda is fully addressed" (19) 
 
 
The Framework document laid the ideational groundwork that was then confirmed 
in the Annual Report for broadening the policy interests of DCMS well beyond that 
of the old DNH. The policy area in which its new cultural concept was most obvious 
was in the Government's social, economic and physical regeneration agenda in 
which DCMS participated with policies for social inclusion and, as it claimed, the 
unrealised economic power of the cultural industries.  Placing culture at the heart of 
social and physical regeneration would allow the DCMS to move from a department 
at the fringes of Whitehall power-broking into the centre of the New Labour 
mission. In the words of the Framework document, DCMS would now:  
 
play a full part in 'joined-up Government', not only making the case for 
support for our sectors from other parts of Whitehall, but developing more 
integrated approaches to policy development, exploiting the links which 
already exist and arguing for recognition of the part the arts, sport, tourism, 
etc. can play in delivering Government policies beyond this Department's 
direct interests; (DCMS, 1998c: 2) 
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The DCMS 1999 Annual Report then dedicated a chapter (Chapter 9) to 
"Regeneration and Social Inclusion" policies to be realised through their 
participation in a number of cross-government initiatives (DCMS, 1999a: 76). 
Principally among them: 
 
 the PAT 10 Neighbourhood Renewal Programme - 
DCMS was to be one of the 18 teams to examine the various issues related 
to neighbourhood renewal. Arts and sport were the particular aspects of 
concern to DCMS. 
 the New Deal for Communities - 
led by DETR, DCMS was a member of the NDC Steering Groups to work 
in 17 Pathfinder Districts ("selected because their problems are very 
severe" (1999a: 77) with a fund of £800 million. DCMS also participated in 
the Sure Start programme led by the Department of Health. 
 the Social Inclusion element in culture and leisure policies -  
the main force of which was to be realised by the department's funded 
bodies under a new regime of contracts that tied them to DCMS policy 
(this is discussed below). In addition, libraries were highlighted as the 
"cornerstone" in the National Grid for Learning. The Lottery-funded New 
Opportunities Fund was another new institutional tool for social 
inclusion, particularly as it might support the Priority Areas Initiative of 
the English Sports Council. Tourism was argued to have a role in 
promoting social inclusion, but the mechanism by which this might be 
effected was not detailed. 
 the Regional Development Agencies - 
Established on April 1st 1999 and covering the English regions, these were 
to have "business-led boards" with responsibility for regional regeneration 
and economic development. No specific role for DCMS is mentioned in 
the Annual Report, except that it claims they, the RDAs, would "make a 
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significant contribution to the quality of life in the regions and to 
attracting investors" (78).  
 Regional Cultural Strategies - (discussed below); 
 Sustainable Development policies - 
This expressions appears throughout the Annual report, with references to 
"sustainable use" of Millennium projects, "sustainable public access to 
World Heritage sites", "sustainable domestic film industry", "sustainable 
tourism", and "sustainable communities". "Sustainable development" 
though, has a section in the Report to itself in which tourism, in 
particular, is featured "in ensuring a better quality of life for everyone". 
How this was to be achieved was not explained. 
 Environment-Friendly policies - 
Obligations for "greening" and environmental improvements were 
contained in DCMS's PSA, to be achieved by the British Tourist Authority, 
the Royal Parks Agency, and "the larger NDPBs".   
 
Policy Action Teams 
 
The DCMS's inclusion in the cross-Government policies of regeneration and social 
inclusion, to which Chapter 9 of the Annual Report was devoted, took "excellence, 
access, education and the creative economy" collectively into new governance 
territory. This extension arose, it was stated, "following the Social Exclusion Unit's 
recent [1998] report" (noting DCMS's conscious rewording of "exclusion" to 
"inclusion") that set-out a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal (Social 
Exclusion Unit, 1998). The SEU was "to report to the Prime Minister [Tony Blair] on 
how to 'develop integrated and sustainable approaches to the problems of the worst 
housing estates, including crime, drugs, unemployment, community breakdown, 
and bad schools, etc.'" (1998: 3). While its remit covered only England it was also 
stated that "the analysis underlying the report, and the priority accorded to solving 
the problems identified is shared by the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland 
Offices. The Government will pursue vigorously action to address the issues in all 
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four countries using measures appropriate to each situation" (1998: 3). The SEU's 
report brought together new and existing Government policies central to New 
Labour's mission, among them the New Deal for Communities, Sure Start, 
Employment Zones and the Education and Health Action Zones, with the collective 
aim of "setting in motion a virtuous circle of regeneration, with improvements in 
jobs, crime, education, health and housing all reinforcing each other" (1998: 9). And 
to achieve all this, every Government department was asked to participate in a 
"joined-up", "national strategy" of: 
 
 Investing in people, not just buildings 
 involving communities, not parachuting in solutions 
 developing integrated approaches with clear leadership 
 ensuring mainstream policies really work for the poorest 
neighbourhoods 
 making a long-term commitment with sustained political authority 
(1998: 10) 
 
Institutionally, collaboration was realised by the representation of eleven "Whitehall 
Departments" on eighteen "cross-cutting action teams" or Policy Action Teams 
(PATs), with "the whole process co-ordinated by the Social Exclusion Unit" (1998: 11). 
The overriding rationale given for the SEUs' work was summarised simply as 
"National Programmes to tackle the causes of social exclusion" (1998: 52), but this 
challenge contained the most intractable problems every government has to face:  
unemployment, the benefits system, crime and drugs, the problems faced by young 
people, housing, the environment, public health generally and mental health 
specifically.  
 
Of the eighteen PATs, the DCMS was to participate in ten, with Tony Banks leading 
PAT 10 on Arts & Sport. 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
Table 6:  
 Policy Actions Teams in which the DCMS Participated 
Issue PAT title 
"Getting People to Work" Skills 
"Getting the Place to Work" Unpopular Housing 
 Community Self-help 
                                  Arts & Sport (Lead Department) 
"A Future for Young People" Schools Plus 
 Young People 
"Access to Services" Information Technology 
"Making the Government Work Better" Learning Lessons 
 Joining it up locally 
 Better information 
Data source: (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998: 58-59) 
 
On the face of it, the breadth of issues addressed within this list appeared to 
demonstrate the importance of culture, media and sports policy to government 
ambitions. As the table below shows, DCMS participated in more than half the PATs, 
making their contribution greater than that of the DTI, the DSS and even the 
Cabinet Office. On the other hand, it also suggests the Government's rhetoric was 
somewhat disingenuous. A strategy to deal with the major socio-economic problems 
of the time but with the comparatively minor involvement of the DSS and the DTI is 
curious. Research on the "Task Force Revolution" by Democratic Audit lists all the 
PATs as the responsibility of the Cabinet Office (Barker, Byrne et al., 1999: 43-54), yet 
their participation in only two teams, and leading none, also begs questions of how 
strategy and policy were aligned. 
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Table 7 
Departmental Participation in Policy Action Teams 
Department No. of PATs 
Social Exclusion Unit 18 
Dept of the Environment, Transport & the Regions 18 
Dept of Education and Employment 14 
Her Majesty's Treasury 12 
Home Office 12 
Dept of Culture, Media and Sport 10 
Department of Health 10 
Dept of Trade & Industry 9 
Dept of Social Security 9 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food 2 
Cabinet Office 2 
Data source: (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998: 58-59) 
 
DCMS also claimed a number of its policies as "social inclusion element[s]", not just 
those arising from the work of the Social Exclusion Unit, notably: 
 
 The "Outcomes" required of its funded NDPBs; 
 Libraries - "a cornerstone of the National Grid for Learning" which can 
"develop community organisational capacity, help people develop community 
pride and confidence, and contribute significantly to people's quality of life"; 
 English Sports Council Priority Area Initiatives - bringing Lottery funding to 
deprived areas; 
 The Lottery's New Opportunities Fund - and its first initiative, Healthy Living 
Centres; 
 Community Access to Lifelong Learning; 
 Inclusive, Sustainable Tourism "spreading the benefits of tourism through 
society". (DCMS, 1999a: 78-79) 
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In effect, the DCMS was taking on policy issues of concern to government generally 
but fitted to the new and extended cultural remit DCMS had given itself.  
 
Regional Cultural Consortia 
 
Another of DCMS's early initiatives were eight new Regional Cultural Consortia. The 
aim was to bring together a wide range of organisations within each region (as 
defined geographically by the Regional Development Authorities) to "identify 
regional policy priorities and themes" and "to contribute to the development of 
regional economic strategies" (DCMS, 1999a: 80). They were “charged with ensuring 
that culture and creativity have a strong voice in the developing regional picture and 
that they play a full and coherent part in contributing to increasing prosperity and 
enjoyment of life in the regions” (DCMS, 2001a: 146). In this way, they would 
"champion cultural and creative interests" and "promote the role of culture, tourism 
and the creative industries in economic development, regeneration and social 
inclusion” (2001a: 125). The breadth of interests represented in these bodies was, 
though, extremely wide with no defined mechanisms for agreeing their "policies, 
priorities and themes". The 2000 DCMS Annual Report explains their constitution in 
these words:  
 
The Secretary of State appoints the Chairs of the Regional Cultural 
Consortiums. Nominations to the membership of the consortiums are made 
by the regional arts, museums, heritage, tourism and sporting public bodies, 
library and archive interests, the Regional Development Agency, and local 
government. Other interests may be invited to join the consortium, 
particularly from the creative industries and also from National Lottery 
distributors, countryside, recreation and educational interests and the 
voluntary sector. The major task of the consortium will be to draw up a 
regional cultural strategy that will set out the future of cultural, creative and 
sporting activity in the region (DCMS, 2000: 108). 
 
It is also noteworthy that the RCCs had no remit and little money to take any action 
on their own account, but each were given the improbable task of developing a 
cultural strategy (itself not defined) that all its participating members would enact. 
Their value to Government policy appeared to be in the presumption that out of 
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discourse and networking would arise common aims among the participants 
together with collaborative strategies for their realisation.  In a detailed paper on the 
Regional Cultural Consortia, Jane Lutz refers to RCCs as "characterized by flirting 
with notions of devolution and regional autonomy" (Lutz, 2006: 26). One of the 
tasks they undertook, apparently in preparation for regional devolution, was 
research and data collection, although their work targetted mostly economic  
factors. As a number of researchers have identified, the lack of supporting data 
remained a major weakness of New Labour's cultural policy (Evans, 2005;  Evans and 
Shaw, 2004;  S. Miles and Paddison, 2005;  Selwood, 2002). What remains  
significant,  though, with or without appropriate data, is the manner in which these 
bodies quickly became links in the DCMS policy chain. 
 
The DCMS Task Forces 
 
There have been few attempts to list the extent of the "bacterial growth" of New 
Labour's task forces, advisory groups and policy review groups, perhaps because 
information on them was seemingly evanescent or never recorded (Barker, Byrne et 
al., 1999: 7). The research body, Democratic Audit, published in 1999 the most 
extensive guide of these phenomena, listing all those that had been "invented by the 
Blair administration" (1999: 7) since coming to power. Although their report includes 
the centrally-formed PATs under their book's title of "Ruling by Task Force", the 
DCMS 1999 Annual Report treats the Task Forces separately, the former being an 
outcome of the cross-government initiatives arising from the SEU Report, and the 
latter concerning internal DCMS own policy generation, research and "watchdogs". 
Excluding the PATs, Democratic Audit lists 30 Task Forces, Policy Review Panels, 
Forums and their sub-groups, and working groups.  
 
In one sense they appear as a genuine move towards more open, inclusive 
government as their membership included practitioners and critics among the 
political and governmental representatives. This practice follows, too, the style seen 
in the formation of the Regional Cultural Consortia and in the principles of cross-
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government action on shared socio-economic ambitions. In the wake of the 1995 
Nolan Committee report, "openness" might be expected in making appointments to 
these bodies but, in practice, Democratic Audit claimed that "Senior civil servants 
talk of appointments in terms of 'being invited to the party'" as "invitations are made 
outside the Nolan rules which govern appointments to public bodies... " (Democratic 
Audit, 1999).  
 
(2) DCMS Policy,  Directives & its funded NDPBs  
In discussing "the main results of the Comprehensive Spending Review outcome", 
DCMS's 1999 Annual Report refers specifically to an additional £290 million in 
funding from the Treasury over three years, but "with strings attached".  Those 
strings tied the money to the creation of  "A new framework of investment, rather 
than mere subsidy, designed to link public expenditure to specific outcomes". This 
implied a greater control of cultural policies that had, until then, been largely a 
matter for each individual, legally independent, NDPB. As discussed above, one way 
to achieve this was to form new institutions or projects in fields in which the NDPBs 
operated, particularly where that work carried the interests of DCMS across the 
Government's policy agenda. However, that route still left the activities of the 
funded NDPBs themselves outside the Department's control. Two approaches were 
taken to rectify this: 
 
1. The creation of work programmes, defined by DCMS, that existing or new 
NDPBs would undertake; and   
2. Changes in DCMS's relationship with the NDPBs from one that was 
relatively undefined (the "arm's length" relationship) to one based on a 
contract which required them to achieve the objectives of DCMS as passed 
down from the Treasury in the PSAs.  
 
1. New work programmes  
 
This group of policies are in a category that concerns the activities of existing NDPBs 
across all DCMS's sectoral interests. They are differentiated here from the "structural 
134 
 
innovations", discussed above, and from the mechanism by which the policy 
objectives of funded NDPBs could be influenced or even directed by contract 
(discussed below). The ambitions that underlay all DCMS's structural ambitions 
were also embedded in these policies, most especially extending public access to the 
work of the NDPBs (DCMS, 1999a: 40), improving their efficiency and 
competitiveness (50), and improving "value for money" granted to the NDPBs (84). 
Some of the work programmes were quite practical, examples being measures 
against doping in sport, the "rescue" proposals for Stonehenge, and "Marking the 
Millennium". Others, such as free entry to museums for children, directed the 
policies of funded bodies to meet Labour's political objectives or commitments. 
More indicative of the deeper changes being instigated by DCMS were the new 
institutions and programmes that drew the work of the NDPBs into the ambit of 
departmental policy and strategy. A selection of the main new initiatives is given 
here: 
 
 
Table 8:  New Policy Initiatives  
Sector 
 
Policies 
Arts:   Creation of a New Audiences Fund - "to 
broaden access to the arts to the widest 
possible audience", to be administrated 
by the Arts Council. 
 
Establishment of the Youth Music Trust, 
run in conjunction with the Department 
for Education and Employment's Fair 
Funding Initiative. 
 
National Lottery:       Establishment of the Lottery 
Commission to replace the single 
regulator. 
 
Creation of the "Awards for All" Lottery 
scheme for local community groups. 
 
Establishment of a new fund for health, 
education and the environment. 
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Museums: A new £15 million museums 
improvement fund. 
 
Work undertaken with the Heritage 
Lottery Fund to "institute" a new "access 
fund". 
 
Sport: The Introduction of measures "to protect 
against the sell-off of school playing 
fields". 
 
The creation of "world class training and 
back-up facilities for elite sports people". 
 
To "Finalise" plans for a UK Sports 
Institute. 
 
Heritage:   Establishment of a national "Champion" 
for architecture. 
 
Broadcasting: Extending the list of "protected" sports 
events that must be shown on free-to-air 
television 
 
Film: Establishment of the Film Finance 
Forum.  
Opening of a British Film Office in Los 
Angeles 
 
Establishment of British Film - a body to 
"help" channel Lottery funds into film 
and coordinate Government support for 
film. 
 
Creative Industries:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establishing NESTA with Lottery funds 
to help develop ideas in the arts, 
sciences and technology. 
 
Producing a mapping document 
showing the value of the creative 
industries prior to "establishing an 
agenda for action by Government and 
industry". 
 
Promoting creativity through "Creative 
Partnerships" between schools and 
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creative professionals. The programme 
was funded by DCMS via the Arts 
Council and an independent charity, 
Creativity, Culture and Education. It was 
operated by more than 20 organisations 
across the country. 
Tourism: "develop plans for a more strategic body 
[than the British Tourist Authority] to 
support tourism in England". 
 
Work to "realise the full potential of the 
New Deal within tourism". 
 
Libraries: DCMS requirement for library 
authorities "to produce annual plans as a 
means of monitoring the quality of 
service and driving up standards". 
 
Millennium: Completion of the Millennium Dome 
and other Millennium plans. 
 
 
 
QUEST 
 
Among the proposals in the 1998 New Cultural Framework was a new body, referred 
to as a "Watchdog": the Quality, Efficiency and Standards Team, usually abbreviated 
to QUEST. Its creation was one of the changes "central to the new relationship 
which DCMS is developing with its sponsored bodies and with the sectors more 
broadly". The absence of any guidance to what was "quality", what was "efficient", 
and what would meet the Department's "standard" meant, though, that QUEST was 
also a rein with which to control the policy direction of the NDPBs, something 
further confirmed by that aggressive, adversarial, description: "Watchdog". As the 
Framework document stated: "We need to ensure that sponsored bodies meet our 
objectives and deliver improvements in efficiency, access, etc. in return for the 
investment of public money". The role of QUEST was stated as being "to identify, 
evaluate and promote good practice in the delivery of outputs related to DCMS 
objectives across all our responsibilities..." (DCMS, 1998c: 14). DCMS argued 
proleptically that its work would not duplicate that of the National Audit Office nor 
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the Audit Commission although, as will be seen later, the Culture, Media and Sport 
Select Committee was unconvinced about this.  
 
The 1999 Annual Report added a little to the description of QUEST's brief, referring 
to "The emphasis on outcomes and the development of contractual links" with its 
"sponsored bodies and with the wider 'constituency' of practitioners", before adding 
that QUEST was to "provide independent advice to the Secretary of State on the 
performance of sponsored bodies in meeting our objectives [viz, those of the 
DCMS]" (DCMS, 1999a: 18). In operation, the QUEST would be formed of  "a small 
core team supported by individuals from sponsored bodies, the wider cultural sector, 
local Government and the private sector".  Although it was to be "independent of 
DCMS" (DCMS, 2000: 29, 67), senior appointments were to be made by the DCMS 
and its "annual work programme" would have to be agreed in advance with the 
Secretary of State (DCMS, 1999a: 18).  
 
The QUEST was finally formed in July 1999 with the initial task of "looking at 
strengthening the funding agreement process" (DCMS, 2000: 18), a task that 
explicitly added to the argument that it was a departmental instrument for policy 
enforcement. Indeed, the whole idea of "best practice" was said by DCMS to be 
"indirect policy persuasion" (DCMS, 2001a: 51;  2000: 37). In June, 2001,  QUEST 
"agreed a framework for future work with the Secretary of State which it used as the 
basis for consultation with sponsored bodies and others". It set-out three "broad 
themes", the first of which was again explicit about: "how sponsored bodies are best 
delivering specific Government objectives for the cultural and sporting sectors..." 
(DCMS, 2001a: 124). By 2002, the DCMS had published four QUEST reports on social 
inclusion, the contractual agreements with funded bodies, e-commerce and the 
internet, and a review of Lottery application processes (QUEST, 2002a, 2000b, a, 
2002b). 
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2. Public Service Agreements and the "Delivery Chain" 
 
The most radical structural change implemented by the DCMSs, particularly in an 
historical perspective, was to co-opt its "sectoral interests" into the New Labour 
mission by contract (DCMS, 1999a: 19), by which was meant the work of the NDPBs. 
The principle behind this was not, though, a New Labour innovation. As mentioned 
above, in Tracing the Path (3), the recommendation of the 1996 National Heritage 
Select Committee had proposed just such a change (National Heritage Committee, 
1995/6: xii), which was then incorporated into the Department's plans under the 
explicit heading of "Funding Agreements" (Department of National Heritage, 1996: 
66). This action ran counter to a tradition of "arm's length" policy independence for 
most of the Government funded NDPBs, a principle with historic roots demanded by 
Keynes during the formation of the Arts Council and reinforced by Lord Redcliffe 
Maud's 1976 report for the Gulbenkian Foundation (Redcliffe-Maud, 1976).  
 
Redcliffe-Maud's use of the arm's-length metaphor was far from original but 
nevertheless characterised the Arts Council's relationship with the government as 
being “… a satisfactory substitute for the old patrons of the past …” and which “…by 
self-denying ordinance the politicians leave the [Arts] Council free to spend as it 
thinks fit” (1976: 24). His report captured the essence of an existing arrangement 
which others then quickly appropriated into a seemingly immutable natural law of 
artistic rights in Britain. The change of government after the 1997 General Election 
prevented the DNH from fulfilling its plans for funding contracts, leaving little 
indication of what terms they might have contained.  However, it is quite 
conceivable, perhaps even probable, that they would have stipulated no more than a 
requirement for the NDPBs to act with probity and efficiency, respecting 
employment laws and anti-discrimination practices. The terms of the contract 
imposed by DCMS were quite different. 
 
The origin of the contracts DCMS formed with its clients was in the Public Service 
Agreement (PSA) between the Treasury and the DCMS that set out how the 
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Department's spending "will deliver Government objectives alongside increased 
efficiency and improved effectiveness" (DCMS, 1999a: 17). In Tony Blair's words, they 
were "... setting targets right across the public services ... . PSAs set out each 
departments aims and objectives in services or in the results of those services ... in 
concrete targets" (HM Treasury, 1998: Foreword). But the most emphatic claim came 
from the Treasury itself, saying: "The Public Service Agreements ... are at the cutting 
edge of a revolution in the way public services are managed ... These PSAs are part of 
the biggest drive to modernise public services our country has ever seen" (HM 
Treasury, 1999: Foreword).  
 
The PSA set overall "Performance Targets" for the DCMS, with a rationale explained 
in the 1999 Annual Report: 
 
All areas for which the Department is responsible have a role in delivering the 
Government’s wider social, educational and economic objectives. The 
Department plays a leading role in developing the quality of life of the nation, 
funding cultural organisations, regulating broadcasting and the new media, 
and fostering sporting activity. All these activities are important to the 
economy – whether tourism or the creative industries. They are sectors in 
which employment opportunities are expanding and are central to improving 
the quality of life and tackling social exclusion (1999a: 95). 
 
The obligations it contained were listed under four headings aimed at three 
"objectives" within which were some quite specific targets: 
 
Table 9:   PSA Objectives and Targets 
 
Heading Objective Performance Targets 
 
To increase national 
productivity 
1  Facilitate competitiveness 
 Promote high quality sustainable 
tourism 
 Develop proposal for a broadcasting 
regulatory system 
 Promote competitiveness in 
broadcasting 
 Ensure broadcasters sustain quality 
and output 
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 Implement a strategy to develop the 
film industry 
 
To Widen Access 2 & 3  Increase the numbers of children 
and pensioners visiting  national 
museums (following the removal of 
entry charges) 
 Increase access to the performing 
arts with 300,000 new opportunities 
to experience the arts 
 Establish a £15 million Challenge 
Fund to raise standard of care for 
collections and public access in 
Designated Museums 
 Extend social inclusiveness in 
identified priority social groups [not 
defined] 
 Maintain and ensure standards of 
inclusiveness in broadcasting to 
harness the educational potential of 
DCMS funded institutions 
 200,000 new educational sessions 
undertaken by arts organisations 
 Double the Internet connections in 
75% of libraries by 2002 
 
To Agree New Standards 
of Effectiveness 
All  Make funding of NDPBs conditional 
on quantified improvements in 
outputs - efficiency, access, quality, 
and income generation/private 
sector funding 
 Improve efficiency by completing 
efficiency review 
 
To Streamline Policy 
Delivery Mechanisms 
All  Establish new funding council for 
the performing and visual arts and 
film; create a new strategic body for 
museums, libraries and archives; 
change existing frameworks for 
heritage, sport and tourism so as to 
save £23 million 
 Establish the new Film Council by 
April 2000 with objectives to 
develop film culture and a 
sustainable industry 
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 Transfer responsibilities for the 
Heritage Grant Fund to English 
Heritage 
 Establish a new Lottery Commission 
and transfer responsibilities 
 Lottery funding to achieve a proper 
balance between capital and 
revenue schemes and geographic 
spread 
 Devolve decisions where possible 
 
Sources: (DCMS, 1999a: 94-97;  HM Treasury, 1998: 107-112).  
While the text is a précis, the vocabulary is largely that used in the source documents. Sara Selwood 
also produced a summary of these objectives and targets together with some historical comparisons, 
although her concern was primarily for the arts (see Selwood, 1999). 
 
 
A number of the requirements of the PSA simply enshrine the Department's policy 
initiatives, but others demonstrate the depth of the conceptual shift in which DCMS 
was engaged. The effectiveness of individual policies or actions can be debated, but 
the significance of the move towards detailed control of the whole breath of cultural 
policy, itself now concerned with cross-government social, educational and 
economic policies, has a greater significance. In this respect, one particular clause is 
revealing: under the heading "To Agree new Standards of Effectiveness" is the 
requirement to make "funding of NDPBs conditional on quantified improvements in 
outputs - efficiency, access, quality, and income generation/private sector funding" 
(DCMS, 1999a: 96). It is this clause that effectively ratified the notion that DCMS 
pass on to its funded clients the policy demands made upon it under the PSA. The 
consequence of this requirement was to create a policy "chain", ultimately linking 
the Treasury to thousands of organisations and individuals across the country in 
receipt of financial support from the NDPBs. The links of this chain were to be 
assayed with quantitative evidence that measured success in achieving "outputs" 
and, rather more improbably, their "quality". 
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The "Delivery Chain" 
 
In March 2006 the National Audit Office of the Audit Commission published a 
report into the mechanisms by which the Labour Government “delivered” its policies 
both through its departments and Government funded NDPBs. It used the 
expression “delivery chain” to describe the process, defining it in the following way: 
 
“A delivery chain refers to the complex network of organisations, including 
central and local government agencies, and bodies from the private and third 
sectors, that need to work together to achieve or deliver an improved public 
sector outcome defined through a central government Public Service 
Agreement.” (Comptroller & Auditor General, 2006: 1).  
 
The report described four types of delivery chain: 
 
1. Those based solely on “Internal links” within departments; 
2. Those requiring “Contractual or regulatory links” with external bodies; 
3. Links with “common purpose”, such as might exist between a housing 
association and a local authority; 
4. Links into the “wider community” which, to be effective, relied on coercion or 
persuasion to align the actions of community groups with Government policy. 
 
The PSAs fell within type 2, although their origination may owe something to type 1 
and their subsequent effects were intended to affect types 3 and 4. They are the 
source of the policies that were then formulated by each department, in this case 
DCMS, into conditions attached to agreements as funds were transmitted to their 
clients. The conditions of the PSA were initially defined by the Treasury, but it fell to 
each department to decide how they were to be achieved. As a consequence, in 
setting policies to its funded bodies the DCMS added and altered conditions. Where 
funds were then passed further down the funding line, for example the grant-in-aid 
to the Arts Council, these conditions were further adjusted before being imposed, in 
turn, on its own clients. In effect then, every recipient of state grants or financial 
assistance was unilaterally co-opted into the consanguineous policy objectives 
originated by HM Treasury.   
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As mentioned above, the PSAs also required a base point from which the value 
returned by the money awarded, the "outputs", could be measured. In this respect, 
the Audit Commission said, “It is essential that the achievement of a PSA target will 
be measured appropriately” (Comptroller & Auditor General, 2006: 14). The resulting 
complexity of this simple statement became most apparent when the "outputs" of 
each funded organisation were passed back up the delivery chain for eventual 
assessment by the progenitor of its demands; HM Treasury. To demonstrate the 
process by example, a brief case study of the City of Birmingham Symphony 
Orchestra follows. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Case Study:  
 
Down and Up the Delivery Chain -  the example of the City of Birmingham 
Symphony Orchestra 
 
The City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra (CBSO) is an independent charitable 
trust formed from a private company limited by guarantee and financially reliant on 
the support of the Arts Council England (ACE) and the Birmingham City Council. 
The CBSO has its own objectives that are formed and maintained ultimately by its 
trustees. They are:  
 
1. To give a high concentration of concerts in Birmingham; 
2. To present a wide range of musical activities; 
3. To be an international ambassador [for Birmingham]; 
4. To give performances of the highest possible quality; 
5. To perform to the widest possible range of people. 
(Maddock, 2006a) 
 
The origins of the first four objectives predate its funding arrangements.  Only one, 
the fifth, is a subsequent concession to its funding bodies.  
 
The PSA DCMS contracted with the Treasury for the period 2005 to 2008 was an 
outcome of the 2004 Spending Review. Structurally it was similar to that arising 
from the 1998 review discussed above and the following 2000 and 2002 reviews (HM 
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Treasury, 2000, 2002), and its policy objectives were extensions of those resulting 
from those reviews. In essence they come down to New Labour's consistent themes 
from 1997: broadening access, increasing economic performance and increasing 
efficiency, but they contain many more precise quantitative targets.  It listed the 
performance targets under four main objectives, all of which may be interpreted to 
contain ambitions for the arts (as part of a broad definition of  "implicit" culture). 
They were: 
 
1. “Further enhance access to culture and sport for children and give them the 
opportunity to develop their talents to the full and enjoy the full benefits of 
participation.” 
2. “Increase and broaden the impact of culture and sport, to enrich individual 
lives, strengthen communities and improve the places where people live, 
now and for future generations.” 
3. “Maximise the contribution which the tourism, creative and leisure 
industries can make to the economy.” 
4. “Modernise delivery by ensuring our sponsored bodies are efficient and 
work with others to meet the cultural and sporting needs of individuals and 
communities.” 
(HM Treasury, 2004a: 35;  see also HM Treasury, 2004b) 
 
The sub-sections of Objectives 1 and 4 contain no further reference to arts or culture, 
but Objective 2 does. By 2008 it required the DCMS to; 
 
increase the take-up of cultural and sporting opportunities by adults and 
young people aged 16 and above from priority groups by : 
 
o increasing the number who participate in active sports at least 
twelve times a year, by 3%, and increasing the number who engage 
in at least 30 minutes of moderate intensity level sport at least 
three times a week, by 3%; 
o increasing the number who participate in an arts activity at least 
twice a year by 2%, and increasing the number who attend arts 
events at least twice a year by 3%; 
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o increasing the number accessing museums and galleries collections 
by 2%; and 
increasing the number visiting designated historic environment 
sites by 3%. 
 
The single sub-section of Objective 3 simply says: “By 2008, improve the productivity 
of the tourism, creative and leisure industries.” (2004a: 35) 
 
The funds that were granted by ACE to the CBSO came from the DCMS grant-in-aid, 
which itself was received from the Treasury under the PSA. In its 2005 Annual 
Report DCMS confirmed the co-option of ACE in realising the "outputs" required of 
the PSA:  
 
“Our target to increase the number of adults benefiting from the arts is being 
delivered through Arts Council England and its partnership organisations. 
This will build on their existing approach to target as many people as possible 
in accordance with their cultural diversity priority and sharing information 
learned from the £20 million New Audiences programmes” (DCMS, 2005: 35). 
 
The point was made again later in the Report, but this time extending itself to direct 
how the Arts Council should deliver the policy objectives:  
 
The package of interventions underpinning this objective will be delivered by 
Arts Council England, managed and monitored through the Funding 
Agreement with DCMS. Arts Council England will work through three main 
funding channels: regularly funded organisations (RFOs), grants for the arts 
(open application funds) and flexible funds (which are not open to 
application) 
(DCMS, 2005: 60). 
 
Given the Arts Council's fifty years of policy independence, some resistance to this 
co-option might have been expected. In fact, in an interview with ACE’s Director of 
Corporate Programmes, Helen Flach, she was quite accepting, saying that “We are 
the lead delivery agency for the arts in achieving the DCMS PSA targets” (Flach, 
2006). Difficulties of defining the targeted "priority" social groups were also side-
stepped as she added “The Treasury decides what is art, so they decide who is 
included in the measurements against the PSA”.  
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ACE Grant to the CBSO 
 
Funds for the CBSO, as a "Regularly Funded Organisation", or RFO, were awarded 
under a contract with ACE, through its West Midlands office. The contract 
contained two parts: a “Funding Agreement” and “Standard Conditions for Grants”. 
The latter is of little interest to the subject of this essay as its conditions were 
unrelated to policy but dealt with procedural matters, legal liabilities, and 
contingencies. However, the Funding Agreement committed the CBSO to two 
conditions that could affect its operational practises. To quote from the Agreement: 
 
4.2 carrying out the plan of activity set out in outline in appendix 1 and detailed 
in the plan of activity agreed by the Arts Council prior to beginning each year; 
4.3 participating and cooperating in the monitoring and review process set out in 
appendix 3. 
 
Appendix 1 described the required “activity” as being: "To operate a world-class 
symphony orchestra offering a season of concerts at Birmingham Symphony Hall 
and elsewhere together with a full range of associated education and outreach 
programmes, a full chorus, youth orchestra and youth chorus". Within a clause in 
the appendix entitled “Other specific requirements” it also required the CBSO to 
“…provide evidence that you have continued to discuss and take forward the 
development of an effective plan for your organisation to address the issue of race 
equality/diversity.” (Arts Council England, 2006a). 
 
All these conditions sat comfortably with the CBSO’s own objects. However, the 
conditions in appendix 3 were more problematic. It began by restating the 
responsibilities ACE had imposed on it by DCMS, saying: “We are required by the 
terms of our funding agreement with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
to monitor the performance of the organisations we fund”. Clause 4 of the appendix 
then continues; 
 
The annual review will consider your performance under the terms of this 
agreement, against the targets you have set in your detailed plan of activity and 
in relation to ambitions for the arts, which are:  
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 supporting the artist 
 enabling organisations to thrive, not just survive 
 championing diversity 
 offering opportunities to young people 
 encouraging growth. 
 
Together, those requirements took the CBSO's responsibilities beyond its own 
objects, demanding ambitions that had not been seen before at any point in the 
policy delivery chain. In effect, they required that the CBSO assist ACE to achieve its 
“ambitions for the arts”, even though several were arguably beyond the powers of the 
CBSO to affect to any noticeable degree. Interestingly, the agreement made no 
comment on any data collection requirements nor how the CBSO’s "outputs" could 
be measured. 
 
 
Climbing the Chain 
 
In making funding applications, Stephen Maddock recognised that funders’ 
requirements may not, indeed probably would not, coincide with the objectives of 
the orchestra. “Everyone running an arts organisation has to learn how to play the 
game. In any case, the criteria are always changing so you can never match-up what 
you actually do with what you say you’ll do” (Maddock, 2006b). The most difficult 
examples of unsympathetic requirements actually appeared to arise with funding 
applications to the European Union. A CBSO project to present all of Igor 
Stravinsky's works under the City Council’s “Urban Fusion” programme required an 
application for European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) made under their 
“Image enhancement” criterion (Robinson, 2006) 1. ERDF funds were assessed by 
their economic “outputs” so, rather absurdly, the application required evidence that 
the funds would “improve productivity”, produce “better quality products” and 
“reduce costs”, and that there must be “New sales generated by the intervention” and 
a vocational “Training place” must be created (2006). This application was then 
made to the City Council which compiled it into a larger application for part of the 
                                                     
1 Then Director of the Regional, European and International Division of Birmingham City Council 
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ERDF budget held by the Region Development Authority, which was then assessed 
initially by Government Office West Midlands. It was then judged against other 
strategic programmes that fitted the criteria for the whole region’s Objective 2 ERDF 
allocation before making its way to Brussels.   
 
For the CBSO, the uncertainties of European funding were, Maddock said, a 
comparatively small problem as applications were infrequent and always project-
based. Rather, it was somewhere along the Treasury-DCMS-ACE-CBSO delivery 
chain that the task of meeting the Government’s PSA requirements and the 
orchestra’s own objectives created the most turbulence. That is not to say that the 
ACE agreement caused the CBSO severe practical difficulties, but that the 
interlinked process allowed the PSA requirements to be altered, sometimes quite 
substantially, creating a confusion of purpose. Sir Michael Lyons1 asked the question, 
“Is the CBSO an appropriate subject for a PSA?”, “In a rationally managed world you 
would expect the PSA to be agreed directly with the end-client” (Lyons, 2006). 
Stephen Maddock expressed it more directly, saying that funding rationales were 
subject to “knowingly disingenuous deceit on the way down from Treasury” 
(Maddock, 2006a). Lyons appeared to place the source of problems with the 
Treasury, whilst Maddock found them in the interpretation of the PSA in the process 
of delivery.  
 
The Delivery Chain and Data Collection 
 
The Arts Council was charged by DCMS with two types of task: the first was to 
deliver “the package of interventions” that must achieve DCMS’s objectives, and the 
second to collect data that measured the effects of the actions taken. DCMS was 
conscious that data from which performance indicators were produced lacked any 
base-line position (Davey, 2006b)2 so made it a primary requirement that ACE 
should “establish target baseline and finalise trajectories for 2006-07 and 2007-08.” 
                                                     
1
 Then Chairman of the CBSO, ex Chief Executive of Birmingham City Council, Honorary Professor of 
Public Policy at Birmingham University, author of the Lyons Report for HM Treasury, and ex BBC 
Chairman. 
2
 Then Director of Arts and Culture, Department of Culture, Media & Sport. Now Chief Executive of 
Arts Council England 
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(DCMS, 2006: 9), although Davey stated that this had not yet been achieved. It may 
therefore seem curious that ACE’s contract with the CBSO did not contain any 
requirements for data collection. But there appears to be a reason for this; the 
specific requirements of DCMS’s PSA in this period, unlike  the obligations DCMS 
has passed to ACE, were all numerical in nature and did not socially differentiate 
within the targets. Capturing qualitative social data was a completely impractical 
task for the CBSO. The only source of raw data of attendances at CBSO concerts was 
that recorded by box office systems when selling tickets. Understandably, the selling 
process did not record age, social group, nor ethnicity. Even the box office data from 
concerts at the same venue were irreconcilable with actual attendances as any 
multiple purchase (viz. for two or more tickets) was only recorded as a single 
purchaser. This issue, by the way, affected galleries even more than theatres and 
concert halls, most particularly in the period of free entry when no tickets were 
issued (Kawashima, 2006: 62;  Bailey and Falconer, 1998). In any case, the data did 
not belong to the CBSO but to the venue and without each customer’s individual 
consent, information could not be shared under data protection legislation 1. Though 
Though some data collection was undertaken by the CBSO from its outreach and 
community programmes, it represented only a small part of its activities. For ACE to 
require the CBSO to provide statistics was practically pointless. 
 
Nevertheless, ACE did collect some data towards the obligations of the PSA. It came 
primarily from two sources: 
 
1. The “Taking Part” survey, described by ACE as  “… a major continuous survey 
that will ask nearly 30,000 members of the public every year about their 
attendance at a wide variety of arts events, museums, galleries, libraries and 
heritage sites; and their participation in creative activities and sport”. The 
figures eventually published were therefore a projection from a large and 
                                                     
1
 The DPA of 1998 replaced the 1984 Act and the Access to Personal Files Act of 1987 following the 
European Data Protection Directive of 1995. 
150 
 
statistically significant sample of the English public. The survey was 
commissioned by DCMS1.   
2. The “Statistical Survey of Regularly Funded Organisations”. This survey, it 
claimed, “provides essential information for reporting to the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Treasury about what has been 
achieved as a result of their funding” (Arts Council England, 2006b: 1). 
Matching the data to DCMS’s requirements was, however, not possible. The 
“constant sample” from which comparisons were drawn were not a complete 
record of RFO activity and it recorded no social data at all. (Arts Council 
England, 2006b: 89-93). 
 
Part of ACE's difficulty was that the DCMS remit simply could not be accurately 
fulfilled, making the PSA indicators too reliant on comparative data extracted from 
DCMS’s “Taking Part” survey. Even when discussing “social stratification”, ACE 
appeared implicitly to accept that its data did not address the precision required of 
the PSA (Bunting, 2005), and that "data gathering in the cultural sector has been a 
spurious exercise" (Selwood, 2002). Furthermore, the insistence of DCMS that ACE 
should be their delivery organisation for the arts presumed that ACE shared, or 
could be directed to share, the political aims that directed the ministry’s work. Yet 
its objects and origins gave it a different purpose, and one which now sat 
uncomfortably with its new remit. Alan Davey understood the issue, though from a 
different viewpoint, when saying “The Arts Council are more than just deliverers of 
the PSA, but this is where the PSA is so partial.” (Davey, 2006b). From ACE’s 
viewpoint Helen Flach made a similar point about partiality, insisting that fulfilling 
the terms of DCMS's PSA was only one of its many tasks (Flach, 2006).  
 
The Broken Chain? 
 
These factors leave the indicators of qualitative data on cultural consumption and 
participation particularly susceptible to criticism. Quantitative indicators formed in 
                                                     
1
http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/aboutus/project_detail.php?rid=0&sid=&browse=recent&id=373. 
Accessed 14
th
 June 06. 
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this way are generally considered as less than precise instruments of analysis, lying 
“…at the nexus between the production of cultural data and the analysis of cultural 
phenomena…” (Madden, 2005: 221, original italics). Perhaps it is for this reason that 
the performing arts do not appear among the “Cultural and Related Services” 
indicators published by the Government (ODPM, 2006: 217-230). With all this in 
mind it is interesting to reflect back on the opinion of the National Audit Office, 
that: “It is essential that the achievement of a PSA target will be measured 
appropriately”.   
 
However, although the Treasury was not receiving the hard evidence it required, 
Alan Davey stressed that it was not a major concern. His surprising claim was that, 
on the one hand, the Treasury actually had no real interest in the PSA targets but 
was content “to leave DCMS to build a model that encompasses public value by tying 
together instrumental value, institutional value and artistic value”; and, on the other, 
it was a recognition that the PSAs were “partial, and distorted” and actually had little 
value for DCMS either. Davey then added, “We are not alone with this problem. The 
Home Office, for one, is in much the same situation” (Davey, 2006b). These 
concerns over the measure of "performance" and outputs were also shared by the 
Treasury's Select Committee (Treasury Select Committee, 1999). Chris Smith later 
confirmed this same line in 2003, saying: 
 
So, use the measurements and figures and labels that you can, when you need 
to, in order to convince the rest of the governmental system of the value and 
importance of what you’re seeking to do. But recognise at the same time that 
this is not the whole story, that it is not enough as an understanding of 
cultural value. (Quoted in Belfiore, 2009: 348) 
  
The natural question that follows this insight is then: why did the DCMS agree with 
the Treasury to instigate the PSAs in the first place? Davey answered: “We didn’t. It 
was just sent to us by No. 10 after the [financial] settlement with DCMS was agreed… 
They would have given the money anyway”. In a later email Davey confirmed that 
“Special advisors in No 10 and HMT [Her Majesty’s Treasury] cooked them up” 
(Davey, 2006a). This view of the PSAs was not actually news:  The Times of July 2nd 
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2002, quoted Paul Boateng, when Chief Secretary to the Treasury, commenting on 
PSAs, saying: “There was never any question that: 'Oh if we don't meet this target, 
our money's going to be cut' ... The purpose is to focus minds, and get people to 
work together better.’" (Crooks and Blitz, 2002), and it fits well with Tony Blair's 
comment on what matters in New Labour's strategies: "It's the signals. Not the 
policies" (Jones, 1999).  
 
These comments appear dismissive of cultural policy of a concern of government at 
all, but there is another reading, and one that explains the intensity with which 
DCMS pursued its policy concerns and fits with the economic model that will be 
discussed in chapter 5 below:  DCMS was concerned with building the structures 
within which culturally driven economic potential could be created, not with any 
specific qualitative outcomes. These were, by analogy, the company's profit-loss 
account of the moment, not its balance sheet. It expressed the work that had to be 
done and the direction of travel, not the potential of the structural plan. At the same 
time, it was Chris Smith's primary aim that DCMS should participate in core 
government policy. The politics was more important than cogency, coherence or 
fact.  
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the most striking and defining characteristics of DCMS was its insistence on 
participating, one way or another, in the policies of every Government department. 
"Without culture", Chris Smith claimed, "there can ultimately be no society and no 
sense of shared identity or worth. For a government elected primarily to try and re-
establish that sense of society that we had so painfully lost, this is a very important 
realization" (C. Smith, 1998: 16); and "culture" in Smith's argument was the structural 
framework for social and economic development. The DCMS was re-drawing its 
curtilage as if to place itself at the centre of a grand Venn diagram in which it 
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overlapped sections of the entire government policy agenda. The aims and targets of 
these policies were set-out in policy statements, in the PSAs, and in contracts with 
its funded NDPBs, yet the example of the CBSO showed just how difficult it was to 
apply them in practice or to assess their effects. But then, as both Alan Davey and 
Paul Boateng claimed, quantitative measures were not actually of much interest 
anyway. Rather the point was "to get people to work together"; towards common 
aims and shared agendas, whether institutions or individuals. This was at the core of 
the "conceptual inconsistencies" noted by Sara Selwood and referred to above in the 
Introduction. Chris Smith had acknowledged that quantitative justifications for 
cultural policy were "necessarily going to be inadequate" yet the implicit alterative, 
the promotion of the arts for their own intrinsic value, was an argument rarely heard 
within government (C. Smith, 2003;  quoted in Selwood, 2006: 39). By clear 
implication, there was an agenda that lay behind the policy statements, contractual 
demands and data gathering: the ambition to make the department relevant to all 
government policy.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Commentary and Criticism 
 
Preceding chapters have sought to establish the profound change in national 
cultural policy instigated by the DCMS in 1997; one constructed to place the DCMS 
at the heart of government and predicated on its ability to influence social change 
for economic effect. This chapter will query the validity of the claims DCMS made 
for its policies to be efficient and effective ways to bolster cross-government 
objectives, and for how cultural policy could result in improvements in economic 
performance while ameliorating "the quality of life". It will show many aspects of 
DCMS cultural policy were superficially incoherent but, when judged against Chris 
Smith's ambitions for the department, they nevertheless had a consistent and 
purposeful logic.  
 
The Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 
 
The remit of CMS Committee was similar to that of most Select Committees, its 
constitution, powers and purposes being prescribed by a Standing Order (SO 152): 
"to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport and associated public bodies" (1998b: vi). Except for the 
change of the Department's name, and thereby the title of the select committee, its 
terms of reference essentially repeated those of the preceding National Heritage 
Committee1. Gerald Kaufman2 was appointed its Chairman on July 17th 1997 and 
remained in post until 2005, being re-elected after the 2001 General Election. 
Kaufman's acerbic, incisive, and sometimes satirical style of cross-examination, 
combined with his strong views on the shortcomings of his own Labour Party and 
the workings of Government more generally, brought attention to a committee that 
                                                     
1 Appointed under SO 130 
2
 The Rt. Hon. Sir Gerald Bernard Kaufman, Labour MP for Gorton, in Greater Manchester. 
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its brief might not otherwise have attracted. His caustic summary of Labour's 1983 
election manifesto as "the longest suicide note in history" was typical (quoted in 
Healey, 1989: 500) and launched a phrase that, in the language of the Internet, 
quickly went "viral".  Given that Kaufman referred often to the advice of the 
preceding NH Select Committee (the first to examine the policies of a department 
responsible for arts, heritage and other implicitly cultural matters) it is also 
noteworthy that he was elected as its first Chairman in 1992, so bridging the change 
of Government in 1997.  
 
During its seven years, the NH Committee published just three reports. The CMS 
Committee, by comparison, produced twenty-eight "Standard" reports and eighteen 
"Special" reports between 1997 and 2001. It is tempting to read some motivational 
significance into this dramatic increase in activity, but a review of the CMS 
Committee's reports show them to be firmly focused on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Department (however measured) rather than any ideological 
debates or disputes. For this same reason, its criticisms provide limited help in 
resolving the conundrums that concern this thesis, but four reports do contain 
useful material: the 5th 1998 Report on the Objects and Performance of the 
Department (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b); the 6th 1999 report on its QUANGOS 
(DCMS Select Committee, 1999a); and the subsequent responses by the Government 
(DCMS Select Committee, 1999b, 1998a). 
 
The Objects and Performance of DCMS 
 
The Select Committee's  deliberations on economic development, the creative 
industries, tourism, NDPBs and the relative power of DCMS within government, 
contributed to arguments that the Department's rationales were power-seeking 
through its perceived role in economic development and the reformation of societal 
structures that related to economic performance. At the same time, this was 
countered by DCMS's apparent ineffectiveness in negotiations with the Treasury. In 
the year of the Select Committee's review of DCMS's "Objectives and Performance" 
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(published on June 4th 1998) the Department's total budget had actually decreased 
over the period since the DNH was formed in 1992. In the Committee's words, there 
was "a history of continuous decline", as "the Department's share of the Government 
total [expenditure] has fallen from 0.44% in 1992-93 to 0.33% in 1998-99" (DCMS 
Select Committee, 1998b: xiii) 1. Given the passage of time, inflation, and the 
department's increased responsibilities, this drew scathing criticism from the Select 
Committee and the recommendation that: "The Secretary of State should make it his 
highest priority to advance the Department both within Cabinet by taking a much 
tougher attitude in his negotiations with the Treasury which has certainly not been 
achieved and may not even have been attempted"  (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b: 
ix).  A comparison of the cash expenditure of the DNH and DCMS since 1992 
supports the Committee's concerns: 
Table 10: 
DNH/DCMS Cash Expenditure 1992-1999 
£ millions 
 
1992-3 
outturn 
 
1993-4 
outturn  
1994-5 
outturn 
 
1995-6 
outturn 
 
1996-7 
outturn 
 
1997-8 
outturn 
(estimate) 
 
1998-9 
outturn 
 
 
 
974 
 
 
964 
 
975 
 
1,023 
 
950 
 
882 
 
885 
Data Source: (DCMS, 1998a: 16) 
 
DNH/DCMS Expenditure 1992-1999 
£ millions 
Corrected for inflation, 1996-7 = 0% 
 
1992-3 
outturn 
 
 
1993-4 
outturn  
 
 
1994-5 
outturn 
 
 
1995-6 
outturn 
 
 
1996-7 
outturn 
 
 
1997-8 
outturn 
(est) 
 
1998-9 
outturn 
 
 
 
1,109 
 
 
1,048 
 
1,035 
 
1,056 
 
959 
 
889 
 
863 
Data Sources: (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b: Minutes of Evidence, p1). 
Note that there are small differences in the data between the two sources. 
 
                                                     
1 The Select Committee's source was given as "Public Expenditure: Statistical Analyses 1998-99, April 
1998, Cm 3901, p10; Evidence, p1". 
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Smith's reply to this accusation was to refer to the on-going Comprehensive 
Spending Review, whose conclusions had not then been published, with the 
implication that the downward trend would be reversed. The outcome of the CSR 
was later reported in the 1999 DCMS Annual report, showing a budgetted 
expenditure increase of £290 million. In a somewhat loaded but unexplained 
comment, these increased funds were said to be "investment, not mere subsidy", and 
explicitly attached to the conditions of the Department's PSA agreement (DCMS, 
1999a: 17). This, the Annual Report claimed, represented "a clear message that 
money spent on culture, in its widest sense, can play an important part in achieving 
key Government objectives ..." (1999a: 8). It was, Chris Smith himself wrote, "...a new 
and enhanced investment in our cultural life, and we are placing new responsibilities 
on funded bodies to agree improvements in efficiency, access and private sector 
sponsorship" (DCMS Select Committee, 1998a: iii). Even so, compared to the DNH 
budgets for 1992 to 1996, the increase of  "5.7% in real terms" or ca 9% on 1995/6, 
when corrected for inflation (DCMS Select Committee, 1998a: v), was not a dramatic 
increase, particularly bearing in mind the extended responsibilities of the 
Department. Pace Niskanen, what motivated DCMS appeared to be closer to 
Dunleavy's arguments on the behaviour of institutions: that officials (a word that 
would include the Secretary of State) are actually more interested in shaping 
institutional boundaries and "conferring high status and agreeable work tasks" than 
in "budget maximising" (Niskanen, 1991;  Dunleavy, 1991;  see also Niskanen, 1971)1. 
Given DCMS's unprecedented participation in other areas of national policy, their 
institutional boundaries had indeed expanded considerably. 
 
In coercing the DCMS "to enhance its influence within Whitehall", the CMS 
Committee began its argument by referring briefly to the Department's "economic 
and cultural importance", making clear its view that "The Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport is avowedly an economic Department" (DCMS, 1999a: v), quoting 
                                                     
1 Niskanen did revise his views on the incentive mechanisms employed by "bureaus" (sic) in the later 
paper, but still maintained the principle of budget-maximising. 
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also a statement by Chris Smith that "at its heart are a series of powerful economic 
sectors: the creative industries ...media, tourism and sport" (DNH, 14th July 1997).  
However, the Committee not only tacitly declined to discuss the concept of "creative 
industries" but referred to the title of Chris Smith's recently published book, Creative 
Britain, that expounded these theories as "an inadequate label for what should be the 
Department's focus" (1998b: ix).  
 
"Creative Industries" were defined by the Office for National Statistics under the 
heading "the arts and creative industries" (a distinction never made by DCMS) 
which, after discussion with the Arts Council, the DTI, "and academics researching 
this field", came to include:  
 
film; music; architecture; publishing (including electronic publishing); 
computer games; radio and television; the content industries (for example, 
museum collections on CD); software; advertising; crafts; visual and 
performing arts; designer fashion and art/antiques trade.  
 
This list was then "translated into components of the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC)" (1998b: Evidence, 4). The turnover of these industries in the UK 
was said to be "of the order of £50 billion a year". Although not original, this process 
of naming and defining the creative industries (one perhaps more accurately called 
"listing") had global impact, leading quickly to gaining worldwide currency (Flew, 
2012;  see also Wang, 2004;  Ross, 2007). Given their silence on the subject, yet a 
record of robust investigation, it is possible that the CMS Committee had simply not 
then realised the significance of this conceptual wrapper or perhaps rejected it as a 
priority for a department for culture. 
 
In any event, their interest was more for what that list did not include: tourism. The 
Committee expressed particular concern at the Department's apparent lack of 
emphasis on tourism for its potential to realise "the economic objective [of the 
Department] that we recommend" (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b: vi), referring to 
it as "the biggest Dollar or export currency earner for the United Kingdom" (1998b: 
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Evidence, 36). Smith put an annual value on it of £40 million, significantly below 
that of the "value and importance of the creative industries to the economy" (1998b: 
Evidence, 35).  
 
It was mentioned earlier that the Committee believed an opportunity to bring 
tourism into the centre of its work had been missed when "renaming" the 
Department. They now went further, expressing  themselves as "deeply concerned 
that ... tourism is subordinated in favour of more glamorous and trivial matters" and, 
in a rare reference to the new industrial category named by the DCMS, that "we 
recommend that the Department's economic objective should be to foster tourism, 
creative and sports industries" (DCMS, 1999a: vi).  
 
In its response to the Committee's report, the Government (viz, DCMS) again 
refuted this criticism, enclosing supporting letters from the Chairmen of the British 
Tourist Authority, the Tourism Society, the British Hospitality Association (in the 
form of a press release) and the Joint Hospitality Industry Congress. Their central 
message was support for "fruitful and constructive dialogue" with the Department, "a 
fruitful relationship", recognising the "immense input from your Department" and 
its "clear sighted leadership". These views challenged the Committee's assertion of 
comparative disinterest in the tourism industry but not how that support was 
actualised financially - the measure that most particularly concerned the Select 
Committee.  
 
In seeking to promote the business of tourism the CMS Committee appeared not to 
have understood DCMS's macro-economic mission or, if it did, it offered no criticism 
of it. DCMS was primarily concerned with building institutional and contractual 
systems that would support, develop and operationalise its policies rather than 
fighting for budget increases in pursuit of old-style DNH objectives.  Across all its 
funded bodies, it pursued rigorous systems of policy control without significantly 
increasing financial support for their work (but with some decreases). In effect, 
DCMS policy was concerned with building guiding and constraining structures 
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rather than for individual objects or actions. The sector of DCMS's work where these 
structural controls were most glaring was in the arts. Despite the significant 
precedent of classifying "arts" as an industry, it drew no comment from the 
Committee nor from those DCMS called in evidence. This was all the more 
surprising as it appeared to demonstrate so exactly Adorno's and Horkheimer's 
intentionally egregious and oxymoronic neologism: the "culture industry" (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 1979;  J. M. Bernstein, 1991) and the prospect, if not the 
inevitability, of the commodification and mass production of the arts that was 
necessary if increased economic value and greater public access were to be 
simultaneously achieved.  
 
Non-Departmental Public Bodies 
 
Capitalising non-departmental public bodies as NDPBs was DCMS's preferred 
description for what the CMS Select Committee and the Select Committee on Public 
Administration both referred to acronymically as QUANGOs (quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental organisations), (DCMS Select Committee, 1999a, b;  Select 
Committee on Public Administration, 1999). The Cabinet Office referred to them as 
"Executive" NDPBs, while in his Foreword to a 1997 Cabinet Report on the subject, 
David Clark used both terms in adjacent paragraphs (Cabinet Office, 1997;   see also 
Cabinet Office, 1998, 1999a). None offered an explanation for their preference (at 
least, that this author can find), although, in their Memorandum of Evidence to the 
Select Committee on Public Administration, DCMS wrote pointedly that: "The 
Government's policies set out in 'Quangos: Opening the Doors' are focused on non-
departmental public bodies (NDPBs)". They then referred to the "full list of NDPBs" 
attached to their submission to the report (1999: 22). A total of 54 were listed, of 
which 40 were "Executive Bodies", many of which were themselves grant-giving 
bodies, 9 "Advisory Bodies" and 5 "Public Corporations", the latter all being 
broadcasting companies (1999: 24). This was one of the few instances in which 
DCMS appeared to suggest that the terms "QUANGO" and "NDPB" may not be 
entirely synonymous.  If that was the case, though, it was a matter of little concern 
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to Government generally, despite the academic literature that dwells on the subject 
(for example Greve, Flinders et al., 1999;  Hogwood, 1995).  
 
The predominance of NDPBs under contract to DCMS makes relevant a particular 
body of academic literature on governance. Guy Peters's, and Rod Rhodes's  claims 
for the "hollowed out" state (B. G. Peters, 1993;  Rhodes, 1994;  D. Wilson, 1995;  
Rhodes, 1996), in which the state distributes its powers to a plethora of unelected 
bodies, were re-described by Chris Skelcher as "congested" following increasingly 
"plural modes of governance" through the 1990s (Skelcher, 2000: 12;  1998). 
Skelcher's arguments have a particular relevance to the socio-cybernetic concerns of 
DCMS, in which NDPBs were the structural instrument of policy implementation. 
Writing in the mid-1990s, Rhodes's "stipulative definition" of governance as "self-
organizing, interorganizational networks" regarded the main issue for government to 
be policy "steerage" when "central government is no longer supreme" in the 
hollowed-out state (Rhodes, 1996). This principle can be seen in DCMS's policy 
operations as "more than any Whitehall department, ([DCMS] meets its objectives 
through a network of sponsored bodies" (DCMS Select Committee, 1999a: v, 99). 
NDPB's accounted for "about 95% of the Department's programme" (1999a: v), and 
of those, 97% were categorised as grant-distributing bodies in the arts and sports 
(DCMS Select Committee, 1998b: x).  
 
Under New Labour, all the reports on the subject produced by the Cabinet Office, 
the Public Administration Committee, the CMS Committee and DCMS itself  were 
explicit in their treatment of NDPBs as extensions of Government departments. For 
the effective and consistent application of policy, Government sought to install 
controls over the NDPBs in three respects: firstly, policy objectives were 
contractually defined, initially in the PSAs then in the contractual funding processes 
that cascaded down to end users; secondly, their operational practices were subject 
to constant scrutiny rationalised in the "3Es" (efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness). 
This was a New Public Management mantra from the 1980s, to which "transparency" 
and "accountability" were added as both a nod to the "democratic deficit" of 
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governing through unelected bodies (to use a term popularised in the literature on 
the European Union) and a necessary requirement for oversight of the minutiae of 
NDPB operations.  The third mechanism of control was over the seven hundred 
appointments to the boards and senior executive positions of the NDPBs (DCMS 
Select Committee, 1999a: xi). In most case these became subject to the formal public 
appointments system in addition to any requirements for their approval by their 
funding Departments.   
 
This was a crucial factor in the logic by which DCMS's cultural policies were formed 
and exercised. Unlike every other government department, it was unable to take 
executive control of its policies. Previous departments had seen their role solely as 
financial distributors to cultural NDPBs and other supported bodies, in which the 
state's duty was to support the arts and national heritage as a patron, not through 
policy direction. Although there had been the rumblings of an incipient discontent 
of arms-length funding since the 1980s, becoming more explicit as financial 
allocations to NDPBs increased over the years, Chris Smith's instigation of a 
complex, cross-departmental cultural policy left DCMS with only one route for its 
delivery, and that was control over its funded bodies. Structurally, it also has to be 
seen as conveniently co-incident with the Treasury's creation of PSAs as these 
provided the mechanism with which DCMS could apply its policies right down the 
"delivery chain" without taking on what would otherwise have surely been a highly 
controversial reorganizational challenge. 
 
Noticeable by its absence in all the Government's reports is any but scant 
consideration of the legal independence of most of the executive NDPBs. Given that 
among them were organisations with Royal Charters, (the Arts Council being a 
prime  example), independent corporations and private companies, all of which were 
legally obliged to operate according to their own best interests under their 
constitutions or Memorandum and Articles of Association, this is a subject that 
might reasonably have been given more consideration. 
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Outside the DCMS, reports by the Cabinet Office and the Committee on Public 
Administration questioned neither the value nor the purposes of NDPB's; rather they 
expressed concerns only for how well the these bodies met the performance targets 
set by the sponsoring government departments, recording their achievements and 
failures annually for three years (1997 to 1999). Tightening control of the NDPB's was 
undertaken more severely by DCMS than within government more generally. In 
their view, it must ensure the work of its NDPBs "is aligned with the Department's 
overall objectives, that measurable and meaningful targets are set related to those 
objectives ...": "We regard the autonomy in certain areas of budget allocation ... as 
letting the arm's length principle go much too far" (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b: 
xviii).  This was reinforced and extended by Chris Smith: "There is no arm's length as 
far as the setting of principle, the setting of overall directions and the accountability 
of public money is concerned" (1998b: 28). 
 
"Creative Britain" 
 
Given the remit of the CMS Select Committee it also surprising that they never 
questioned the Department's declared policy "pillars" or "four themes": access, 
excellence, education and the creative industries. These had been set-out in its first 
policy statement - A New Cultural Framework  (DCMS, 1998c: 2), and thereafter 
consistently restated by Chris Smith even as late as his interview with this author in 
2009 (C. Smith, 2009). In 1998 Smith published his ideas in Creative Britain, a 
reworking of fourteen of his speeches made in 1997 and 1998 to which he added a 
substantial introduction and conclusion (C. Smith, 1998). The book, referred to by 
Timothy Bewes as "the most explicit statement yet on the importance of culture for 
New Labour" (Bewes and Gilbert, 2000: 31), repeated Smith's remark that 
"Excellence, innovation, regeneration and access may be the main justifying 
purposes for modern state patronage" (C. Smith, 1998: 19). Neither Bewes nor, more 
importantly, Smith elaborate on this assertion, nor provide any logical link between 
those policy objectives and the responsibilities of the organisations funded by 
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DCMS. In this respect, the texts in Creative Britain suggest a dichotomy between the 
inherited understanding of culture and Smith's ambitions for his department.   
 
Each of Smith’s speeches were directed at a different audience with the language and 
the arguments of each adjusted accordingly. They include the Fabian Society, the 
Association of London Government, the Lottery Monitor Conference, the IPPR think 
tank, Royal Television Society Biennial Convention, Public Library Authorities, 
among other arts and creative-industry audiences. Chris Smith himself put it that 
“…you have to talk a very different set of priorities and a very different kind of 
language” when addressing different Government departments, and the same 
seemed to be true of public and professional audiences (C. Smith, 2009). Despite 
their rhetorical deceit, the content of the speeches was both repetitive and, at an 
ideational level, inevitably conflicted given Smith's assertions for the power of 
culture to ameliorate just about every aspect of social and economic life. These ideas 
are, though, those that form the substance of DCMS's founding policies, further 
establishing Smith's role as their principal author.  
 
That said, there is one important difference. Smith records within parts of these 
speeches a view of culture as meaning the arts, expressing an intellectual view on 
their value. Where large sections of the DCMS's policy statements reify culture into 
an object to be nurtured for its manifold values to contemporary society, for Smith it 
was creative activities that had the ameliorative power, not a crude hypostatised 
concept of culture itself. Discussing "cultural value", Smith makes an argument 
rarely heard within the New Labour government, saying  "let me stress that the 
creative and cultural value of experience and activity is important simply and solely 
for its own sake" (C. Smith, 1998: 28), and "it tends in fact to be the artistic and 
creative activity that helps define what Hazlitt called the 'Spirit of the Age'" (1998: 
21).  Addressing the Royal Academy, he adapted an earlier statement saying it is "the 
arts ...", not culture, that "... are at the very centre of our mission" (1998: 42, 
emphasis added) and relegated the much vaunted economic value of the arts to a 
side issue; as a fortuitous benefit that should be exploited. Sport is rarely mentioned 
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in the book, and tourism appears to be just another way, or another reason, to 
support artistic works and our national heritage. Given Smith's advanced education, 
it may be that his personal understanding of culture was much closer to the tradition 
in which it was defined by artistic and intellectual works. Comparing these speeches 
with DCMS policy suggests a difference between his personal convictions and his 
political aspirations. Culture for the DCMS was a political initiative in which 
ambitions for institutional power were dominant. 
 
This tendency to reinvent or adjust his arguments according to his audience are an 
important part of the argument that culture, for Smith, was a malleable political 
device.  The conceptual foundations of DCMS policy are discussed later in this 
chapter but two examples from Creative Britain demonstrate their rhetorical 
construction. The first of these is comparatively straightforward, its principal 
significance being an indication of Smith's willingness to re-describe the past to suit 
a present need. In his speech to the Lottery Monitor Conference on 24th September 
1997, he asserted that: "Through the years, there has been a fine tradition of lotteries 
financing the desirable things of community life, as opposed to the normal 
responsibilities that should be shouldered by all of us as tax payers. The building of 
the British Museum, for example..." (1998: 114-5). While Smith did acknowledge "the 
man running it [i.e. the British Museum lottery] ran off with half the funds", he did 
not mention that it was one of several scandals that cemented Parliament's view that 
lotteries were "pernicious" and "destructive"; resulting in their prohibition until re-
introduced at a local level by the Betting and Lotteries Act of 1934. This subject is 
discussed in more detail above (Chapter 2) and shows that, quite aside from 
arguments on the morality of gambling for the financial benefit of the public good, 
British lotteries simply did not have the "fine tradition" Smith claimed for them.  
 
A far more complex and substantial issue concerns Smith's claim to have been 
reuniting the arts and industry, a quest intrinsic to his ambitions for the "creative 
industries". On October 17th 1997 he made a speech at the opening of the Design 
Resolutions Exhibition in London's Royal Festival Hall which he later adapted for 
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Creative Britain (C. Smith, 1998: 111-113). The ideas behind that speech appear to be a 
reference to the separation of the humanities from the rationalistic and 
deterministic claims of science and technology embedded in late 19th industrialism 
and 20th century modernism. The subject, "Design: at the Crossroads of Science and 
Art", was one that reached back to the foundations of British cultural policy in the 
19th century: to the 1835 Select Committee on "The Arts and their Connexions with 
Manufactures"; the Department of Practical Art; the Great Exhibition;  the 
collaboration between Henry Cole and Prince Albert; and to the Department of Arts 
and Manufactures itself .  
 
It was not, though, the "manufactures" of the 18th and 19th centuries for which 
Smith sought a renaissance but an apparently naïve view of an earlier period, when: 
"Before the Industrial Revolution, science [by which Smith meant, he said, 
'technological accomplishment and...innovation'] and the arts were two sides of the 
same coin, two aspects on 'creativity'". The spirit of "Leonardo, Michelangelo, 
Bernini or Brunelleschi" were now, he claimed, being rediscovered: "We are now 
beginning to witness a breaking-down of the artificial barriers which have separated 
science and the arts over the last 200 years" (C. Smith, 1998: 111). Were that the case, 
it might add credibility to DCMS's claim of the economic importance of cultural 
activity. However, contrary to Smith's proposition, the early 15th to late 17th century 
could be better characterised by a growing scientism and the separation of the arts 
from science; a shift from the restoration of classical texts to an increasing vigour for 
experimentation and the logical validation of hypotheses (Dear, 2001). It was this 
increasing methodological demarcation of empirical science from art (or, rather, 
non-science) as found, for example, in the works of Copernicus, Descartes  and 
Bacon, that led directly to the disengagement that concerned Smith. As the "two 
cultures debate" had shown1, the resulting manifestations were becoming clear by 
                                                     
1 A dispute between C. P Snow and F. R. Leavis that erupted in 1959 with Snow's article in the New 
Statesman (subsequently published in book form: SNOW, C. P. 1998 [1959]. The Two Cultures. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.) followed by Leavis's reply in the Spectator (also published 
in book form as LEAVIS, F. R. 1962. Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow: Being the Richmond 
Lecture. London, Chatto & Windus.). Snow argued that the British educational system had favoured 
167 
 
the 19th century (and, indeed, noted by Matthew Arnold at the time) but its origins 
were in Enlightenment rationalism not Victorian industrialisation. Smith did 
acknowledge the attempts by William Morris and the Arts and Crafts movement to 
unite "the useful and the beautiful" (C. Smith, 1998: 112), but he ignored the 
technological energy arising from the potent mix of art, design, and science in the 
18th and 19th centuries (Holmes, 2008;  Uglow, 2002). In sum, the claim that there 
had been "artificial barriers" between art and science in the 19th century was at best 
partial. In practice the two had been economically and politically intertwined.   
 
In many respects the policies of Smith and DCMS drew on practices in 19th century 
industrial Britain far more than they did from early Enlightenment thought. In 
commerce and in politics, artists, scientists and technologists had cooperated 
intensely, and mutually profited in the process. Even at a practical level, the arts and 
sciences were consistently intermingled throughout Smith's "last 200 years" just as 
19th century entrepreneurialism had been synchronous with governments' 
promotion of art to improve industrial design. This specifically met with Smith's 
objectives for the modern economy; one in which state invention, collaborations 
across disciplines, education and a strong sense of national pride, were characteristic 
of the economic spirit the New Labour government promoted. Ironically, it was the 
logically-positivist, syllogistic, forms for the validation of truth and knowledge that 
New Labour drew upon in its desire to employ "evidence-based policy" (Boaz, 
Grayson et al., 2008;  Solesbury, 2002;  Sanderson, 1998, 2002;  Parsons, 2002;  Evans, 
2005), not the philosophies of classical thought, however profound and prescient 
they were in so many respects. New Labour required evidence that a selected policy 
would have the intended effects; that policy makers could establish pre factum the 
efficacy of particular strategies. The 1999 White Paper on Modernising Government 
put it unequivocally: “government must…produce policies that really deal with 
problems; that are forward-looking and shaped by evidence rather than a response 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the humanities over the sciences resulting in the deterioration of the nation's international strength 
and standing. Leavis's reply was excoriating but left standing an argument on the separation of 
science and the arts that is still unresolved. 
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to short-term pressures” (Cabinet Office, 1999b: 15). In other words, Blair's 
consequentialism demanded that the government must do what works (Blair, 1998).  
 
In contrast, the texts in Creative Britain presumed but never substantiated causal 
relations between cultural activity and social amelioration. Rather, Chris Smith 
proposed a sociological legitimation for creativity through a paralogical cultural 
narrative: "creative and cultural activity... is also about helping to lead each and 
every one of us into a glimpse of a deeper world than that which exists simply on the 
surface"; "...the individual fulfilment that comes from the act of creating, or the 
appreciation of the created experience, leads to a sense of something that lies 
beyond the immediate surface consciousness, and that makes the real world more 
real still" (1998: 23). In this sense, the "artificial barriers" Smith had referred to (1998: 
111) brought him closer to Baudelaire's insight - "au fond de l'Inconnu pour trouver 
du nouveau" than to Gordon Brown's brand of positivist social economics 
(Baudelaire, 1997: 351, original emphasis;  also quoted by Frederick Jameson in 
Lyotard, 1984: ix) 1. But as DCMS preferred the language of the Treasury, this 
difference may be down to Smith's educational background rather than any 
difference of intent. 
 
As has been discussed above, industrial and post-industrial Britain had, in 
combining art and technology, already identified a necessary chemistry for the 
creation of successful products and their passage from invention to sales in the 
marketplace. So why not praise their example? Perhaps Smith felt that the brutal 
political economy of industrial Britain may not have been something that suited the 
post-industrial argument he was making. Or perhaps he felt intuitively that his, and 
New Labour's, commitment to social policy might appear corroded by an 
unqualified, simplistic association with the coarseness of 19th century 
industrialisation and its apparent lack of concern for the welfare of individuals. On 
                                                     
1 Quoted from Baudelaire's Le Voyage, within Death in the collection Les Fleurs du Mal. There are 
many different translations of this. Preferred here is William Aggeler's (1954) in an Academy Library 
Guild paper, Fresno, CA: "To the depths of the Unknown to find the new". It is also one most 
commonly used. 
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the other hand, it is possible that references to 19th century arts and industry might 
have been thought to imply support for its excesses of utilitarian individualism (a 
criticism the Left also made of the Thatcher government (see Hoover, 1987 for 
example)) and the brutality of mechanical muscle over the aesthetic refinement of 
the late-Renaissance Greats or the utopian romantics of Victoria's England. Whether 
Smith's statements arose from rhetorical, political or ideological intent is not clear, 
but given his stated willingness to re-describe his arguments according to his 
audience, perhaps the most supportable view is that he employed the former 
(rhetoric) in pursuit of the latter (ideology). 
 
The Four Themes  
 
Although the CMS Select Committee largely failed to examine the nature and depth 
of DCMS's policy initiatives, Chris Smith consistently repeated the themes within 
which he sought to coral his social and economic ideas: "Access, excellence, 
education, and the creative economy: these stand as the great aims of policy" (C. 
Smith, 1998: 142). In addition to defining core concepts they also provide subjects for 
testing the cogency and logic of Smith's policies. In effect, they stand between the 
traditions of governmental interest in cultural matters and the socio-economic 
objectives of the New Labour government. To place DCMS "centre stage" (C. Smith, 
2009), these policies would need to be effective in furthering government aims 
whilst still honouring the department's responsibilities to the cultural objectives of 
its funded NDPBs.  
 
For analytical clarity, these themes are discussed below separately but in practise 
they were never finely demarcated.   
 
Access 
 
At its simplest, "access" questions the extent to which there are material or cultural 
(in a socio-anthropological sense) barriers between an individual and the object or 
service they wish to acquire. Such barriers, if impermeable, are said to prevent 
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distributive equality ("equality of outcome") and damage social cohesion. For these 
reasons alone access was an immediate, driving concern of the Social Exclusion 
Unit and its eighteen Policy Action Teams. Significantly, Smith chose the term 
"access" rather than "social exclusion" to identify the policy theme. Once access to 
material and cultural resources becomes possible, so the proposition goes, it is then 
up to each individual whether or not they acquired them. The significance of this 
nomenclature is often missed (see, for example, Finlayson, 2003: 162-3) but Smith 
was one to choose his words carefully. Although true equality, whether of resources 
or opportunity, is generally accepted as an impossible utopian ideal (Arneson, 1989;  
Dworkin, 1981a, b) and, within New Labour, even undesirable, Smith could argue 
access to be part of  “a profoundly democratic agenda, seeing cultural access as one 
of the egalitarian building blocks of society”. Indeed, the whole of Creative Britain, 
Smith claimed, "is about bringing democracy culture" (C. Smith, 1998: 2, 3). In a 
persisting metaphor, this required the removal of "barriers" to national resources 
and participation in cultural life. "Exclusion", the preferred term of the Cabinet 
Office (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998), results, it argued, in deprivation which might 
be ameliorated by access to all the advantages and opportunities that a healthy 
society can provide.  
 
DCMS then added a further subtlety by referring not to exclusion or access but to 
"inclusion": "A Policy Action Team has been established (following the Social 
Exclusion Unit's report on Neighbourhood Renewal) to explore with others the role 
of our sectors in promoting social inclusion" (DCMS, 1998c: 3, emphasis added). In 
this more positive form it suggested policy success and not simply a description of 
the problem. Nevertheless, despite the considerable effort made by New Labour to 
"develop integrated and sustainable approaches to the problems of the worst 
housing estates, including crime, drugs, unemployment, community breakdown, 
and bad schools..." (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998), the term "inclusion" also implied 
unhindered opportunities for disadvantaged individuals to draw upon skills, 
material resources and social institutions without differentiations arising from 
issues of class, education, or values formed by particular codes of social practice.  
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It was in this sense that the task was problematic for DCMS. In what way could 
DCMS open-up access to the health, education, social welfare, housing, 
employment, child care, transport, and all the other concerns of the SEU? After all, 
in DCMS's understanding of culture as social customs, norms and relations, it 
effectively constituted daily practises and could not exist outside of those who 
created them.  The studies that have been undertaken into this subject have 
generally looked at material factors, most especially poverty, and less at the 
immaterial forces of cultural practises. Jeanne Moore's 1998 paper, which aimed to 
investigate the question: "What are the main barriers which deter people living on 
low incomes from attending arts institutions and events" (J. Moore, 1998: 53), found 
consistent correlations in several studies from which she (and others) drew 
conclusions on the effects of poverty, education and class. However, such 
conclusions presupposed an actual or potential desire to attend in the first place. 
Quoting M.G. Hood's  rather obvious comment that "merely analysing 
demographics will not reveal what these groups [non-attenders] value in their 
leisure activities" (M. G. Hood, 1983;  J. Moore, 1998: 60), Moore's work touched 
upon but never investigated those sociological and psychological factors thought to 
influence participatory preferences. In effect, it highlighted those attitudes which 
demarcated the world of the educated from their alterity.  
 
In common with most of the literature on this subject, Moore's paper sought 
explanations for exclusion through researched statistics. Important examples can 
be found in the studies which examined DCMS's early decision to remove entry 
charges to museums and galleries. Chris Smith stated at the time that "Access is a 
cornerstone of all this government's cultural policies, including museums and 
galleries. We want to see access to our cultural treasures made available to the 
many, not just the few" (C. Smith, 1997b). Along with the policies pressed on the 
arts sector through the PSAs and funding contracts, free entry was intended to 
remove the most frequently reported barrier to attendance - ticket prices. Other 
factors were also shown by market research to be significant: travel difficulties, lack 
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of time, and a range of smaller miscellaneous costs among them. But ticket prices 
generally topped the list.  What was much harder to pin down, or quantify - let 
alone change, was "disinterest" (J. Moore, 1998: 63), (see also, Bailey and Falconer, 
1998;  Dodd and Sandell, 2001;  Sandell, 1998, 2002;  C. S. Smith, 2001).  
 
In a more detailed discussion of the terminology of "access" policies, Kawashima 
discussed the articulated links between "inclusion", "access" and "audience 
development", pointing particularly to the considerable force and the "significant 
impact" of DCMS's New Audience Fund (administered by ACE) (Kawashima, 2006: 
56). Over the five years of its existence, from 1998 to 2003, the NAF supported 1,157 
projects spending some £20 million, taking concerts, drama productions and 
exhibitions into shopping centres, hospitals and other unorthodox venues in the 
hope of stimulating an interest among those nominated as "non-attenders"  
(Johnson, Pfommer et al., 2004). Techniques of "Extended Marketing, Taste 
Cultivation, Audience Education and Outreach" (Kawashima, 2006: 57) were 
applied in a language of social coercion redolent of the 19th century inner-city 
missionaries, when "Culture, including state schools, libraries and museums, was 
considered effective for civilising these relatively uneducated people, uplifting their 
morale and thereby achieving social cohesion and harmony" (2006: 61).  
 
"Access" in these initiatives was certainly affected by financial barriers, but those 
who responded to those changes were fewer than policy makers had hoped. This is 
not to doubt that the energy and commitment given by British artistic institutions 
to take their work to housing estates, shopping centres, factories, hospitals, prisons 
- anywhere, in fact, where "new" audiences  might be found or fostered, had some 
effect. Some, perhaps many, of those touched by these efforts may have been 
enticed into further contact with artistic forms that they might never otherwise 
have encountered. It was recognised, though little researched, that to make a more 
substantial difference it would be necessary to engender a desire to participate. But 
to participate in what exactly? Smith's apparently conflicting thoughts on this are 
difficult to reconcile, but there is an unexplained logic to them if the arts and 
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culture are addressed as different concepts. He certainly supported the 
idiosyncratic but once orthodox Shavian view of the power of the arts1 in which 
"poetry triumphs over pragmatism" (C. Smith, 1998: 130). But then, without further 
explanation, this idea was linked to "creativity" and the "interrelationship between 
culture and society" and its power to assist in the processes of social regeneration 
(1998: 131). That assertion, for it was not yet an argument, contributed to Smith's 
justifications for the emphasis on "access": "let no one try to convince me that art 
cannot move minds and help to drive a determination for change" (1998: 132).  
 
 
There was, though, (as there still is) the question of the legitimacy in judging the 
tastes and preferences of those targetted as lacking access.  This issue has produced 
some sharp criticism. Andrew Brighton's attacks on the logic of arts policies is an 
example: 
 
The propagating of serious art amongst people who are relatively uneducated 
is an act of cultural aggression. It is requiring people in one form of life to 
adopt the values and sensibility of another. It is to conceive of their culture 
and way of life as other, as an enemy to be vanquished. The community arts 
movement solves this obvious objection by encouraging arts activities which 
have no significance except for those who make it. They are activities without 
any elaborated culture of reception or production (Brighton, 2006: 5). 
 
James Fenton's article on a paper by Chris Smith's successor, Tessa Jowell, provides 
another example. It was headed "Down with this access pottiness" (Fenton, 2004), 
and reported Jowell's comment that "Access to the substandard is access to 
disappoint ... it will not inspire or raise levels of aspiration and the end is not 
worthwhile" (Jowell, 2004: 16): before noting: "She never believed that oboe 
concertos can help reduce crime, or binge-drinking, or indeed obesity in children". 
 
A research programme in 2007 and, therefore, not available to Chris Smith or 
                                                     
1 Smith referred to Shaw's Everybody's Political What's What ( SHAW, G. B. 1944. Everybody's Political 
What's What? London, Constable & Co.) as "rambling" (Creative Britain, p129), but explicitly shared 
Shaw's exhortations for the power of the classical arts, just as he did Matthew Arnold's, albeit 
conditionally.  
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DCMS, indicated that "cultural consumption" (meaning the arts and intellectual 
works) was separated more according to Weberian stratifications of education and 
social status than they were by lingering notions of class (Chan and Goldthorpe, 
2007). A commentary by Catherine Bunting on behalf of ACE, referring to an early 
2005 draft of the report, summarised Chan's and Goldthorpe's research by saying 
they found "no evidence of a 'cultural elite' " although acknowledging different 
opportunities for, in their term, "consumption" of the arts for geographic or cost 
reasons (Bunting, 2005: 213). These challenges were substantially avoided by DCMS 
by differentiating between the arts and a socio-anthropological idea of culture, that 
is to say the absolute values of the former were demarcated from the relative nature 
of the latter. But in order not to make value judgements between preferences 
within society that relativism then led to pluralism. "Culture - or perhaps we should 
talk rather of cultures" (C. Smith, 1998: 36) was also now synonymous with local 
practices and, by extension, national identity:  
 
Is it warm beer and the sound of leather on willow and 'old maids' bicycling 
through the morning country mists to communion? Is it what goes on in 
Albert Square or Coronation Street? Is it the Notting Hill Carnival? Is it the 
crowd at Wembley rising silently to 'Candle in the Wind', or roaring at the 
goals that followed? Is it Italian Opera at Covent Garden, Scandinavian plays 
at the National Theatre and Russian music at the Proms? Is it marching 
down the catwalk in Paris or designing a new gallery in Stuttgart 1 ? (1998: 
36). 
 
This form of characterisation is of a different nature to the cultural jingoism of past 
rationales for cultural policy (O. Bennett, 1995: op.cit), being concerned more with 
civic cohesion and a common self-identity than with international competitiveness.  
Some artistic forms are mentioned, but only to support the idea of creativity as a 
national trait.  
 
Despite Smith's implied distinction between the arts and culture it is not one 
generally made within DCMS policy, although the dichotomy had been present at 
                                                     
1 A reference to British architect James Sterling's design for the Neue Staatsgalerie Stuttgart which 
opened in 1984 to replace to original 1843 building bombed in World War II. 
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least since Jennie Lee's White Paper of 1965 (which, said Smith, "needs now to be 
taken up once more" (C. Smith, 1998: 130). Lee had attempted to promote both the 
high arts and social culture, but a later publication by two Labour Party members 
of the Greater London Enterprise Board, Geoff Mulgan 1 and Ken Worpole, took a 
different view in their book Saturday Night or Sunday Morning (Mulgan and 
Worpole, 1986). In it they challenged the Party "to develop [cultural] policies that 
are at the same time industrial and aesthetic" (1986: 15) and, through the 
democratisation of arts policy, support the development of "new forms of creative 
works" that had until then been "ignored" (1986: 29). In the process, they 
denigrated the Arts Council as a "self-appointed and self-perpetuating metropolitan 
clique" unable to represent the creative works of artists in contemporary Britain. 
But, most of all, they claimed for culture an emancipatory mission, fighting against 
the ravages of commercialism that had "most successfully destroyed all artistic 
standards and cultural standards" (1986: 61). In one manifestation of this argument 
they argued for a model of news broadcasting in which "new structures and 
conventions can be overturned to concentrate on what people do that is important, 
rather than what important people do" (1986: 59). These matters, they claimed, 
should rightly be a central concern of the Labour Party, and proffered an agenda for 
action for the Party that was an amalgam of ideology, socio-anthropology, and a 
critique of the orthodox concept of the arts.  
 
In contrast, Chris Smith's ideas are much more carefully considered, if 
simplistically expressed, propositions for the interconnections between the 
separate semantic identities of the arts, culture and economy. In various forms, 
claims that a new culture can "now embrace the economic and the social, as well as 
the cultural" (Stevenson, Rowe et al., 2010: 248), are found throughout Creative 
Britain. Nevertheless, in policy terms, these ambitions were all closely tied to the 
potent issue of "access" for which participation in cultural life and an appreciation 
                                                     
1 One time CEO of the Young Foundation, Chief Advisor to Gordon Brown, Director of Policy for 
Tony Blair at Downing Street, co-founder of Demos and now Chief Executive of NESTA. He also holds 
several academic posts. 
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of the arts were paramount: "Enhancing the cultural life of the nation will be at the 
heart of the New Labour's approach. The arts are not optional extras for 
governments; they are at the very centre of our mission." (C. Smith, 1998: 42).   
 
An objective and apposite assessment of access to culture came from Olivier 
Donnat when discussing the results of France's 1990 survey of cultural practices, 
Les Pratiques Culturelles des Français. Donnat's arguments could have applied 
equally to New Labour's Britain: "It has been well known for a long time that simply 
creating a theatre in a provincial town or proposing tickets at a reduced price in 
workers' councils will not in themselves spontaneously attract a new public" 
(Donnat, 2002, 1990). Instead, he argued for our acceptance of  "the decline in the 
model of the cultivated man accompanied by the diminishing influence of the 
previous cultural authorities" (2002: 139). "Media", Donnat claimed, was now the 
collective word for new cultural phenomena; one that required a re-appraisal of 
political concepts of culture. In this light, policies for "access" to the arts appears 
patronising and anachronistic. In a society unabashed and not at all disadvantaged 
socially by its cultural preferences, it has all the access it needs - indeed it defines 
the rules of its own cultural club.  
 
"Access" and Cultural Rights 
 
The dualistic appeal to both absolute and relative cultural values is one that draws-
in conceptions of cultural rights (Cowan, Dembour et al., 2001). These are 
formulated around national cultural practices that are seen to have historic, 
timeless values, but at the same time seek to promote the rights of communities to 
their own, local values that may not be shared by others.  Alain Finkielkraut 
referred to this conundrum, when discussing UNESCO's policies against racism 
(itself an ideational concoction of the absolute and the relative), as "double talk" 
(Finkielkraut, 1988: 78). Article 27 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states: "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
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benefits" (United Nations, 1948). UNESCO encourages nations to take a more 
promotional and interventionist view, as can be seen in its conventions for cultural 
protection which also seek to give "access" substantive meaning (UNESCO, 2005, 
ratified by the UK on Dec 7th 2007).  The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the European Convention on Human Rights also speak of artistic freedoms and 
rights but, as with the UN Charter, their concerns are for unreasonable legal and 
physical denial of access to cultural assets and practices, not preferences. This was 
exemplified in the recent case of Akdaş v. Turkey (case 41056/04, 16th February 
2010) which found against Turkey for fining the publisher of a Turkish translation 
of Apollinaire (this and other cases can be found in Division de la Recherche, 2011). 
In Britain, the existence of museums, galleries, theatres and other arts institutions 
that are open to the public undeniably provides access to cultural experiences. The 
UN principle of "rights" does not seek to equalise the individual circumstances of 
those who might seek that access, nor does it proselytise the values of any aspect of 
the culture(s) represented. Selectively encouraging visitors and audiences with 
financial inducements or with purposefully constructed exhibitions and 
performances (such as were promoted by DCMS and the Arts Council) is not, for 
the UN, a basic, moral obligation it seeks to promote.  
 
By this argument "barriers to access" was a poorly chosen metaphor; what DCMS 
was promoting were inducements to participation. Smith's concerns for access were 
driven by a belief in the instrumental power of artistic activities for social benefit, 
but he, and DCMS, then appeared to confuse human rights, structural impediments 
and aesthetic preferences. The assertion that "equality of access to social and 
cultural aspects of society" are a "fundamental human right" merely made Smith's 
pleas for "access" untenable and confused. 
 
Intellectuals and Masses 
 
There is also, though, another influence on Smith (and New Labour generally) that 
contextualises the policies intended to reclaim the arts for every citizen. His political 
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ideology was, of course, left of centre; social democratic rather than socialist but 
with a moral concern for society's underclass. Smith, like Blair, tended not to speak 
of society aggregated into classes, resisting socialist practises that, in John Carey's 
words, "deny the singularity of the individual" (Carey, 1992: 175). "Marxist ideology", 
said Blair in New Britain, "... suppressed the individual by starting with society"  
(Blair, 1996: 59). Nevertheless, for Smith, as for Jennie Lee thirty-five years earlier, 
any concept of culture had to include all of society not just those of privilege and 
education; viz, not just intellectuals who understood and revered great artistic works 
in all their manifestations. Here again, then, are the two "cultures" exposed in 
conflict: the first in its socio-anthropological definition towards which Lee had 
leaned, and the second as the arts and intellectual works. The wedge between them 
had been firmly driven-in by modernism. 
 
John Carey's exploration of The Intellectuals and the Masses explains how Modernists 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries' deliberately obfuscated their artistic and 
intellectual works as a reaction to widening democratic participation. It was 
contemporaneously perceived, Carey argues, as coincident with the destruction of 
the rural nation under a new and hideous urban sprawl occupied by the half-
educated, the commuter and the clerk. In other words, in Carey's view, a new class, 
the masses, were aspirationally nibbling at the edges of an old world of refinement of 
aesthetic knowledge and class privilege. "The early twentieth century" Carey wrote, 
"saw a determined effort, on the part of the European intelligentsia, to exclude the 
masses from culture" (Carey, 1992: 16-17). It could be seen in the critical theory of 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in which mass culture and its transmitting 
media had defiled aesthetic values, and in Herbert Marcuse's "'élitist' doctrine that 
genuine arts must be inaccessible to the masses" (1992: 43). Aldous Huxley referred 
to "an immense class of what I may call the New Stupid" (quoted in 1992: 16) which 
he then fictionalised into Brave New World, while Eric Gill attacked canned foods as 
symptomatic of aesthetic corruption and Yeats praised the benefits of eugenic 
sterilization as a defensive plan against the crassness of the general population. 
Similar views came from George Orwell, Carey shows, in his conflicted relations with 
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the manners and squalor of low-class life. Philosophers, writers and musicians of the 
period, among them Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset, T.S. Eliot, George Bernard Shaw 
(see also G. B. Shaw, 1944), E. M. Forster and even F. R. Leavis (in Mass Civilization 
and Minority Culture (Leavis, 1930) all joined the argument. Tom Wolfe's 
"Cultureburg" is the fictional location of the Modernist intellectual, the cénacle of 
the artistic elite for which, quoting from Tristan Tzara's Dada manifesto (1918): "Any 
work of art that can be understood is the product of a journalist" (Wolfe, 1975: 33). 
Also from the American side of the Atlantic, John Cage is quoted as saying: "If my 
work is accepted, I must move on to the point where it isn't" (Revill, 1992: 13), while 
from Austria Arnold Schoenberg expressed a feeling commonplace among the 
composers of serious music throughout most of the twentieth century, writing that: 
  
[after the war] My works were played everywhere and acclaimed in such a 
manner that I started to doubt the value of my music...If previously my music 
has been difficult to understand .. how could it happen that now, all of a 
sudden, everybody could follow my ideas and like them? Either the music or 
the audience was worthless (Schoenberg, 1975: 51;  also quoted in McClary, 
1989: 59). 
 
Schoenberg shared Milton Babbitt's uncompromising argument that music in the 
mid-20th century was comparable to advanced mathematics or physics in its rarefied 
intellectual demands. Few could be expected to understand it or appreciate its 
achievements, making it inaccessible to the public at large: 
 
I dare suggest that the composer would do himself and his music an 
immediate and eventual service by total, resolute, and voluntary withdrawal 
from this public world to one of private performance and electronic media, 
with its very real possibility of confusion of categories, and the composer 
would be free to pursue a private life of professional achievement, as opposed 
to a public service life of unprofessional compromise and exhibitionism 
(Babbitt, 1958). 
 
This intellectualism was observed by New Labour to be interrelated with approaches 
to knowledge and opportunities for personal advancement, just as poor education, 
allied to poverty, poor housing and other social problems, is said to result in 
"exclusion" from resources and opportunities otherwise freely available (Social 
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Exclusion Unit, 1998). To be excluded from things is to be "prevented  from being a 
full member of society" (The Community Development Foundation, quoted in 
Jermyn, 2001: 2) whose optimal standards are defined with complex methodologies 
for the production of indices, comparative statistics and impact assessments in an 
attempt to measure, in the case of DCMS, the affects of aesthetic and intellectual 
experiences (Belfiore and Bennett, 2007a). Thus, the question of accessibility to 
cultural works is not only a concern for cultural policy but, in the related conception 
of  "social exclusion", is one central to governmental responsibilities and therefore of 
primary interest to DCMS. A problem here which DCMS never addressed (unlike 
Victorian absolutists like Matthew Arnold) is that exclusion might arise from a lack 
of understanding or appreciation of what is considered "excellent" and therefore, 
paradoxically exactly the thing to which access is required. 
 
2. Excellence  
 
"It is important to have the twin goals of excellence and access in full view. The two 
go together; they do not - as some have assumed - contradict each other", said Chris 
Smith in Creative Britain (C. Smith, 1998: 50, original emphasis). This was also the 
view of Tony Blair, as he confirmed in his one and only speech on the arts (one that 
had to wait until 2007): "The funding squeeze persisted through the early 1990s and 
cemented the spurious distinction between excellence on the one hand and broad 
access on the other" (Blair, 2007). The CMS Select Committee reported the 
contention of Robin Young, then Permanent Secretary at DCMS, that "The themes of 
access and excellence seem almost self-evidently applicable to the wide range of 
activities which the Department sponsors" (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b). These 
all echo the supportive words of the earlier Select Committee (noting that both were 
Chaired by Gerald Kaufman): "Expenditure on the arts, museums and galleries and 
the heritage [sic] to enhance excellence and access for all represents an investment 
in the quality of life, as well as providing direct economic benefits and helping to 
underpin tourism..." (NH Select Committee, 1996, 1994). 
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Despite linking "access" to "excellence", DCMS also wrote rather of "the pursuit of 
excellence and innovation" (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b , emphasis added). 
Smith argued this to be important for "ensuring that governmental support is used 
to underpin the best, and most innovative..." (C. Smith, 1998: 2). Statements that link 
all three ("excellence", "access" and "innovation") are much harder to find, but one 
such came in 1999 from the Labour Peer, Lord Mcintosh of Haringey, when 
declaring, somewhat mystifyingly: "We should provide those who are providing the 
arts with an opportunity to excel and give them the opportunities for innovation 
which will in turn bring excellence" (HL Hansard, 1999b: col 250).  
 
The playwright and theatre director, Peter Gill, expressed an unease with all this: 
"And how is excellence going to be defined? Coming from the mouth of New Labour 
it sounds dismal. There is something churchy about it, a pious diversion from the 
orthodoxies of philistinism and populism" (Gill, 1998). Gill had blended the rich fog 
of New Labour's political rhetoric with his own sense that the words themselves had 
no meaning in the context in which they were employed. If so, then it may have been 
the rhetorical timbre of "excellence" that appealed to New Labour rather than its 
considered meaning. Nevertheless, it is still possible to deduce more purpose than 
Gill suggested. 
 
A useful etymological history of "excellence" was given by Kathryn Allan in a paper 
on its use in education, explaining its relationship to "excellent"  and "excel" since its 
first appearances in the 14th century. Her most significant point, and one made by 
others (for example H. J. Pratt, 2012), is that its meaning , "to rise above others" 
(OED definition), "implies comparison" (Allan, 2007: 59). This, in turn, requires a 
depth of knowledge and experience on the part of the critic before a judgement can 
be made. "Excellence" is, then, a word that implies process, knowledge, skill and 
experience on the parts of both the creators and their critics. In support of this, Pratt 
quotes David Hume's adage: "improved by practice, perfected by comparison" (H. J. 
Pratt, 2012: 46;  Hume, 1979 [1757]: 494). Without a comparative opposite, its alterity, 
the idea of universal excellence would be a logical fallacy.  
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Smith, DCMS and New Labour at large, gave no definitions for "excellence" nor how 
it could be achieved but, rather, exhorted the concept as a general ambition; that 
everything should be excellent and anything that fell below that standard would be 
unacceptable 1. This questionable logic appears to have its origins in 1980's business 
theory and the desire for standards that could compete internationally, particularly 
against Japanese industrial manufacturers. Initiatives for improving quality were 
soon initialised and institutionalised into TQM (Total Quality Management) by the 
EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management) and a general movement for 
CWQC (Company-wide Quality Control),  (Dale, Wiele et al., 2000). In this context, 
the ambition that every manufactured article be of a high standard is both practical, 
desirable and, importantly, measurable. The subsequent descriptive shift from 
"quality" to "excellence"  does not impair the intention to achieve consistently high 
standards in comparison with others competing in the marketplace.  
 
That is the idea which, in part at least, lay behind DCMS's creation of QUEST, 
referred to earlier. However, in the immaterial world of cultural policy (whether of 
social relations, anthropological practices or artworks) comparisons are not absolute, 
measurable or consistent between individuals and their works. In the absence of any 
measurable standards, comparisons have to judged by public (and that means also 
"market") responses. Be it a piece of music, a design, a performance, or other creative 
work, if people like it then ipso facto it is judged to be good. Presumably, then, if the 
public like it in preference to all other comparable works, it becomes "excellent".  
 
The problems of judging the quality of cultural objects and activities accounts for the 
lack of any proposals for how excellence in the cultural field might be achieved, with 
                                                     
1 Although outside the period of this study, in 2008 DCMS commissioned a report from Sir Brian 
McMaster that investigated the concept of excellence in the arts. McMaster provided the definition: 
"...excellence in culture occurs when an experience affects and changes an individual. An excellent 
cultural experience goes to the root of living" MCMASTER, S. B. 2008. Supporting Excellence in the 
Arts: from Measurement to Judgement. London: DCMS.p9. This is a weak attempt and offers no help 
to this study. A critical view of McMaster's report is provided by ECKERSLEY, S. 2008. Policy Review: 
'Supporting excellence in the arts: from measurement to judgement'. Cultural Trends, 17 (3), 183-187. 
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the important exception of education (discussed below). This is noteworthy, firstly, 
because "excellence" was a theme of the Department and rhetorically of political 
importance, and secondly, because "excellence" does appear to stand in opposition 
to "access" in some important respects. Although this latter problem was dismissed 
by both Chris Smith and Tony Blair (in the quotations given above), its denial 
neither removes nor resolves the conflict. At its most obvious, the problem lies in 
the assumption that intellectual refinement and specialist knowledge are required to 
understand cultural and artistic creations. Jeremy Lane expressed this succinctly 
when discussing the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu:  
 
The appreciation of a work of art was, he [Bourdieu] argued, an act of 
decipherment which demanded possession of the requisite cultural code. 
Members of the bourgeoisie were far more likely to possess such a code, not 
simply because of their longer exposure to formal education but also thanks 
to a more general familiarity with the things of taste and culture, an aesthetic 
disposition they had acquired in earliest childhood by inhabiting a cultured 
environment of which high art and culture formed an integral part (J. F. Lane, 
2000: 52).  
 
Bourdieu's description may not have been specifically in the mind of Chris Smith or 
Tony Blair but its reference to "cultural codes" would have been readily understood 1. 
Bourdieu's sociological theories contributed to a critical realist understanding of 
society. Unlike those of Karl Marx, his explanations of social structures gave a role 
for the kinds of agential influences that New Labour sought to promote in its active 
welfare programmes and for the development of responsible citizenship (in their 
terms). Bourdieu's concept of "habitus", in particular, provides a conceptual and 
metaphorical vocabulary with which to explain an interrelationship between 
theories of  "access", "excellence" and "education". By habitus, Bourdieu meant 
formative cultural environments: the "product of history which produces individual 
and collective practises...which tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices, and 
their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms" 
(Harker and May, 1993: 174). Bourdieu's own description: "an acquired system of 
                                                     
1 Although not necessarily as Bourdieu intended. For a discussion of this subject, see HARKER, R. & 
MAY, S. A. 1993. Code and Habitus: Comparing the Accounts of Bernstein and Bourdieu. British 
Journal of Sociology of Education, 14 (2), 169-178. 
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generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is 
constituted” (Bourdieu, 1977: 95), is typically more precise but less easy to grasp. 
However, the point here is that excellence as a subjective judgement is a result of, or 
at least strongly influenced by, an individual's habitus and their innate 
understanding of the codes that give them access to a shared basis for evaluations.  
 
Bourdieu's theory therefore relates judgements of quality to communities that 
believe themselves to share values and ideas.  As Benedict Anderson has argued, in a 
globalised world these communities may not be geographically limited but may be 
local or global, private or public (Anderson, 1991), all of which makes relative the 
ideas and beliefs of the judges of quality. Thus, for "excellence" to be effective as a 
political idea there has to be, at the very least, a presumption of shared knowledge 
and values; the harmonisation of cultural understanding (in the arts as much as 
social values). As these arise also, perhaps even primarily, within differing material 
circumstances, shared judgements of excellence, or any other value, require socio-
economic as much as purely cultural policies to attempt to equalise differences:   
 
The participation of all individuals in cultural life requires the elimination of 
inequalities based, inter alia, on social background and status, education, 
nationality, age, language, sex, religious beliefs, health or the fact of belonging 
to ethnic, minority or fringe groups (UNESCO, 1982: para 22).   
 
The circle of interrelations that links material life to common values to codes of 
access and to a shared comprehension of  "excellence",  relies ultimately on forms of 
education; a process that, in this respect, may be the only tool humanity has for 
creating a critical universality of knowledge and understanding. 
 
3. Education  
 
While the roots of a social democratic, anthropological cultural policy can be found 
the White Paper of 1964 (the earlier social initiatives of CEMA having been cut short 
in favour of the professionalism and artistic absolutism of the Arts Council), cultural 
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policy as a concern for the arts had always been linked instrumentally to education 
and self-improvement. This is clearly evidenced by the institutional hosting of 
governmental expenditure on artistic matters within departments of education since 
the late 19th century; at first as a budgetary convenience but later, by 1900, also 
administratively (see Chapter 2).  In both a professional and an aesthetic battle 
against anti-intellectuals (recalling the "philisters" of Jena), Matthew Arnold 
proselytised a view that cultural values, viz. the arts, were absolute; the unchanging 
foundations of a civilised society. Although his reputation as a Victorian man-of-
letters was primarily earned as a poet and literary critic, it was Arnold's authorship of 
Culture and Anarchy that, together with his position of Her Majesty's Inspector of 
Schools, carried his work into the canon of political thought.  
 
To a significant extent, it is the indisputable and invariable nature of great cultural 
works that, for Arnold and his generation, filtered the uneducated from civilised 
society. Even by 1979, Hugh Jenkins, the Minister for the Arts from 1974 to 1976, was 
writing about a "culture gap" defined as the social space between the culturally 
educated and those seduced by "the overwhelming torrent of technically competent 
but often mindless and antisocial pap, aimed at the most easily stirred instincts of 
consumers..." (Jenkins, 1979: 19). He had in mind Hollywood films and television 
broadcasting but this rant might also have included fashion, tabloid newspapers, 
consumer-oriented entertainments in general and all manner of modern 
conveniences. His views are redolent of Eric Gill's objections of canned food and to 
the intellectualism of the modernists. The culture gap that Jenkins observed had, he 
claimed, been left by the "collapse by the end of the 1860s" of a "common culture".  
What was common about it was not a shared appreciation of its values but its 
acceptance of the absolute nature of the arts; one that separated the merely 
transitory and popular from the permanent but, for the uneducated, abstruse, 
esoteric and inaccessible.  
 
As has been noted, it was not until the last decade of the 20th century that policies 
for a social, anthropological culture really took hold, finally splitting from its long-
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time institutional partner, education, and connecting with Jennie Lee's inceptive 
concerns (albeit interpreted post hoc). In those intervening years, "the principles of 
the evolutionary process" (Kidd, 1902: 239) were finally abandoned in favour of a 
localised and community construction of cultural values as practised in everyday life. 
Improvement in this context was "modernisation without telos" (Andersson, 2010: 18;  
refer also to Bauman, 2000;  Bauman, 2007); meaning the assumption of 
advancement through constant change made possible by continuous, life-long, 
learning rather than by following a defined path to a utopian future. "One is not 
born a fully-fledged individual" Alain Finkielkraut wrote, "rather, it is something one 
learns to become by surmounting the chaos of mere appetite, narrow sectional 
interest and the tyranny of received ideas" (Finkielkraut, 1988: 123). These changes 
challenged the precepts of cultural policy inherited by DCMS and, in doing so, 
necessarily stimulated a new debate on the place of the arts and humanities within 
formal education.  Chris Smith took this one stage further, arguing not only that 
education was the mechanism by which historic cultural values could be constructed 
and shared for each new generation but that cultural "texts" (to borrow a word from 
the lexicon of Cultural Studies) were themselves an essential component of the 
educational process. DCMS stated baldly that: "The activities we sponsor ... are 
important for the quality of education". Smith himself, synonymising culture and 
creativity,  put it that "it [culture] is about helping the rest of the curriculum" (C. 
Smith, 1998: 133). It was even embedded in the Department's PSA: "Objective III" 
being to "develop the educational potential of the nation's cultural and sporting 
resources " (HM Treasury, 2000: ch.13).  
 
These ideas appear to give culture an important role in education policy. But they 
are also an example of what Clive Gray argued to be policy "attachment" arising from 
the "considerable structural and political weakness" of the arts sector and its 
consequential need for a strategy to provide "a means by which greater opportunities 
may be created for policy development" (Gray, 2002: 88;  Gray and Wingfield, 2011: 
590;  Gray, 2008: 217). Smith's explanation in a 2009 interview gave weight to this 
theory:   
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I knew that if I went along to talk to the Treasury and said I want you to put 
more money into the arts because I want you to invest in beauty and truth, I 
would get nowhere. If I go along to the Treasury and say I want you to invest 
more in the arts because there are hundreds of thousands of children whose 
education will benefit as a result of this and we will get millions more people 
coming to visit museums and we will help to reduce crime levels in run down 
areas and it will feed through into the creativity that drives quite a number of 
industries in the economy, then I might get a better hearing. This is nasty 
political horses for courses discussion (C. Smith, 2009). 
 
Smith's argument depends, though, on a presumption of the instrumental power of 
the arts. In the same interview, Smith further asserted: 
 
... there’s been some scientific studies, the impact on participation of children 
in school, in music, and its impact on their learning in maths is pretty well 
documented now, with quite a lot of work having been done in the States. But 
some of the impacts on other educational aspects, are less certain, some of 
the economic things; it’s difficult to present 100% proof.  However if you walk 
into a school where they do music and drama and dance and art I defy you to 
tell me that that is not a better school with a better atmosphere, a better 
climate, more well-adjusted kids, a better learning environment for 
everything else, than a school that doesn’t do those things, and you can go 
into school after school after school where that is the case.   
 
Smith gave no references for that research, but what there is does not strongly 
support his assertion. Richard Deasy provided in 2002 an extensive compendium of 
the research (Deasy, 2002) and Anne Bamford another entitled a Global Research 
Compendium on the impact of the arts in education in 2006 (Bamford, 2006). 
However, as these surveys gave no conclusive analyses of the research reports they 
document, it is more useful to turn to Katharine Smithrim's and Rena Upitis's 2005 
paper. This is an analysis of their own research programme on the effects of the arts 
in Canadian schools and includes reviews some of the most significant published 
literature on the subject since  E. W. Eisner's article in 1974 (Smithrim and Upitis, 
2005;  Eisner, 1974). Eisner himself referred to no research earlier than his own. The 
conclusions to all this are rather weak. Across all the research, some improvements 
in mathematics were recorded, together with less quantifiable improvements 
referred to by Smithrim and Upitis as "engagement", along with improved levels of  
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"joy, attentiveness, and motivation" among the study subjects (1974: 124). A close 
reading shows even those conclusions to be unconvincing, as they themselves 
admitted. 
 
Nearly all the above research was undertaken by those academically or pedagogically 
involved in the arts in one form or another, and noticeably favoured positive 
correlations between the academic performance of individuals at schools and the 
teaching or practise of the arts. Helpfully, Ellen Winnner and Lois Hetland 
summarised more neutral research in a special edition of the Journal of Aesthetic 
Education, pertinently also repeating that old academic adage that "correlation is not 
causality" (Winner and Hetland, 2000: 4). Published in 2000, this is work that would 
have been available to Chris Smith and DCMS. It indicated that: "there is as yet no 
evidence that arts-rich educational environments lead to improved academic 
achievement", although "In some (but not all) areas reviewed, we were in fact able to 
document potentially causal relationships between studying an art form and some 
area of non-arts achievement" (2000: 6). These two statements are crucially 
differentiated by the effect of an arts "environment" and studying an arts subject. 
Even so, they added, "more research would be required to determine whether 
transfer [of academic] skills, when it occurs, is due to transfer of cognitive skills, 
transfer of working habits, transfer of motivation and attitude, or to some other type 
of mechanism". They concluded that: "we should not expect more, in terms of 
transfer, from the arts than we expect from other disciplines" (2000: 7). The difficulty 
all the studies faced was separating-out their effects from any improvements simply 
from collaborative intellectual activity of any sort. As with most of the assertions 
made by Chris Smith and DCMS for the effects of their policies, supporting evidence 
was weak at best.  
 
One explanation for DCMS's forays into education policy and "the nurturing of 
education opportunity" (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b) is for the economic 
potential of creativity rather than the Arnoldian argument for civilisation and 
citizenship. "We must develop the educational role that creativity can and must 
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have...", Chris Smith wrote (C. Smith, 1998: 26), and creativity, for Smith and New 
Labour, was an essential element in a competitive economy. It also provided DCMS 
with an argument for its centrality in national economic policy. Finlayson thought 
much the same: "Education is taken to be the key route out of poverty or social 
exclusion. [...] Primarily  it is seen as the mechanism by which individuals can equip 
themselves and by which the national economy can feed itself with the appropriate 
skills of the new economy" (Finlayson, 2003: 164). This fundamental rationale is 
discussed in more depth later, but its relevance here is for what New Labour 
neologised as the "creative industries"; the fourth of Chris Smith's policy "themes" or 
"pillars". 
 
4. The Creative Industries 
 
DCMS and Chris Smith used several expressions synonymously for this concept: 
"Labels such as creative industries, cultural industries, creative economy and cultural 
economy, or cultural and creative industries have all been used" (A. C. Pratt and 
Jeffcutt, 2009: 5;  for critical views cf. Hesmondhalgh, 2002;  Garnham, 2005;  Flew, 
2012;  Cunningham, 2002;  Hartley, 2005;  Galloway and Dunlop, 2007), but what 
they share is a theory of culture, when embedded with industrial or mercantile 
activities, as an essentially economic concept. "Culture", Smith asserted to the Public 
Library Authorities, "also has a hard commercial edge. The creative industries are big 
business, and one of the Government's key objectives is to help improve economic 
performance in this area by taking a broad view of the cultural economy" (C. Smith, 
1998: 57). This alone did not appear to be DCMS's rationale for placing the creative 
industries as a core theme of policy but, when conceptualised as the fabric of a new, 
modernised, society, and matched with the political importance given to this type of 
endogenous economic development, its rhetoric was easily co-naturalised within 
New Labour's Third Way ideology. It also brought DCMS into the centre of 
government policy. 
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A considerable critical literature has grown up around the concept of the creative 
industries since the term's adoption by Australian Government in 1994 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1994)1, but the task here is to try and relate that 
concept to the policy rationales of New Labour and DCMS. The list of business 
activities initially deemed by the Office of National Statistics to constitute the 
creative industries was given earlier as "film; music; architecture; publishing 
(including electronic publishing); computer games; radio and television; the content 
industries (for example, museum collections on CD); software; advertising; crafts; 
visual and performing arts; designer fashion and art/antiques trade" (DCMS, 1998b: 
evidence, 4). What is in and what is out of that grouping has changed over time 
between countries, governments, organisations and theorists, but they all attempt to 
aggregate innovation, and therefore creativity, within knowledge-based, post-
Fordist, economic activities. It is the "creative" and "innovation" elements that have 
been loosely argued to be related to the arts, and thereby to cultural policy. 
 
The concept of the creative industries appears close to that of Theodor Adorno's and 
Max Horkehimer's expression, "the culture industry" but there are fundamental 
differences. "From the outset", wrote Jay Berstein , "Adorno's reflections on the 
culture industry were embedded in the wider context demanded by the collapse of 
the classical Marxist evolutionary scheme for historical development" (J. M. 
Bernstein, 1991: introduction) but it could equally be interpreted as another 
manifestation of modernist intellectualism. Indeed, in the early drafts for Dialectic of 
Enlightenment the term appears as "mass culture" before becoming "the culture 
industry" in the published text (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979;  J. M. Bernstein, 1991: 
98). In both possibilities it is some way from New Labour's idea of economic activity 
resulting from creativity and innovation. Adorno's concern was over the 
technological reproduction of cultural objects; the increasingly rapid growth of the 
means by which cultural products could be created and replicated in the service of 
profit, rather than for their aesthetic and non-material qualities:  
 
                                                     
1
 The first nominally cultural policy by an Australian Federal Government 
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What parades as progress in the culture industry, as the incessantly new 
which it offers up, remains the disguise for an eternal sameness; everywhere 
the changes mask a skeleton which has changed just as little as the profit 
motive itself since the time it first gained its predominance over culture (J. M. 
Bernstein, 1991: 100). 
 
As was observed above (in discussing Objectives and Performance of DCMS), 
Adorno's term was an intended oxymoron, expressing dismay at the loss of the 
artistic particular as it was "subsumed" by the manufactured general. It is then ironic 
that the term's passage via "cultural industries" ended in the 1990 as the "Creative 
Industries", embracing not just commercialised, commodified, cultural objects but 
also the businesses founded on those processes. They were then given the full weight 
of government support for their claimed economic powers.   
 
Placing those two words together met precisely with the aspirations of the Third 
Way variant of social-democratic neo-liberalism, while proffering social reform as an 
outcome of the new economic principles and still appealed to the ideology of the 
artistically conscious left. The process was open to two interpretive directions, 
suiting both old and New Labour. By one view, the theories developed through 
Cultural Studies claimed that cultural democratisation would expose and undermine 
the real ideology of the ruling, capital-owning class, represented by its defining 
culture of elite, inaccessible, artistic forms. On the other hand, the creative 
industries and its subset, the cultural industries (Throsby, 2010: 89), were argued to 
create jobs, power economic development and, by liberating the aspiring individual 
from the pointless rigors of a traditional liberal education, equalise the opportunities 
of all who were intent on self-advancement. In effect, those old powers symbolically 
displayed in an anachronistic bourgeois culture could be "debunked" (Scruton, 2012).   
 
Descriptions of culture are given above in Chapter 1, but, as is often the case in the 
period under discussion, its various meanings were exchanged freely according to 
the points being made, even where derived from foundationally different concepts. 
Never was this so obviously a difficulty as in discussions on creative industries 
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where, for the purposes of analysis at least, there is an acknowledged need to 
separate the arts, or culture as meaning the arts, from the industrial processes of 
commodification (Throsby, 2010: 88-89;  O'Connor, 2007: 44-51). As Throsby argued: 
"If they are simply commodities bought and sold on markets like any other products 
that circulate in the economy, the application of economic policy to their production 
[etc]... would be no different from economic policy-making in respect of any other 
commodity" (Throsby, 2010: 15). The most developed and plausible of these attempts 
at economic location, if not definition, arguably belongs to the Work Foundation 
whose diagram, or "stylised typology", of the relationship has, at its core, "creative 
fields ... [that] possess a high degree of expressive value" which are then related in 
expanding concentric circles to "The rest of the economy" at the most distant (The 
Work Foundation, 2007: 4).  
 
Satisfactory definitions of "creativity", as it interrelates culture to the economy, are 
more difficult to pin down. It was a problem identified by Peter Hall in his extensive 
survey of Cities in Civilization, where he noted the absence of literature on "the 
location of creativity" in the small number of studies on "the culturally creative"  or 
even in studies on "the technologically innovative city, where we shall find the 
shelves bursting" (P. Hall, 1999: 10). A 1988 report by the National Advisory 
Committee on Creative and Cultural Education made reference to one of the more 
thoughtful attempts by Calvin Taylor (C. W. Taylor, 1988: 99-121;  NACCCE, 1999). 
Taylor's approach was essentially taxonomic though, resulting in more than 50 
definitions that were, in effect, descriptions which offered no deeper understanding 
of the nature of creativity itself. For its connections to cultural policy, the most 
telling element of Taylor's work is that he made no attempt to differentiate artistic 
creativity from any other sort. That suited the nomenclature of the cultural 
industries, which (ironically) is not nominally associated with the arts. The reference 
to "cultural" is then both the creative source and the market for industrial products, 
but it does not otherwise recognise, or least differentiate, those creative sources as 
artistic.  
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The NACCCE itself made no claims for creativity to be a component of culture (or 
vice versa) but, rather, saw it as an influence on cultural formation. The report 
argued that the education system promoted creativity "in all areas of human 
activity...[for] when individuals find their creative strengths, it can have an 
enormous impact on self-esteem and on overall achievement" (1999: 6). Similarly, 
their concern for culture was primarily as a topic of education, seeking "to enable 
[young people] to understand and respect different cultural values and traditions 
and the processes of cultural change and development". Nevertheless, to further 
their educational aims its authors were seeking to exploit the Government's 
commitment "to promoting the creative abilities and cultural understanding of all 
young people through education" (1999: 7), and appeared to select language carefully 
to those ends.  
 
The task of pursuing political ideologies can, though, distort the very object of 
concern. The commercial benefits of working with artists were long realised by 
industrial Victorians, but there was no intention then to subsume them both into a 
concept of cultural production but, rather, simply to use the talents of those engaged 
in one field (artists and designers) for the improvement of objects in another 
(industrial production). In contrast, the culture from which the creative industries 
were generated was constructed of social relations, but one that could also be 
reversed so as to reform those relations on of the economic structures defined by the 
creative industries. This was the weightless "new economy" which Charles 
Leadbeater described vividly:  
 
Most of us make our money from thin air: we produce nothing that can be 
weighed, touched or easily measured. Our output is not stockpiled at 
harbours, stored in warehouses or shipped in railway cars. Most of us earn our 
livings producing service, judgement, information and analysis, whether in a 
telephone call centre, a lawyer's office, a government department or a 
scientific laboratory. We are all in the thin air business (Leadbeater, 1999: vii).  
 
Leadbeater presented his arguments in a White Paper a year before his book was 
published. Written for the Department of Trade and Industry it was entitled Our 
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Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Economy (Dept of Trade & Industry, 
1998). In it he argued energetically that the rapid exchange and exploitation of 
knowledge  across the world was already the basis of an economy no longer 
dependent or defined by mindless manufacturing processes or physical products. 
"Globalization is good ... If we turn our backs on the global economy, we turn our 
back on the most vital force in modern societies: the accelerating spread of 
knowledge and ideas ... We must not retreat into the illusory comfort of a closed, 
nostalgic, communitarian society" (Leadbeater, 1999: ix). The validity of this 
declaration is not the issue here, although it does rather obviously ignore the 
necessity of, and, for many, a preference for, routine manual work. It was the 
connection with creativity that carried Leadbeater's claims into the purview of 
DCMS and cultural policy.  
 
At that time Leadbeater made no special claims for the knowledge economy as a 
cultural policy. Indeed, Tony Blair stated bluntly in his introduction to the White 
Paper that "All this is the DTI's role" (Dept of Trade & Industry, 1998: 5). However, 
Leadbeater's propositions suited Chris Smith's institutional and personal ambitions 
for cultural policy: "On the creative industries, I wanted to set up the creative 
industries task force, which would draw ministers from other departments together" 
(C. Smith, 2009). Some of Leadbeater's later work was, though, specifically aimed at 
cultural policy. Responding to a commission from the Arts Council, he proposed 
"Ten Challenges" to "Arts Organisations in the 21st Century" (Leadbeater, 2005). 
Although published after the period of concern of this thesis, it is written in a style 
somewhat similar to Chris Smith's Creative Britain and characteristic of other 
literature on its subject. The ideas are simple, but curiously difficult to read, being 
constituted mainly of unsupported assertions; a tirade of shallow, sometimes banal, 
statements and exhortations for which the author feels no evidence is required 
(Oakley, 2006, 2004;  Evans, 2005;  Evans and Shaw, 2004). Commending "radical 
steps to redefine creativity" (Leadbeater, 2005: 8), Leadbeater claims that we are (or 
rather were) all consumers in an "experience economy" which demands changes in 
how artists and their institutions should respond to the "knowledgeable and 
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committed groups of consumers... 'trading up' to experiences and goods that deliver 
added performance" (2005: 9). The marketplace competition for musicians, writers 
and artists is now, he claimed, Apple, Google and Playstation (2005: 10). To help arts 
organisations to meet these challenges, "The Arts Council must consciously promote 
disruptive innovation ...[to] shake up the established order", or else "Where will the 
arts equivalent of Zara come from?" (Leadbeater, 2005: 11); and so on.  
 
In the process, Leadbeater promoted networks (and their social capital underwriting: 
trust), community activism, shared resources, and skills, whilst insisting on the need 
for innovators, entrepreneurs and market competitors in the arts (who, for 
Leadbeater appear to be managers, not artists) without commenting on the apparent 
conflict between sharing in the community and competition in a marketplace. The 
arts were not discussed, nor any consideration given to the actual motivations of 
those leading arts institutions at whom his sermon was directed.  
 
The DCMS Task Force for the creative industries issued two reports "mapping" the 
locations and concentrations of the creative industries that were considered to have 
been instrumental in bringing credibility to the concept, in the process raising  its 
importance to national economic policy  (DCMS, 1998b, 2001b). Even by mid-2000s, 
though, Oakley and others were still complaining of  "the almost uncritical  
acceptance of these arguments, many of which are untested and unproven" (Oakley, 
2004;  C. Taylor, 2006). Supported by explicit and long-standing declarations for the 
value and economic importance of the arts (for example: Myerscough, 1988), DCMS, 
its Task Force, and cultural policy makers nationally were by then, however, 
operating in the shadow of more politically attractive arguments for innovation and 
creativity as the essential ingredients in urban regeneration.  
 
Urban Regeneration 
 
Embedding the creative industries into the challenges of urban regeneration resulted 
from the coincident trajectories of DCMS's social and economic policy and New 
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Labour's Third Way ideology. As mentioned, Tony Blair made just one speech on 
cultural policy throughout his premiership - at the Tate Modern gallery on March 
6th 2007. In it he referred back to an earlier commitment to make "the arts and 
culture part of our 'core script'". They were, he said, to be "central, an essential part 
of the narrative about the character of a new, different, changed Britain".  His 
argument was founded on the belief, he said, that "modern goods and services" come 
from "people - their ability to innovate, to think anew, to be creative" (Blair, 2007).  
As was shown earlier, Chris Smith promoted the creative industries strongly though 
DCMS policy, in his speeches, and in writing (its elements dominate the text of 
Creative Britain). Perhaps because of strong support from the Treasury and No. 10, 
he also supported urban regeneration for its claimed socially ameliorating powers. 
Referring to a range of "cultural projects", from the Edinburgh Festival to the 
Gateshead-Newcastle regeneration, The Lowry in Salford, and the spread of "cultural 
quarters", Smith extolled their ability "to lift the eyes and thoughts and abilities of 
people in a local community" (C. Smith, 1998: 138). Tony Blair made almost exactly 
the same claims, but expressed in jobs and money:  
 
“Cultural regeneration has created 11,000 jobs in Salford Quays, 6,500 
attributable to the Lowry alone. This building we are in created 3,000 jobs in 
Southwark and an economic benefit of £100 million in its first year. The Baltic 
and Sage cultural centres have underpinned a £1 billion redevelopment 
programme for east Gateshead” (Blair, 2007).  
"To anyone who doubts this" Smith concluded, "you only have to look at the 
remarkable rejuvenation of the South Bank alongside the Globe Theatre and 
Bankside to see what heritage and cultural-led regeneration is all about" (C. Smith, 
1998: 139). It is glaringly obvious, though, that redeveloping the South Bank of the 
River Thames in Central London has few practical points of comparison with the 
derelict Salford Quays (ex Manchester Docks), Liverpool's inner city, or the 
Gateshead side of the River Tyne. Nevertheless,  for Smith, Blair, Brown and New 
Labour, urban regeneration was an intervention in social and economic structures 
with the aim of stimulating, guiding, and growing "human capital" for the 
betterment of the nation. These grand cultural projects were thought to demonstrate 
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physically the innovation and entrepreneurialism on which the modern economy 
depends. Like Bentham's "projectors":  "all such persons as, in the pursuit of wealth, 
strike out in any new channel, and more especially into any channel of invention" 
(Bentham, 1839 [1787]) 20-21), the entrepreneurs of these projects have, in Tony 
Blair's terms, the ability "to innovate, to think anew, to be creative" (Blair, 2007).  
 
Those ideas were expounded most effectively by the American economic geographer 
Richard Florida, although not until 2002 with the publication of The Rise of the 
Creative Class (Florida, 2002) - five years after the advent of the New Labour 
government and more than twenty years after British theorists had first developed 
similar theories. Florida's book quickly gained international fame, but its arguments 
had precedents in the works of Franco Bianchini,  Francois Matarasso, John 
Howkins, and Charles Landry, much of it published by the think-tank, Comedia, 
formed in 1978 by Landry to study and publish on the interconnectedness of culture, 
creativity and cities (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993;  Bianchini and Landry, 1994;  
Landry and Bianchini, 1995;  Matarasso, 1997;  Landry, Greene et al., 1996;  
Matarasso, 2003). Their collective propositions appeared to rest on two particular 
assertions. Firstly, that "artists and cultural organisations are urban agents par 
excellence" (Landry, Greene et al., 1996: summary) -  "urban agents" being those who 
catalyse the chemistry of desirable economic, social and cultural development in 
urban areas. By the nature of this metaphor, it proposes also that these reactions can 
be created artificially by bringing together the appropriate physical, environmental 
and human elements into areas targetted for regeneration. The second assertion is 
that the arts have socially ameliorative powers: that classical economic analyses 
"miss the real purposes of the arts, which is not to create wealth but to contribute to 
a stable, confidence and creative society" (Matarasso, 1997: summary).  
 
This is a broader issue which begs questions on many arguments about the 
instrumental power of the arts. Criticisms have been levelled at both the creative 
industries and urban regeneration programmes: that they are actually socially 
divisive and segregating, favouring and furthering the interests of one section of 
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society above "the creative class";  that they are dismissive of trade unions, 
traditional practices, and mundane work; and that they regard traditions as 
uncreative anachronisms irrelevant to the modern economy (Peck, 2005). In a 
detailed analysis of  "culture-led regeneration", Jonathan Vickery raised what is still 
perhaps the most incisive question: "To what degree the cultural component of 
urban regeneration was masking forms of economic development that were actually 
destructive to cultural development" (Vickery, 2007: 24).      
 
These criticisms were mostly made some years after the idea of cultural industries 
and their part in the social and physical regeneration of towns and cities had been 
first voiced. At the time, though, the principles of the Landry-Florida-et al thesis 
attracted heavyweight political support from local government, regional 
development authorities, Government business departments (including the DTI) 
and, most importantly, Gordon Brown's Treasury. In fact, they had a history in 
economic and social analysis that began even before Comedia's work or the Blair-
Brown leadership of the Labour Party to be found, for example, in Alfred Marshall's 
work on "agglomerations" (now called "clusters") (Marshall, 1890;  Johansson and 
Quigley, 2004) and Alfred Weber's Theory of the Location of Industries (Weber and 
Friedrich, 1909).  
 
While these neo-classical approaches to economic development posited arguments 
for industrial locations according to the availability of existing resources, workers, 
communications, and raw materials, they provide a stark differentiation with the 
urban development theories now founded on the uses of knowledge and "human 
capital". In this sense, human capital means the collected experience and knowledge 
of each person, enabled by their cultural influences and innate creative abilities. 
Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of business cycles (J. Schumpeter, 1939), itself a 
response to the business cycle "wave" theories of Nikolai Kondratieff (Kondratieff, 
1935), illuminated the mechanisms of change in this new knowledge economy with 
the concept of  "creative destruction" (J. Schumpeter, 1939;  McCraw, 2007;  P. Hall, 
1999: 295). Over time, other theories strengthened compatible socio-economic 
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approaches: Perroux's Pole Theory, 1955; Aydalot's forms of innovation, 1988; 
Castells's work on development logic 1989;  Granovetter's concept of the "strength of 
weak ties" (Granovetter, 1973); and Daniel Bell's theory of post-industrial society 
(Bell, 1973). All featured in that narrative and all can claim to have found correlations 
between the social structures of cities, the quality of both public and private realms, 
and developmental outcomes.  
 
The most beneficial and essential structural element, through which agents could be 
empowered, was identified as networks. Through these were generated human 
capital, technological innovations, and as Jane Jacobs termed it "differential 
production": viz. new development arising out of innovative niche products rather 
than more established mass manufacturing (Jacobs, 1970: 278). Peter Hall was one 
who recorded the economic history of relationships between those who work and 
live in cities and the social and cultural milieu (all of which constituted nodes in the 
network metaphor) that they naturally construct around them (P. Hall, 1999). His 
work provided an historical context for Florida's and Handy's attempts to construct 
causal relations between economic success, innovation (viz. creativity) and both 
societal and artistic culture. Leadbeater's pleas for "disruptive innovation", for 
example, can be found in Schumpeter, as much of the originality of Florida's book is 
found in its ability to draw together arguments formed over more than a century and 
across differing theoretical economic foundations: classical, social, cultural (social 
and artistic), and psychological. In a British context, Jonathan Vickery's research 
published in 2007 showed just how broad, more researched and economically 
embedded, this whole idea had become under New Labour (Vickery, 2007), but in 
doing so it defined its own particular form of culture. 
 
Research and Evidence 
 
It was said earlier (p169) that Smith's four themes or pillars of policy stand between 
"the traditions of governmental interest in cultural matters and the socio-economic 
objectives of the New Labour government". While they fit well into the rhetoric of 
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the New Labour government, on close examination any claims for their ability to 
carry cultural activity into the centre of its agenda appear unjustified. Indeed, this 
mismatch contributes substantially to the observed incoherence and inconsistencies 
of DCMS policy, suggesting their function may, in large part, be as a vehicle to carry 
the department into areas of greater institutional power rather than for the 
promotion of cultural values. 
 
The problem of finding evidence for the effectiveness of any line of policy is an 
important question in this thesis generally. Whatever the private value of the arts (as 
the traditional substance of cultural policy), if their public value is proved to be in 
their power to cohere society and generate economic development then any 
inconsistencies and logical contradictions may also be shown as ill-conceived or at 
least irrelevant. But just as this chapter has shown the theoretical foundations of 
DCMS cultural policy to be incoherent, empirical evidence also offers little support. 
Empirical research faces two difficulties: the first in the nature of the subject to be 
researched and the second over concerns about research methodologies. 
 
The artistic world remained vociferous on arts policy throughout the New Labour's 
government but, in doing so, showed how it misunderstood cultural policy. Nicholas 
Hytner's 2003 tirade on rhetorical economism in the arts, David Edgar's acerbic 
review in the Guardian of post-war funding for arts, Stephen Bayley's post-Dome 
critique of New Labour, and Jonathan Glancey's protests at cultural "dumbing-down" 
are typical for their views, albeit that they are expressed so differently (Hytner, 2003;  
Edgar, 2004;  Bayley, 1998;  Glancey, 1998: 21). Most are accusations of 
instrumentalism for economic and social policy purposes (Jermyn, 2001;  Sanderson, 
2002;  Gray, 2007), or plaintive attacks at New Labour's or Chris Smith's apparent 
disinterest in the quality they claimed to promote. Glancey noted pointedly that the 
index in Smith's Creative Britain listed only "Gallagher, Noel" under "G". "What did 
you expect?", he asked, "Glazunov? Giotto?". 
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These criticisms, typical of the period, were targetted at New Labour on the 
presumption that cultural policy was arts policy. A longer historical view of the 
relationship between the arts and the state was published in 2006 by Eleonora 
Belfiore (Belfiore, 2006a, b) and Belfiore and Bennett the following year (Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2007b, 2008) that questioned the most basic assumptions of how the arts 
affect society. Reaching back to debates in ancient Greece they found arguments for 
the potential for the arts to corrupt as much as benefit well-being;  to provide a 
means of catharsis; for moral improvement; for their educative potential; and for 
their civilising effects. Nevertheless, this approach also viewed cultural policy as arts 
policy even while recognising its definitive relationship with society generally;  a 
relationship that makes any transformative power of the arts all but impossible to 
establish.  
 
What was (and still is) required was a research methodology capable of producing 
the information from which strong conclusions can be built. The parsimonious 
principle of controlled research design that lies within the logic of science is 
inappropriate for this task. Although it may provide the research methods most 
valued by those seeking to construct "evidence based policy", at the same time and 
by the nature of those methods, it actually denies the possibility of robust 
conclusions. Quite obviously, to understand social phenomena requires all the 
characteristics of that society to be present, producing such complexity that 
conclusions are at best indicative and rarely certain. In the words of Belfiore and 
Bennett:  
 
"...the idea of transformation is so complex that it is impossible to imagine 
how it might be reduced to a set of measurable attributes. Moreover, even if it 
were, the number of potential factors effecting the transformation would be 
so great that it would be impossible to establish with any certainty that 
experiences of the arts had been the root cause" (2008: 6). 
 
Although Belfiore's and Bennett's concerns were for the arts, the same criticisms can 
be made of research into the cultural industries. The effective characteristics of 
creativity and innovation are the basis of claims for the power of the arts to affect 
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social improvements, economic activity and the quality of life in urban areas, and are 
entangled with the same "contorted and torturous definitional historical discourse" 
from an international as well as a national perspective (Roodhouse, 2006). As noted 
earlier in this chapter, research problems into the cultural industries begin with 
attempts to define them (A. C. Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009;  Hesmondhalgh, 2002;  
Garnham, 2005;  Flew, 2012;  Cunningham, 2002;  Hartley, 2005;  Galloway and 
Dunlop, 2007) but ultimately fail when confronted with the complexity of influences 
and conditions within which human interactions take place. As the breadth and 
claims for cultural policy increased in the final decades of the last century, the lack 
of strong evidence was gradually to become an increasing concern, both in cultural 
theory and in the methods by which that theory might be tested (Selwood, 2002, 
2009;  Belfiore, 2006a;  Belfiore and Bennett, 2007b, 2008).  
 
A further problem of research methodologies concerns so-called "advocacy 
research". In its design and the interpretation of qualitative and quantitative data, 
this type of research appeared to have become more frequent in cultural policy 
research after New Labour took office (Merli, 2002;  for contemporaneous literature 
reviews, see Reeves, 2002;  and Guetzkow, 2002). The prior assumptions of advocacy 
are claimed to bias the conclusions of a good deal of the research on the 
instrumental value of cultural policy. Belfiore and Bennett said that it "blurred the 
boundary between advocacy and research", and "Instead of questioning whether or 
not the arts actually do have the economic and social impact claimed for them, 
researchers have directed their efforts to coming up with evidence that they do" 
(Belfiore and Bennett, 2008: 6-7). Charles Peirce's observation that empirical science 
research actually operates through "retroduction" and less through an objective 
process of induction (and almost never through deduction1) in effect logically 
formalised that bias by employing pre-conceptions within the syllogism (Peirce, 
2003). The origins of this problem lie in part with research commissioned from 
                                                     
1
 The deduced conclusions to arguments being limited to what is already contained in their premises, 
empirical science must be primarily concerned with new information from which new premises can 
be formed inductively. By contrast, retroduction tests the validity of pre-conceived hypotheses, 
denying that conclusions are actually reached through inductive logic.  
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organisations interested in particular outcomes: arts organisations, regional 
development authorities, and government departments principally among them (M. 
Miles, 2005;  C. Taylor, 2006, gives examples).  
 
The problems of research reinforce the apparent conceptual incoherence of cultural 
policy but add the further possibility that accurate data (which requires accurate 
definitions and sound research) was not the critical factor in political discourse that 
it was claimed to be. Viewing the complexity of DCMS's institutional and ideational 
legacy, its axiomatic precepts, and its apparent disregard of the many criticisms 
levelled against its cultural policies, poses a serious challenge to anyone searching 
for foundational rationales. Yet in striving for objectives, politics, like most human 
affairs, follows the fault lines between the possible and the aspirational. But there is 
a logic to it and strong guidance in Chris Smith's declared ambitions. The task now is 
to synthesise that logic into a clear and compelling picture. At the root of all these 
difficulties is the confusion of meaning of culture represented in the traditions of 
British arts policy and New Labour's cultural policy. But once the arts are seen as 
marginal to Smith's and DCMS's proclaimed objectives many of the inconsistencies 
fall away. For this proposition to have credibility, the operational model by which 
the DCMS could argue its place in social and economic policy, yet still maintain 
adherence to its culture remit, has to be established. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Economics and Governance 
 
 
 
 
It has been shown that the aims of DCMS were social and economic, with little 
interest in the notion of culture the Arts Council was formed to promote. It was a 
change that was little understood then, as it is now. Even the ACGB's move towards 
business practises was intended not intended to debase the principle of l'art pour 
l'art but to satisfy the Treasury's demands for more self-sufficiency, plural funding 
sources, and the application of New Public Management techniques. Jennie Lee's 
socialism had inclined her to apply the arts to wider social issues, but still the arts 
prevailed as the core meaning. In the latter decades of the 20th century, "amenities " 
and "leisure" activities were added to the institutional concerns of the government 
departments responsible for the subsidised arts, but these were minor political issues 
which did little but slowly dissolve the distinctions between culture as the arts and 
culture as society.  
 
By contrast, the strength and clarity of Chris Smith's objectives should have brought 
immediate critical attention. Only under New Labour was culture to be the vehicle 
for political power achieved by management of the social relations as the active 
framework of the economy; culture as a structure within which economic relations 
could be enacted. In the process, any immanent values thought to be encapsulated 
in artistic works seemed to have been lost to the political class together with words 
for its recovery (witness Tessa Jowell's essay Government and the value of culture 
(Jowell, 2004) and its critique by Belfiore (Belfiore, 2009: 350)). As an extended 
socio-anthropological meaning of culture became part of the political theory of 
economic policy, DCMS had a part to play (so it would argue) in all government 
policy. After all, "political theories are also always social theories of some kind" 
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(Finlayson, 2003: 104). Those artists and their managers, complaining of inadequate 
subsidies and their fear that work had stopped on the national arts edifice, had 
missed the point. DCMS had abandoned the site to its own devices in pursuit of a 
bigger plan. Culture was now society, and society was the economy. The new plan 
required a consequentialist outlook of business backed with the determination of 
the ideologue to coerce every citizen to play their part. The normative principle of 
non-intervention into people's lives that had once left the arts and entertainment as 
matters of individual and private concerns, was barely discernible. Even Henry Cole's 
promotion of the arts as a useful adjunct to manufacturing was a strand worn very 
thin by the time of New Labour. It is to the underlying economic model behind these 
changes that this thesis now turns; one in which DCMS could argue a central role 
and one that united the Treasury's economic model with New Labour's Third Way 
social democracy. 
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Outline of an Economic Model 
 
In a speech at an economics seminar in London on 27th September 1994, Gordon 
Brown, then Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, explained his developing 
economic policies. One sentence in particular was extensively reported:  
Our new economic approach is rooted in ideas which stress the importance of 
macro-economics, post neo-classical endogenous growth theory and the 
symbiotic relationships between growth and investment, and people and 
infrastructure. 
 
Given the nature of his audience, it provided an opportunity to air this complex 
theory to specialists whom he could expect to have both a practical and theoretical 
interest in what might otherwise seem arcane technical issues. But whatever its 
theoretical merits, Michael White, writing in the Guardian, facetiously referred to 
Brown's speech as not being "his punchy, Periclean best" (M. White, 1994). A few 
days later, and with rather less subtlety, Norman Macrae in the Sunday Times 
suggested: "There have to be giggles about what academic cuckoo got Gordon Brown 
to mouth last week that Labour's new economic policy would be rooted in 'the 
growth of post neo-classical endogenous growth theory' " (Macrae, 1994). These 
comments, aimed at important economic theoretical principals, might be seen as 
somewhat disingenuous snipes with more than a hint of anti-intellectualism. White's 
comment even managed the ironic twist of depreciating intellectualism with an 
intellectual reference. But they weren't alone in their disdain. The speech was said to 
have been written by a then unknown Labour Party researcher, Ed Balls. Two weeks 
later, Michael Heseltine, then President of the Board of Trade, greatly amused the 
Conservative Party annual conference with mocking ridicule: "So there you have it. 
The final proof. Labour's brand new shining modernist economic dream. But it 
wasn't Brown's. It was Ball's!" (Heseltine, 1994, October 14th.) 1.  
                                                     
1
 TV footage of Heseltine’s speech became an early example of viral distribution. It is still circulating – 
see (as of Feb 12
th
 2010):  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_7020000/newsid_7023900/7023973.stm?bw=bb&mp=wm&a
sb=1&news=1&bbcws=1. 
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Heseltine’s speech was broadcast around the world  and, at a stroke, silenced Brown 
on the issue.  
 
Although the principles of endogenous growth theory ("EGT") were hardly new, 
having been discussed in economic literature for some years, Gordon Brown never 
again openly referred to the theory by name. Nevertheless they became central to 
New Labour’s economic theories, eventually to be pursued in government three 
years later. Brown had in fact captured in that one sentence a central idea in EGT. 
He noted that its inclusion of ideas, knowledge and resulting innovations in 
economic models (which arise from both public and private investments) gave a 
central role for a Labour government in the prevailing British capitalist, neoclassical 
economy. Just as classical economics was concerned with the accumulation and uses 
of surpluses, neoclassical economics found an interest in individuals and their 
choices. In its attempts to solve a well-acknowledged problem, EGT was in effect a 
collective criticism of neo-classical economic models, seeking to incorporate further 
the part played by individuals within society, assessing their influences and 
measuring their potential: “The basic error of modern macroeconomics is the belief 
that the economy is simply the sum of microeconomic decisions of rational agents. 
But the economy is more than that” (De Grauwe, 2009).  EGT was said to make good 
a fundamental deficiency: "the thrust of this new endeavor [sic] has been to escape 
the straightjacket of conventional neoclassical theory by treating as endogenous to 
the growth process those factors that neoclassical growth model relegates as 
exogenous, in particular technological change and human capital" (R. Martin and 
Sunley, 1998: 202). 
 
Macro-micro 
 
Before discussing further the principles and criticisms of EGT and its relevance to 
cultural policy, it is important to say what it is not. Since the 1980s, debates in the 
arts-world over economic instrumentalism have generally confused trade and 
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commerce in the micro-economy with structural, macro-economic policy. EGT is a 
development of supply-side macroeconomic growth theory in which the outcomes of 
trade (for example, in the creative industries) are embedded and endogenously 
effective. But the extent of profit or loss (or subsidy) from those industries does not 
challenge the theoretical principles of EGT, they merely change the numbers, not 
the structural model nor its formulae.  
 
In the 1980s, the Thatcher government's rejection of Keynesian economics and the 
promotion of individual ambition within the mercantile economy ran concurrently 
with the demands of the New Public Management (Beck, 1989;  Belfiore, 2004;  J.-E. 
Lane, 2000). Together they characterised a period when the arts, which was then still 
the primary object of cultural policy, were marked by a "discourse of beleaguerment" 
(O. Bennett, 1995: 200) in the belief that subsidies were under attack by a 
government disinterested in the intrinsic and materially-transcendent values 
expressed in l'art pour l'art. To be worthy of financial  support it was thought by 
many working in the arts that artistic activity had to provide evidence that it was a 
net contributor to the national economy. This was indicated by, among other things, 
re-terming "subsidy" as "investment". Other than by a considerable volume of direct 
protests, the principal defence of artists and arts administrators alike was to claim 
their work did indeed have considerable economic impact and, thereby, it was 
worthy of "investment" alongside any other economically productive activity.  
 
Whether this interpretation was mistaken or an insightful truth is not the point 
here, although it is worth observing several factors that indicate the former. Firstly, 
the subsidised arts were then, as now, only a small portion of what came to be called 
"the arts market", much of which was thriving (Caust, 2003;  Department of National 
Heritage, 1994: para 1.10); secondly, the data used in these arguments did not 
separate the commercial, unsubsidised work from the subsidised; and, thirdly, that 
the reliability of the data was in any case strongly contested (as discussed in the last 
chapter). Myerscough's claims (Myerscough, 1988) and the infamous  Arts Council's 
Annual Report of 1985 (Arts Council of Great Britain, 1985) were early, if also 
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extreme, examples of arguments which sought to inveigle the arts into the utilitarian 
business world (as it was perceived), thereby placing their products squarely in the 
micro economy.  This seemed to meet the demands of the market economy 
promoted by the Thatcher government, although, as can be seen by looking at 
changes to the Arts Council's Grant-in-Aid, then the largest element of the Arts & 
Heritage budget within the Office of Arts and Libraries, their arguments probably 
had little impact either under the Conservative Government or under New Labour.  
 
It is reasonable to speculate that the Conservative government of the time simply did 
not accept these arguments and may even have been more receptive to pleas for 
support for the arts under the idealist argument of  l'art pour l'art. For New Labour, 
though, their truth and falsity was a side issue. Their concern was for the social and 
economic structures in which any "economic impact" resulting from arts or cultural 
activity might arise; viz. their place in the macro economy. Any particular business 
outcomes would be of interest only as contributions to aggregated evidence for the 
micro-economic effectiveness of macro-economic policies. This argument does not 
deny the business potential of "cultural" activity, but does suggest the lobbying and 
the "buy-in" by arts organisations to that idea was misdirected.  
 
That idea was, though, gradually absorbed, such that in the depths of the current 
economic recession, the Museums, Libraries and Archives Commission published a 
paper on behalf of seventeen national arts bodies entitled Cultural Capital: A 
Manifesto for the Future. In fear of reducing subsidies, it proffered a policy solution 
through: "economic renewal and social recovery led by the arts and culture with an 
entrepreneurial and creative spirit at its heart" (MLA, 2010: 1). Richard Morrison, 
writing in the Times, referred to it as a script for Carry on Subsidising (Morrison, 
2010), but his criticisms were in effect aimed at New Labour's economic  policies and 
its central argument -  that "Creativity is the key to economic recovery" (2010: 7). The 
paper was published in March, two months before Labour lost power in the General 
Election to a coalition whose constituent parties had shown far less interest in New 
Labour's economic models. The result of all the lobbying based around the 
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arguments in Cultural Capital was ultimately annual reductions in grant-in-aid to 
the Arts Council in 2011/12, with further reductions budgetted for the following three 
years  (CMS Select Committee, 2011: Sect 2, para 25).  
 
Published research into the "economy" of the arts since the mid-1960s have been 
similarly concerned primarily with microeconomic or even simply business 
questions. Baumol and Bowen's much quoted (but contestable) application of the 
"cost disease" to the arts (Baumol and Bowen, 1966;  Towse, 1997) is an early 
example. Even Mark Blaug's  thirty-year retrospective survey of the "economics of 
the arts" confirmed that "most of the literature remains wedded to the older, 
narrower conception in which cultural economics means the economics of the 
performing visual and literary arts" (Blaug, 2001: 123).  More recent publications, able 
to take-in the post-1997 changes to cultural rather than simply arts policy were 
linked to that micro-economic lineage established by Baumol and Bowen, examples 
being those by Ruth Towse (Towse, 2006), Ginesburgh and Throsby (Ginsburgh and 
Throsby, 2006), and David Throsby's 2010 book The Economics of Cultural Policy 
(Throsby, 2010),   
 
The contention (made in this thesis) that New Labour integrated social and moral 
developments into economic performance was little understood at the time (at least 
within the arts world) and resulted in arguments for subsidy being at least partially 
misdirected. These had, though, absorbed and re-applied New Labour's persistent 
rhetoric even to the point of reversing social policy into cultural policy: under new 
Labour, "Social policies become cultural policies, aimed at the behavior and 
dispositions of individuals" (Andersson, 2010: 98). Compared with the economic 
potential of increased access to resources, the development of human capital 
through education, and the promotion of creativity and innovation (viz: three of 
DCMS's policy themes), l'art pour l'art had little or no significance in Smith's or 
DCMS's ambitions. 
 
 
211 
 
Endogenous Growth Theories  
 
Shortly after New Labour took office, Aghion and Howitt published what remains 
one of the most complete assessments of EGT (Aghion and Howitt, 1999). In the 
opening pages they make the central point that: “it has not been possible to capture 
this vision [of technological change] of economic life using mainstream economic 
theory...” (1999: 3). It is a claim repeated in one form or another by many economic 
theorists. What traditional economic models cannot allow for, say Aghion and 
Howitt, are, typically, the effects of research, innovation, training, knowledge 
transfers, and technological progress; those particularly human activities for which 
the outcomes and benefits are not easily assessed in quantifiable financial data. “The 
purpose of endogenous growth theory is to fill this gap in neoclassical theory – to 
open up technological progress and innovation to systematic analysis and to study 
their effects on growth…” (1999: 7).  
 
Although EGT is named a "theory", it is not in fact a singular, cohesive proposition 
but a description of adjustments and additions to traditional economic models built 
on the formulae and methodological vocabulary of neoclassical economics. Elements 
of this approach can be traced back to Joseph Schumpeter, most particularly 
outcomes arising from his much quoted concept of "creative destruction" that 
favours innovative entrepreneuralism, but its effects had always been very difficult to 
model predicatively. Robert Solow's 1957 analysis of the US economy between 1909 
and 1949 noted the need to add "something else" or more technically, a "residual" to 
the standard models to account for its rapid development. He settled on 
"technological change in the widest sense" because, in Omar Al-Ubaydli's terms: "it 
also represented advances in everything in the economy that was not labour or 
capital. These included advances in basic science, industrial management, education, 
training, nourishment, morale, the weather, pollution, and so on" (R. Solow, 1957: 29;  
Al-Ubaydli and Kealey, 2000: 10).  
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Writing in 1994, Solow located the revival of EGT in "three waves" over the latter half 
of the 20th century (R. M. Solow, 1994: 45): the first with publications by Roy Harrod 
and E. Domar of their investigations into the relations between investment (and 
therefore capital) and output, and their argument for why these were inadequately 
dealt with in the neo-classical models. The second wave he defines as "the 
development of the neoclassical model", in which attempts were made to include 
endogenous as well as exogenous variables.  Solow's third wave is then characterised 
by questioning the long-established idea of "diminishing returns to 'capital', (now 
interpreted as the whole collection of accumulatable factors of production, one of 
which might be labelled human capital or even the stock of knowledge)" (1994: 49). 
In passing, Solow later commented that: "I think the real value of endogenous 
growth theory will emerge from its attempt to model the endogenous component of 
technological progress as an integral part of the theory of economic growth". Solow 
also referred to Paul Romer (as had others) as the "pioneer" in this respect (1994: 51). 
Indeed, it is Romer's "long-run growth" model that is most often given the 
economists' own innovation accolade. In all these works, the term "technical" refers 
to a broad concept of innovations, and is not field specific (for a literature review on 
innovation in the public sector, see (Røste, 2004)).  
 
Romer's work is worth describing in a little more detail as it was of direct interest to 
New Labour. He characterised his economic model as "essentially a competitive 
equilibrium model with endogenous technical change" in which "knowledge is 
assumed to be an input in production" (P. Romer, 1986). His work was reinforced by 
Robert Lucas's critique of neoclassical growth models, which proposed instead an 
alternative "or, at least complimentary" model by adding to it the effects of "human 
capital" (Lucas, 1988: 14). Romer continued to develop the principles of EGT, 
publishing papers in 1990 and 1994 as his ideas developed (P. Romer, 1990;  P. M. 
Romer, 1994). The last of these was published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives 
alongside papers on EGT from four other eminent authors; Gene Grossman and 
Elhanan Helpman, Robert Solow, and Howard Pack, each reflecting on the 
resurgence of endogenous growth in development theory (Grossman and Helpman, 
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1994;  R. M. Solow, 1994;  Pack, 1994). Together they provided a detailed history, 
explication, and critique of EGT that would have been available to Ed Balls and 
Gordon Brown at the time of that ill-fated speech.  
 
In his 1994 paper, Romer begins with a brief explanation of EGT which, while not 
universally accepted, provides the basis for understanding his contribution to its 
development. Work on EGT, he says: "distinguishes itself from neoclassical growth 
theory by emphasizing that economic growth is an endogenous outcome of an 
economic system, not the result of forces that impinge from outside". Noting that 
neoclassical theory inadequately accounts for differing growth rates in different 
countries, he then adds that EGT "tried instead to uncover the private and public 
sector choices that cause the rate of growth of the residual to vary across countries".  
In the rest of the paper Romer discussed these two questions under the headings of 
"The Convergence Controversy" and "The Passing of Perfect Competition", before 
relating them both to "Neo-Schumpertarian Growth" (P. M. Romer, 1994: 4, 11, 17). 
The challenge under the first of these headings can be summed-up with two further 
questions: "why is it that poor countries as a group are not catching up with the rich 
countries...", and why do workers in the creative industries tend to move towards 
areas that are crowded and more competitive, regardless of wage rates and other 
rewards. Any differences between wages and market conditions should have been 
"arbitraged away" (1994: 9) in convergence, he claimed, but the opposite tends to 
occur (1994: 9;  see also Lucas, 1988). His answer was not absolute, but pointed 
instead to the need for inputs and algorithmic adjustments that take account of the 
complex reasoning, often not obviously utilitarian, with which humankind make 
their decisions.   
 
Romer addressed the question of perfect competition with the somewhat startling 
"observation" that "we had enough evidence to reject all the available growth models 
throughout the 1950s, 1960,s and 1970s" (1994: 11). In search of an explanation why 
endogenous models had been comparatively neglected he stated that progress in 
economics has resulted "not merely from the mechanical application of hypothesis 
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test to data set" but "there is a creative act associated with the construction of new 
models that is also crucial to the process" (1994: 11). Romer appeared to be describing 
a process of retroduction, referred to earlier in Chapter 4, as a more accurate 
description of the logical processes in empirical research. This is an interesting point 
as it makes retroduction itself one of the creative, endogenous processes that factor 
in EGT.  
 
Romer gave "five basic facts" about economic growth that, while long acknowledged, 
had, he claimed, been difficult to incorporate into neo-classical models: 
 
i. "There are many firms in the market".  
Traditional models tend to treat the effect of firms in aggregate or 
singular, whereas their rationales, skills, management practices, 
resources and learned knowledge are multifarious and highly varied. A 
crucial differentiation needs to be made between those that innovate 
and those that don't. 
ii. "Discoveries differ from other inputs in the sense that many people can 
use them at the same time".   
Orthodox neoclassical models treat discoveries and the knowledge 
that accompanies them as non-rival goods, which is only partially the 
case. The availability of discoveries and knowledge then depends upon 
"spillovers"; that is to say, how the acquisition and use of knowledge 
spreads beyond its sources at little additional cost. 
iii. "It is possible to replicate physical activities".  
This is a technical issue concerning the utilisation of assets and capital, 
but can also relate to the question of whether innovations are rival or 
non-rival goods and how their creation can be rewarded. 
iv. "Technological advance comes from things that people do".  
This "fact" places the aggregate rate of discovery as endogenous, not as 
an outcome of random events under external influences. 
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v. "Many individuals and firms have market power and earn monopoly 
rents on discoveries".  
As the counterpart to point ii, it picks up the point that many 
innovations are rival goods, protected by patents, copyrights and 
secrecy in order to ensure rents provide sufficient incentive for further 
innovation. It is a point made earlier by Kenneth Arrow, linking the 
sources of knowledge to technical innovations (Arrow, 1962). 
 
These "facts" have important implications for New Labour's economic policy, linking 
general education, learning-by-doing, and knowledge to the creative processes of 
research and innovation. These interlink the private and public sectors with policies 
intended to stimulate the economy through research, education and the promotion 
of creativity. And it provided New Labour with a crucial role in economic 
development without the need for the operational interventions of the sort that had 
characterised earlier Labour governments. The summary argument was 
straightforward:  
 
economic growth depends on new technology, that new technology depends 
upon research, and that because research and knowledge are 'public goods' 
they are underprovided by the market. Therefore, in the interests of society, 
the government has to pay for research" (Al-Ubaydli and Kealey, 2000: 10).  
 
Nick Crafts concurred: "government can affect the long-run rate of growth - thereby 
influencing the scale of resources allocated to the innovation sector" (Crafts, 1996: 
33). It was a comfortable logic for Third Way ideologists, combining social as well as 
economic measures, and appeared to highlight exactly the issues that were the 
targets of DCMS policies. 
 
In addressing the development of EGT theories, Romer had added much 
sophisticated analysis, but from a simpler political viewpoint these arguments had 
long been available even in the absence of the algorithmic adjustments to the 
neoclassical models. Indeed, much of the debate over EGT had been about 
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difficulties of economic modelling, not about the concept itself.  Howard Pack's 
critical paper on EGT's "Intellectual appeal and empirical shortcomings" noted: "It 
can be rather difficult, using aggregate economic data, to distinguish between the 
traditional neoclassical model of growth theory, and the more recent endogenous 
growth theory" (Pack, 1994: 55). While it is fully recognised that there is a need to 
account for economic growth factors not explained by standard models, it is quite 
another to be certain of what those other factors are and exactly how they affect the 
economy.  
 
A second line of criticism concerns what Al-Ubaydli and Kealey called "endogenous 
growth theory's mistake" (Al-Ubaydli and Kealey, 2000: 13). They were referring to 
the problem noted above in Romer's "facts"; that it is not true that "knowledge" is 
freely available, as neoclassical models require (at least in part), yet nor is it possible 
to protect or control it, as required by EGT. It was not a new criticism but went back 
at least as far as Kenneth Arrow's 1962 paper The Economic Implications of Learning 
by Doing (Arrow, 1962). "Imperfect competition" has to be built into EGT, balancing 
the theoretical requirement for knowledge exchange with a need for returns on 
investment through the protection of new ideas and products. At the very least: "To 
make innovation worthwhile, it must be possible to appropriate returns to cover 
fixed costs of research and for this some element of imperfect competition is 
required" (Crafts, 1996: 33). However, this is a problem of mathematical modelling, 
of scientific definition, rather than of concept or theory. It can be resolved by 
judgement and flexibility in the models while informally noting the complexity of 
the challenge and agreeing that aggregated data used in any formula will be 
indicative rather than accurate or predictive in any particular instance. 
 
Cultural Policy and EGT 
My argument is this.  A country like Britain today survives and prospers by 
the talent and ability of its people.  Human capital is key.  The more it is 
developed, the better we are.  Modern goods and services require high value 
added input.  Some of it comes from technology or financial capital - both 
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instantly transferable.  Much of it comes from people - their ability to 
innovate, to think anew, to be creative. (Blair, 2007) 
This could have been a speech about trade, industrial competitiveness, or to an 
audience of economists. It could have been a reference to the development policies 
of the OECD or the World Bank. But it was in fact a speech on the arts, made by 
Tony Blair at the Tate Modern gallery in 2007, anticipating  a White Paper (due for 
publication the following year) in which the importance of innovation as an outcome 
of research would be strongly argued:  
 
We want innovation to flourish across every area of the economy and, in 
particular, wherever high value added businesses can flourish and grow. We 
must innovate in our public services too. Innovation is as important to the 
delivery of healthcare and education as it is to industries such as 
manufacturing, retail and the creative economy" (John Denham, Secr of State, 
Innovation Universities & Skills, 2008). 
 
The explanation for the elaboration of Blair's ideas in an speech on the arts can be 
traced back to the original objects of DCMS and its "four central themes - access, 
excellence and innovation, education and the creative industries" (DCMS, 1998c;  
DCMS Select Committee, 1998b). Chris Smith had defended the department's title to 
the Select Committee with the same line of thought, saying that: "The new name was 
more suited to a 'Department of the future' which was 'about creativity, innovation 
and excitement'" (DCMS Select Committee, 1998b). Innovation and creativity 
subsequently appeared as a departmental aim in every Annual Report in the period 
of this study as well as in the Department's PSA agreements. In Creative Britain Chris 
Smith repeatedly emphasised the points, integrating artistic values with the "four 
themes" and arguing for the "role of culture in economic society" (C. Smith, 1998: 17).  
 
While Chris Smith promoted culture as the social and economic fabric of society, 
Blair's reference to "human capital" was the economic shorthand for those "skills, 
knowledge and competences" (Schuller, 2010: 25;  see also Schuller, Baron et al., 
2000: 24;  Coleman, 1988: 109). This "capital" was said to be accumulated through 
learning, research and practical "knowledge by doing" (Arrow, 1962); in other words, 
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the sum of the functional usefulness of the individual formed by their education, 
learning and experience. It represents the potential in each individual to contribute 
to economic development in a socialised model of the economy (Granovetter, 1985). 
In his 1988 paper, James Coleman identified three types of "capital" described as the 
"components" of "family background":  "financial", "human" and "social", relating all 
to the individual education (Coleman, 1988: 109). Using ideas from Gary Becker (G. 
Becker, 1964) and Theodore Schultz (Schultz, 1961) to formulate his theories for how 
child education is affected by the social environment in which a child matures, 
Coleman claimed:  
 
Probably the most important and most original development in the 
economics of education in the past 30 years has been the idea that the 
concept of physical capital as embodied in tools, machines, and other 
productive equipment can be extended to include human capital as well 
(Coleman, 1988: 100).  
 
The potential created through education was then expressed in an 
uncompromisingly economic term as "returns to investments in education" 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). In more mundane terms: "Human capital 
theory views schooling as an investment in skills and hence as a way of augmenting 
worker productivity" (Wolff, 2000: 433), supported by the findings of  Blundell et al 
(among others) that "there is a substantial body of evidence on the contribution of 
education to economic growth" (Blundell, Dearden et al., 1999: abstract).  These 
ideas formed an essential part of DCMS's claim for education policy to be a part of its 
remit.  
 
Social Capital   
 
Like all capital, human capital is a form of potential; it has no effect until utilised in 
certain productive ways. It is that other socially generated form of capital, social 
capital, that describes the interconnections between people that allow human capital 
to function economically. Without dynamic social mechanisms, that human capital 
would have only a notional value.  Since the term was used by Jane Jacobs in 1961 
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(Jacobs, 1961: 180), the concept of social capital has generated a vast literature from 
the fields of economics, sociology, anthropology, human geography, cultural policy, 
political theory, and elsewhere (Meadowcroft and Pennington, 2007: 17;  Herreros, 
2004: 5).  Retrospectively, its principles can be found in social and economic theory 
commonly traced back to Alexis de Toccqueville, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber 
(OECD, 2001: 40;  Field, 2008).  
 
The OECD summarised these points with unusual brevity:   
 
 Human capital resides in individuals.  
 Social capital resides in social relations.  
 Political, institutional and legal arrangements describe the rules and 
institutions in which human and social capital work 
 (OECD, 2001: 13). 
 
The holders of human capital must, then, interact with others, using their 
knowledge and skills "as a resource" within society, with "the expectation of 
reciprocity" that is a claimed hallmark of social, rather than merely individual, action 
(Field, 2008: 23).  However, as James Coleman pointed out, this is not a uni-
directional relationship; social actions that result in the breakdown or deterioration 
of social capital can also affect the acquisition of human capital; one cannot be 
entirely decoupled from the other (Coleman, 1988). In this sense, this author 
disagrees with David Halpern's comment that "It is not what you know, but who you 
know" (Halpern, 2005: 44). Both the "what" and the "who" are interdependent. 
 
Hence social capital forms a structure through which the skills and resources (of 
which knowledge is the most significant) of individuals can operate, each being a 
predicate for the existence of the other: 
 
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of 
different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some 
aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – 
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whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure (Coleman, 1988: 
98).  
 
Among Robert Putnam's numerous definitions of social capital one is particularly to 
the point; social capital being, he said: "features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated action" (R. D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994: 167). 
 
At its most effective, social capital must operate within a society in which all its 
members have access to its resources; one made cohesive through trust and shared 
values, and that is productively interconnected through complex networks. This is a 
description of the social relations that can give rise to the endogenous economic 
effects modelled in EGT, and it is a description of the society that the cultural 
policies of DCMS sought to form. The point deserves emphasis: it is argued that the 
term "social capital" contains  theories of social and economic behaviour 
intentionally coerced by New Labour's cultural policies and that are integral to the 
economic models of EGT.  
 
From an economic perspective, the concept of social capital shares a great deal with 
social economics more generally (Swedberg, 1991;  Hunt, 2005;  Staveren and 
Knorringa, 2007: 113), although New Labour appeared to make no distinction 
between them. In fact, although much of its ideational sources are specific on the 
subject (Leadbeater's Living on Thin Air being an example) the policy statements 
from DCMS rarely mentioned social capital as a concept, even though its elements 
were there in abundance, spelled out in White Papers, Annual reports, in Chris 
Smith's speeches, in the strategies of Task Forces, and embedded in policies for 
education, economic development and social welfare. For its presumed economic 
effectiveness, it also appeared (as it still does) in crude forms within regeneration 
programmes and in the work of the Regional Development Authorities. The 
principles of social capital were also contemporaneously explicitly adopted across 
the world, appearing in the policies of governmental bodies including the World 
Bank, the OECD, and the EU. All relied to some degree on a "socialized" concept of 
221 
 
the economy (Bebbington, Guggenheim et al., 2004;  Harriss, 2002;  OECD, 2001). 
Social economics arises out of the idea that people make decisions that are strongly 
influenced by their place and experiences in society, but, as has been noted in 
describing the principles of EGT, this puts it outside the algorithms of orthodox 
neoclassical microeconomic models that rely on self-interested rational action. This 
subject deserves further discussion before returning to the topic of social capital. 
 
 " The Oversocialized Conception of Man"  
 
This phrase has been brought to bear on questions that reach to the heart of social 
economics. It addresses the dialectic of rational choice and economic determinism 
as the bedrock of neoliberal economic models as they combine with the forces of 
socially, or culturally constructed, norms and practises that lie behind individual 
decision-making (Wrong, 1961). Its importance here is that it draws together the 
challenge to create a neoclassical economic model than can encompass endogenous 
economic factors with the potential for cultural policy (in a socio-anthropological 
conception) to promote or influence those factors exogenously. In effect, it shifts the 
study of economics from its scientific pretensions towards a sociological conception 
where it is politically malleable.  
 
In the decades before 1970, sociology had been dominated by the structural 
functionalism of those, like Talcott Parsons, whose theories left little room for 
individual agency. Reacting to the latter ("a model of human nature... that pervades 
modern sociology"), Dennis  Wrong took exception to the structurally and culturally 
determined "oversocialized" theories of human behaviour in which "man is 
essentially motivated by the desire to achieve a positive image of self by winning 
acceptance or status in the eyes of others" (Wrong, 1961: 185). He objected to the 
notion that internalised and habitualised norms of behaviour were solidified and 
perpetuated by the expectations of peers and the requirements of the institutions 
that formed around them. This would leave no place for a Hobbesian view of 
mankind as self-determined, atomised, utilitarian and rational (requiring the need 
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for social order to be contracted to a "Leviathan"), producing instead a concept of 
society, and thereby of the economy, unable to account for personal choice, the 
existence of dispute, and social disorder. If actions were derived from a common 
perception of right and wrong, and individuals made their decisions accordingly, 
there would never be moral disagreement. Wrong put this point as a question: "How 
is it that violence, conflict, revolution, and the individuals' sense of coercion by 
society manage to exist at all...?" (Wrong, 1961: 186). Wrong's well-referenced 
arguments leaned strongly on a Freudian analysis, but they stand regardless, 
implicitly questioning models of individual economic behaviour in the process. 
 
Approaching from another direction, Douglas North, writing about "New 
Institutional Economics", claimed neoclassical economic theory took too little 
account of cultural forces as they were manifested by institutions: "we have 
incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process 
information ... In such a world ideas and ideologies play a major role in choices and 
transaction costs result in imperfect markets" (North, 1992-4). North's purpose was 
to "incorporate a theory of institutions into economics ... the new institutional 
economics builds on, modifies, and extends neoclassical theory to permit it to come 
to grips and deal with an entire range of issues heretofore beyond its ken" (1992: 3). 
His definition of an institution was uncontroversially consistent with the New 
Institutionalism more generally, being, he said: "the rules of the game of a society or 
more formally are the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. They are composed of the formal rules (statute law, common law, 
regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior); and the 
enforcement characteristics of both" (1992: 4). This apparently Parsonian approach 
was nevertheless formed in support of individuals under strong cultural influences in 
its socio-anthropological form: "Individuals possess mental models to interpret the 
world around them. These are in part culturally derived - that is produced by the 
intergenerational transfer of knowledge, values, and norms which vary radically 
among different ethnic groups and societies" (1992: 3). North's "conception of man" 
was acting rationally in an economic society in ways that were locally, 
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environmentally and contingently determined. As he himself made clear, it was not a 
rejection of the neoclassical model but an extension to it, just as was proposed by 
EGT.   
 
Discussing these arguments, Mark Granovetter compared the "undersocialized 
conception of human action, continuing in the utilitarian tradition" with an 
institutionalised, culturally determined member of a community, unwilling to take 
independent action. But as he then pointed out, both theoretical extremes are 
essentially deterministic. In one account, albeit requiring perfect knowledge in a 
perfectly competitive society, rational decisions are predictable; in the other, 
institutionalised norms and practices equally predetermine how people will act. 
Neither are true representations of how people actually act, Granovetter claimed. 
More likely, people are culturally influenced; and that in the absence of perfect 
knowledge or even knowing which "rational" acts might be the most beneficial 
decisions, social factors provide a default position; a guide to behaviour that appears 
to place community above the individual. The term "embedded" is frequently used 
to express the internalized nature of these default preferences (B. Edwards and 
Foley, 1979;  Cooke, 2007)  as it expresses the aggregate influences of social 
relationships and community history  (Granovetter, 1973: 97;  1985;  Coleman, 1988), 
much like Bourdieu's "habitus". However, this can also imply a permanency that 
rejects change and ignores the process of constant reformation to which socially 
determined preferences are subject.  
 
Although the balance of arguments between rational choice and socialization 
theories are both subject to criticisms of determinacy, the latter does at least allow 
for changes of ideas and practices resulting from social interactions. At their 
extremes, the two approaches address the conundrum of the Prisoners' Dilemma as 
it can result in two equilibria, each stable but in opposition. The rational choice 
outcome, in which each prisoner distrusts the other (the least risk option) is 
countered by the existence of trust and collaboration in which each remains silent. 
The former outcome appears to work well in a single situation, but in repeated 
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games - in effect, interactions as might more likely occur in real social experiences - 
the latter is more successful and stable (Sugden, 2005;  Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944). In suggests, too, the sort of social world New Labour proposed to develop, 
with a reliance on trust and reciprocity that is a model of social capital in operation. 
 
Importantly for New Labour, the dynamism of social capital gave a place for agency 
within institutions if they are conceived and reproduced from the norms and 
practices of individuals, just as those institutions subsequently tend to perpetuate 
those norms and guide or coerce the actions of their individual members. This 
culturally derived symbiotic relationship between individuals and institutions (and 
organizations in which they are embedded) was central to New Labour's cultural 
theories as they instigated institutional developments through the cooption of 
individuals (the Cultural Consortia being a good example). The prospect of adjusting 
both by changing the structures in which they operate gave a legitimate role for both 
policy development and the institutions created or funded for its realisation (see 
Coleman, 1971 for an apposite discussion on this structure/agency relationship).   
 
Three Approaches to Social Capital  
 
In the form that social capital developed in the latter decades of the 20th century, it 
is the works of Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam that defined the 
breadth and terms of contemporary debates (Woolcock, 1998: 15-43;  Schuller, Baron 
et al., 2000: 28;  Daly, 2005: 5, 12-14;  Field, 2008). Each is a different concept but, 
while Bourdieu elaborated a socialised world divided by forms of capital, both 
Putnam and Coleman maintained elements of rational choice logic within the 
construction and application of social capital, albeit to different degrees.  All, 
though, agreed on the foundational importance of education in its formation. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu 
 
Of the three, Bourdieu's ideas are the least represented in the literature on social 
economics and Third Way politics, perhaps in part because they describe relations of 
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knowledge, power and social divisions that are not easily applied to economic 
models.  Drawing eclectically on scholarship across history and many academic 
disciplines, his descriptions of the forces that govern social relations used a 
conceptual lexicon in which forms of "capital" are central to the ways in which 
"systems of domination find expression in virtually all areas of cultural practice and 
symbolic exchange" (Bourdieu, 1993: 2). Culture, for Bourdieu, was an important 
form of capital and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1991). In his own, oft-quoted words, 
so characteristic of his literary style: "taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier.  
Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the 
distinctions they make..." (Bourdieu, 1984: 6). Within the "field" of social relations, 
capital was the essential possession:  
 
The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a 
discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents 
who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the 
notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects. 
(Bourdieu, 1986: 241) 
 
This was capital in forms made distinctive by knowledge, "habitus" (and its 
associated "doxa"), and practice within each social field (Bourdieu, 1990: 52-66). The 
cultural capital possessed by each individual then defined their place within an 
hierarchical network of relationships; each competitively achieved and in constant 
tension with others. It was, he said: "the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition"  (Bourdieu, 
1986;  quoted in Portes, 1998).   
 
Bourdieu's profound and complex sociology was nevertheless exceptionally coherent 
(Fine, 2000) and in its explanation for the persistence and dominance of elites (the 
possessors of "cultural capital") appeared to speak directly to New Labour's policy 
assault on "exclusion" and for the social and economic need for open "access" to 
education, knowledge, and thus opportunity. Bourdieu's explanation for the 
appreciation of art and artists in "the field of cultural production" defined it as 
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cultural capital acquired through education and cultural inculcation. As a 
consequence, museums and art galleries, he claimed, demonstrate and reproduce 
the symbolic power of those with cultural capital (Bourdieu, Darbel et al., 1997). 
Once again, this explanation appeared to meet with the policies for education and 
access pursued by the DCMS and promoted by Chris Smith. But Bourdieu's ideas 
linked more to the post-Marxist foundations of Cultural Studies rather than with the 
neo-liberal, socio-economic, ambitions of New Labour. In this regard, for example, 
Bourdieu's version of "cultural capital" should not be confused with the purely 
financial concerns of the afore-mentioned MLA publication and its interest in 
entrepreneurship and the financial exploitation of  heritage and artistic works. It is, 
perhaps, because of the difficulty in using Bourdieu's theory as a financial 
instrument that, in Britain at least, it was of comparatively little interest to 
government. 
 
 James Coleman 
 
 Influenced by Gary Becker (G. Becker, 1964), one of the earliest neoclassical 
economists to carry his theories into sociology (with a particular interest in the 
family), James Coleman's concept of social capital also maintained a place of 
deterministic rational choice within sociology. His major 1990 work, Foundations of 
Social Theory, was based on this approach just as was Mathematical Sociology, 
published twenty six years earlier (Coleman, 1990, 1964;  see also Coleman and 
Fararo, 1992).  Although Coleman is frequently cited in commentaries on rational 
choice theory in sociology his work is far more heterogeneous, often setting out 
competing theoretical approaches to the analysis of social behaviour, concluding 
that none alone are entirely adequate (examples: Coleman, 2002, 1988).  
 
In his 2002 paper, Coleman discussed the rationales of social actors, describing "the 
work of most sociologists [which] sees the actor as socialized and action as governed 
by social norms, rules, and obligations", compared with the inadequacy of social 
models built of self-interested individuals having a single "principle of action, that of 
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maximizing utility".  He added that, "in earlier works [(Coleman, 1986a, b)] I have 
argued for and engaged in the development of a theoretical orientation in sociology 
that includes components from both these intellectual streams" (Coleman, 1988: 95-
6). His aim, he said, "is to import the economists' principle of rational action for use 
in the analysis of social systems proper, including but not limited to economic 
systems, and to do so without discarding social organization in the process" (1988: 
97). This combination of theoretical principles made Coleman's work especially 
relevant to economists and politicians interested in the development of EGT models. 
 
The rational character of Coleman's descriptions of social interactions appeared in 
the form of "reciprocity" (1988: 102-4). This was the essential element that could 
explain collaborations between individuals as rational and self-regarding. In 
Coleman's  model, "social capital ... represents a resource because it involves the 
expectation of reciprocity, and goes beyond any given individual to involve wider 
networks whose relationships are governed by a high degree of trust and shared 
values" (Field, 2008: 23). Reciprocity is also a description of how networks of social 
relations can develop and stabilise, even without a prior requirement for that "high 
degree of trust and shared values".  
 
Coleman's interest in social capital was always practical and his research empirically 
based, constantly seeking "the engine of [human] action" while rejecting the notion 
that "the internal springs of action that give the actor a purpose or direction" could 
be accounted for purely by the nature of, to quote again Dennis Wrong, "The 
Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Society" (Coleman, 1986b;  1988: 96).  
 
Robert Putnam 
 
Both Bourdieu's sociology and Colman's empirical rationalism provided explanations 
for human choices and the structures, influences, and internal logics of society. 
Robert Putnam's work, though, did this and more, providing also a working model of 
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how the individual relates to civic and economic life through the bonds that form 
between families, communities, civil associations and institutions. 
 
It was two books by Robert Putnam in 1993 and 2000 (and related journal articles) 
that really brought worldwide political attention to the concept of social capital (R. 
D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994;  R. Putnam, 1995, 2000), although he gave his 
source of the concept as the economist Glen Loury. It was Loury, he said, who: "used 
the term 'social capital' to capture the fundamental fact that racial segregation, 
coupled with socially inherited differences in community networks and norms, 
means that individually targeted 'equal opportunity' policies may not eliminate racial 
inequality, even in the long run" 1 (R. Putnam, 1993;  Loury, 1977). 2 
 
Much of the American literature on Putnam locates his impact from Bowling Alone 
(John Field, 2008, among them), perhaps because of the application of his theories 
specifically to a North American case. But in Europe it was the earlier 1993 work, 
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, that really heated the 
simmering debates on social capital. As a political scientist, unlike the sociologists 
Bourdieu and Coleman, his approach to social capital also had a theoretical 
significance for governments. In John Field's words: "Putnam's contribution is 
monumental. His scholarship rests in a wide-ranging knowledge of a variety of 
sources of evidence. His wider visibility and influence have ensured that his 
approach has virtually eclipsed those of Coleman and Bourdieu" (Field, 2008: 40).  
 
Making Democracy Work is a substantial work that sought, in Putnam's own words 
"to explore some fundamental questions about civic life by studying the regions of 
Italy"  (R. D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994: preface) and, in so doing, explain why 
regions differed so greatly in their economic performance and social practices. His 
                                                     
1 Putnam names Loury rather than the earlier work of Jane Jacobs (op.cit) while others, notably 
among them being Alejandro Portes, name Pierre Bourdieu as producing "the first systematic 
contemporary analysis of social capital", PORTES, A. 1998. Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications 
in Modern Sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 24 1-24.p3. 
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work began in 1970 at a time coincident with the establishment in Italy of a system 
of regional governments:  
 
I had just gotten my PhD and was in Rome, with my one-year-old and three-
year-old, trying to set up interviews with members of the Italian parliament 
for another study I wanted to do. The government was falling apart. The 
politicians had left the city, I couldn't arrange my interviews, and in the midst 
of all this confusion, the government decided to go forward with a 
constitutional reform to establish regional governments. To me, this seemed 
like being able to start a study in 1789 of Congress [sic]. . . to be able to 
understand how it took root, what social circumstances conditioned how it 
evolved. And so, in a hand-to-mouth kind of way, I started with several 
colleagues doing this research (Edgerton, 1995). 
 
His primary concern became "the origins of effective government", something  
characterised by "the connection between economic modernity and institutional 
performances" and in which "the civic community is marked by an active, public 
spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political relations, by a social fabric of trust and 
cooperation". Across the Italian regions, Putnam noted how "some ... are blessed 
with vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement, while others are cursed with 
vertically structured politics, a social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a 
culture of distrust" (R. D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994: 15). "The theoretical 
approach we develop", he said, "drawing on the logic of collective action and the 
concept of 'social capital', is intended not merely to account for the Italian case, but 
to conjoin  historical and rational choice perspectives in a way that can improve our 
understanding of institutional performance and public life in many other cases" 
(1994: 16). 
 
The importance of his work to the British cultural policies of the New Labour 
government lay in two areas; the first that, through its policies, DCMS was 
promoting exactly the civic and economically effective society characterised by 
"trust, norms, and networks" (R. D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994: passim). These 
were, Putnam claimed, "the vital ingredient in economic development around the 
world" (R. Putnam, 1993: 16). Secondly, that Putnam laid great emphasis on the role 
of institutions and associations in forming those values. In other words, that there 
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was a structural element to those societal relations that government could directly 
influence or control, for example through its contracts with NDPBs. Like Coleman, 
Putnam found reciprocity to be an essential element in social interactions, reliant on 
forms of trust (whether in an individual, in the rules of an association, or in a legal 
system), but he placed far greater weight on the networks through which social 
interactions take place and in the "norms of reciprocity" which might then occur (R. 
D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994: 171). These he included in his description of social 
capital:   
 
Networks of civic engagement, like neighbourhood associations, choral 
societies, cooperative, sports clubs, mass-based parties, and the like... 
represent intense horizontal interaction. Networks of civic engagement are an 
essential form of social capital: the denser such networks in a community, the 
more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit  (1994: 
173) 
 
 
"[H]orizontal interaction" refers to social connections characterised by the "weak 
ties" of civic engagement resulting from "bridging" between remote or associational 
relations (what Anthony Giddins referred to as "active trust" - earned rather than 
"pre-established" (Giddens, 1994: 30)), compared with the "strong ties" of vertical, 
mostly kin relations or between close friends (Granovetter, 1973;  R. Putnam, 2000: 
22-23).  Comparing the two, Putnam noted: "If horizontal networks of civic 
engagement help participants solve dilemmas of collective action, then the more 
horizontally structured an organization, the more it should foster institutional 
success in the broader community" (R. D. Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1994: 175;  see also 
Schuller, 2007).  
 
Elaborating the point, the transmission of human capital across social networks 
requires  a "broader community", and it was this in particular that lay behind the 
interest of the OECD and the World Bank to construct policies to promote social 
capital as an aid to economic development  (Bebbington, Guggenheim et al., 2004;  
Harriss, 2002;  OECD, 2001;  Schuller, 2007;  London School of Economics, 2007;  
World Bank, 2000). The concerns of these agencies was more than just for civic 
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society in an abstract sense. They wished to see ideas, innovations, and knowledge 
from the developed world utilised practically and commercially in each locality. This 
required a “milieu” (Camagni, 1991) in which individuals learn, collaborate and 
exploit their innovations within their social and economic marketplace.  These 
processes are also said to have a spatial context in which the ideas of collaborative 
networks of knowledgeable individuals “swarm” in an appropriate local 
environment, driving business incubation and competition both collaboratively and 
competitively (Davelaar, 1991). To have economic force, individuals cannot act alone, 
but must share thoughts and ideas as much as hard cash across multilayered 
networks of common interests. In order to develop, economically and morally, each 
must cooperate and learn. New knowledge then spills-over into the general 
community of entrepreneurs to be converted into innovations, and more new 
knowledge, as the endogenously powered cycle virtuously repeats (Ács, 2010;  D. 
Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007;  D. B. Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005). 
 
Counter-arguments 
 
Despite the almost universal adoption of the principles of social capital by 
governments and their agencies, these concepts are not beyond dispute. Even the 
metaphor “capital” has been challenged as being, on the one hand, misdirecting and 
therefore inappropriate (Baron and Hannan, 1994) and, on the other, simply a 
reinforcement of the hegemony of ownership and financial capital in a neo-liberal 
world. Epistemological objections abound, with arguments that social capital is a 
concept that can never be defined or measured (Evans, 2005;  OECD, 2001), and that 
it is just another protean, interpretive construction of the sociologist. And its 
connections to political organisations and institutions are sometimes said to be, at 
best, particularistic and conditional.   
 
Social capital is also said to have a “dark side”, giving rise to secretive and often 
illegal groupings, autocracies and forms of community tyranny in which close bonds 
counter its argued benefits (Levi, 1996: 52;  Field, 2008: 42;  OECD, 2001: 79-100;  
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Meadowcroft and Pennington, 2007: 23, passim;  Ostrom, 1997). In what Rhodes 
referred to "that neologism to end all neologisms" (Rhodes, 1996: n659) this has been 
called "cultural autopoietics"; a reference to the idea of communities reflexively 
reproducing cultural norms that, over time, exclude others (Boyd, 2011). 
Meadowcroft and Pennington develop this argument in support of neoliberal 
individualism in which, they claim, it is the weak ties of bridging social relations that 
feature in international commerce that are the true generators of social capital. 
Collectivism and social democracy tend to exclude entrepreneurialism: "bonding 
social capital ensures a sense of social solidarity within small groups, while bridging 
social capital links often disparate people and provides information and 
opportunities outside the small group" (Meadowcroft and Pennington, 2007: 22). 
The argument represented by Ralph Febvre, that: "It is no exaggeration to say that 
capitalism is now manufacturing its own synthetic substitute for social capital" is 
entirely rejected by the views of Meadowcroft, Fukuyama, and others who claim that 
it is only those neoliberal, open market, capitalist forces that create true and 
effective social capital (Fevre, 2000: 106;  Fukuyama, 1995b). Significantly, New 
Labour's Third Way, and its tendency to conflate dichotomies, attempts to meet this 
criticism by promoting the individual within their community, seeming to recognise 
the validity of both views so denying that one excluded the other. 
 
Perhaps the most complex criticism is that the promotion of social capital may 
transfer responsibility for the civic realm away from the state towards unelected 
actors and is, thus, anti-democratic. This criticism is most usually targeted at 
international development agencies and the increasing reliance on non-
governmental bodies for policy delivery (Harriss, 2002;  see also M. Edwards, 2009;  
Marquand, 2004), but it has also been attached to New Labour’s economic and social 
policies (Finlayson, 2003), particularly as they pursued the distribution of executive 
power through NDPBs and subsidised agencies. In New Labour’s logic, they were 
forming the market (and its rules of fairness) as a public good in itself. 
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Just as Putnam's work has had world-wide influence at the highest levels, it has also 
profoundly affected policies of neighbourhood regeneration (Forrest and Kearns, 
2001). Its well-researched arguments give a role for governments in their relations 
with civil life; it describes the manner in which its institutions can be most effective 
at producing economic growth with improvements in civil order; and it serves to 
identify where the necessary structural, behavioural and culture elements are absent. 
Structural changes can be made administratively or legislatively, but behaviour, 
norms, and trust require cultural changes achieved through education or coercion 
with incentives. Recent research has resulted in arguments that trust and norms may 
be cognitive rather than purely relational factors (Larsen, 2013), but this further 
strengthens the idea that culture, in its socio-anthropological meaning, is either the 
result or the generative mechanism of these characteristics. Discussing this, the 
OECD used a definition of culture that followed Inglehart’s as a “system of attitudes, 
values and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and is transmitted from 
generation to generation” (Inglehart, 1997: 15;  OECD, 2001: 10-N). This is a shallow, 
anthropological definition, yet it opens the possibility of interference through 
political action in the construction and reconstruction of social norms and values.   
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Culture as Governance 
 
Like so many new ideas, "governance" is a term that was “nearly incomprehensible 
and hardly ever used as late as twenty years ago [the late 1980s]" (Offe, 2009: 554), 
yet it is founded on principles that have long been debated (for example Deutsche, 
1963) on how power is exercised through its institutionalisation and the 
"naturalization of procedures of decision making" (Levi-Faur, 2012: 9). It has a 
central place in this thesis as a description of the mechanisms the DCMS employed 
to effect cultural changes and policies within NDPBs, civil associations and, thereby, 
individuals within the national community.    
 
Rod Rhodes's analysis of the subject (see Rhodes, 1997, 1994, 1996, 2012), most 
recently described its development in Britain as coming in "three waves"; the first in 
the 1980s 1 with, he argues, the growth of policy networks "clustered around a major 
government function or department", the second as the "meta-governance" of the 
Blair government in which No 10 and the Treasury controlled the work of other 
departments through policy instruments (notably the PSAs, as discussed in Chapter 
3 above), and the third, in which the state sets "the rules of the game for other 
actors", then "leave[s] them to do what they will within those rules". That then 
places all those working within those rules, voluntarily or by force of contract, "in 
the shadow of hierarchy" (2012: 37). The metaphor, "rules of the game", is one 
repeated across the literature (see for example Phillips, 2012: 493). 
 
While it quickly found its way into many areas of organisational concern,  the 
meaning of governance has shifted according to the circumstances of its use. For 
example, governance is now formally structured into the legal and moral compliance 
of business corporations, NDPBs and civil associations, but these localised instances 
are quite separate from the assertion that those same organisations actually 
                                                     
1 Others give a slightly earlier date, around the start of the 1980s - for example RON, A. 2012. Modes 
of Democratic Governance. In: LEVI-FAUR, D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. p474. 
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constitute governance as distributed government. Unsurprising, then, the word has 
also taken on different meanings in different countries, reflecting varieties of 
governmental structures, traditions and values. As a result, "governance" has 
required a note of clarification by the European Union. Defining its use in the UK, 
their Translation Service explains (in words suitably devoid of theoretical content):  
 
The word 'governance' was awarded the honour in 1990 by Anglo-Saxon 
economists and political scientists and some international institutions (UN, 
World Bank and IMF in particular), to designate the new 'art or manner of 
governing ', but with two additional concerns. On the one hand, to 
distinguish the government as an institution, and secondly, as a little-used 
term and therefore having little connotative history, to promote a new mode 
of governance based on the participation of civil society at all levels (national, 
but also local, regional and international).  
(HUYNH-QUAN-SUU, Undated) 
(translated from French by Hetherington) 
 
Placing governance in the hands of civil society, as this definition suggests, effects a 
clear separation from government, and it differentiates informal regulation from 
legislation: "Government involves formal means of exercising power, while 
governance ... means a communal system of rule on the basis of common 
convictions" (Schmitt, 2011: 20).  
 
Within the many semantic descriptions and philological definitions of the word a 
fundamental dichotomy has been claimed. On the one hand the state has been seen 
as "hollowed out" by governance structures (B. G. Peters, 1993) as "power and 
authority drift away upwards toward transitional markets  and political institutions 
and downward toward local or regional government, domestic business 
communities and non-governmental organizations" (Levi-Faur, 2012: 10). On the 
other, Chris Skelcher characterised an "overloaded, hollowed-out, congested" state 
of the late 1990s (and the period of the New Labour government) resulting from its 
own characteristic forms of  governance.  All definitions open-up fundamental 
questions about the role of the state and how power is exercised. They concern the 
operation of government which remains in all cases "the centre of considerable 
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political power" (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 12). Methods of plural governance are, 
then, operational choices of government as they manipulate power. 
 
That all government actions in some ways alter cultural norms, beliefs, practises, 
values, and a sense of what is fair and just, is not contentious. David Throsby is one 
who commented that every area of government policy has examples that “may 
involve a deliberative intent to bring about cultural change” (Throsby, 2009: 182). 
History is full of examples; from the ruthless totalitarian severity of the Maoist 
cultural revolution to minimal state support in Western democracies to maintain 
individual "positive liberty" (Berlin, 1969). Indeed, it has been claimed that all 
government policies "are theories that change people's perceptions of the problems 
the government seeks to resolve" (Bevir, Rhodes et al., 2003: 7). The principles of 
governance and a belief in the power of government, in this case of the New Labour 
government, to change cultural norms is a crucial argument in this thesis. That is 
not to say they were successful, simply that they adopted this logic. They relied upon 
a belief in collective action as much as in adapting cultural practices into the service 
of their mission; the two being inextricably intertwined. 
 
New Labour's concept of an economy fuelled and fired by human and social capital 
integrally required normative changes in both the public and governmental spheres: 
“a new contract between citizen and state”, Blair called it, in which individuals 
recognised their own responsibility to exploit the opportunities the state provided 
(Dept of Social Security, 1997-8: v). The "old" was a welfare state of universal rights 
backed by an ideological commitment to an equal distribution of national resources, 
the "new" referred to access to economic opportunities in return for accepting civic 
responsibilities to the state. The intention was “to restructure the relationships 
between the state, the economy and the individual” (Finlayson, 2009: 400). By 
DCMS's socio-anthropological definition, these were cultural changes, prospectively 
charging DCMS with a central role in all government business. There is little 
evidence that, at the time, the rest of the government took much interest in DCMS's 
self-appointed role but, as has been shown, their policies nevertheless overlapped 
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those of nearly every other department, giving them a presence in all regional 
government offices, in the majority of the Policy Action Teams and Task Groups, and 
with a stake in many of the government's initiatives for social and economic 
development. It is then a short step to link those political and operational claims 
with their role in cultural formation.   
 
Chris Smith's four themes or pillars (excellence, access, education and the creative 
economy) (C. Smith, 2009;  1998: 2) can all be seen as part of the deal. Under 
theories of social and human capital, these ideas travelled easily into the agenda of 
many organisations and working groups across government and across Britain. It 
was something the policies of the erstwhile DNH and all its predecessors could never 
achieve. Yet it was a view of the state as civil society as much as it was of the 
individual, collapsing notions of personal liberty into the well-being of the national 
community and harnessing the energies and the knowledge of entrepreneurial, self-
sufficient, individuals into its service. In effect this continued the decentralization of 
government that had begun two decades earlier, distributing responsibilities around 
civil society under rules defined in Westminster. Government appeared to have 
become fragmented; "a complex welter of intermediate institutions, including 
businesses, voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media 
charities and churches..." (Fukuyama, 1995b: 4) but through a plethora of targets and 
controls, backed-up with the endoscopic surveillance provided by the techniques of 
NPM, the centre of government still focused the policy lens.  
 
As supplicants for financial support, NDPBs (and their clients) were directed 
through the imposition of NPM, contracts and the control of resources, often 
adopting the rhetoric of government in the process.  As the advent of these process 
predated New Labour, it might be argued that attempts to alter cultural norms was 
as Thatcherite and Majorite as it was Blairite 1. In fact, as a result of its supposed 
                                                     
1
 For a discussion of the "change versus continuity" argument in post-war British politics, see KERR, P. 
P. 2001. Postwar British Politics. London, Routledge.  The question of  the "periodicity", with 
particular  reference to Thatcherism, can be found in HAY, C. & FARRALL, S. 2011. Establishing the 
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"portability", NPM  in particular had been an international trend since the late 1970s 
and "emphatically not a uniquely British development" (C. Hood, 1991: 3), although it 
was always and essentially dependent on the development of appropriate cultures 
(T. J. Peters and Waterman, 1982). Yet it was just the supposed universality of NPM 
that offered New Labour an administrative system suited to their ideal of locally 
situated but centrally controlled policy units.  Writing in 1996, just one year before 
New Labour's election victory, Rod Rhodes analysed the relationship between the 
NPM and the apparently concomitant phenomenon of "governing without 
government" and effectively contradicted Hood by arguing that NPM actually 
undermined "reforms rooted in competition": "NPM may suit line bureaucracies", he 
argued, "but it is inappropriate for managing interorganizational networks and, 
more important such networks undermine NPM with its intra-organizational focus 
on objectives and results" (Rhodes, 1996: abstract, 663). NPM is frequently associated 
with the replacement of government with governance (Rhodes, 1997, 1996;  
Kooiman, 1993;  C. Hood, 1991) but, while coincident with New Labour's cultural 
forms of distributed governance (perhaps, in part at least, because of an element of 
path dependency in the application of NPM (Bevir, Rhodes et al., 2003)), these are 
quite different concepts. The assumption most authors make is that the control or 
"steerage" of policy, in which government is exercised through multiple and varied 
actors, requires both tighter controls and frequent measurement of outcomes. In fact 
DCMS made the point plain, saying the whole idea of "best practise" imposed by 
NPM was "indirect policy persuasion" (DCMS, 2001a: 51;  2000: 37).  
 
The controls applied by PSAs and NPM mixed coercion with incentives but were 
always backed by the threat of sanctions:  “...[a] variety of state and non-state 
agencies", claimed Finlayson, "may act directly on individuals with the aim of 
remaking them into people who will be willing and able to care for themselves in an 
open and financialised economy” (Finlayson, 2009: 400). The systems of NPM tied 
together ever-increasing numbers of organisations that played some role in realising 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Ontological Status of Thatcherism by Gauging Its ‘Periodisability’: Towards a ‘Cascade Theory’ of 
Public Policy Radicalism. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13 439-458. 
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government policy (“the meso soup” as Colin Hay called it1), in the process requiring 
all those linked in the policy chains to accept its ideational principles. In Fukuyama's 
words, this was the realisation of  "The improbable power of culture in the making of 
economic society" (Fukuyama, 1995b: Part 1 title). Fukuyama added to this idea a 
paper headed "The Primacy of Culture" in which he set-out how those relations 
should be formed between  neoliberal economies, democratic states and individual 
liberty (Fukuyama, 1995a). There is a strong element of the Third Way about his 
arguments, eliding the ideological divisions between atomistic behaviour and 
communitarian ideals:  
 
Liberalism based on individual rights is quite compatible with strong, 
communitarian social structures and disciplined cultural habits. Indeed, one 
can argue that the true importance of civil society and culture in a modern 
democracy lies precisely in their ability to balance or moderate the atomizing 
individualism that is inherent in traditional liberal doctrine, both political 
and economic (Fukuyama, 1995a: 13). 
 
The centre-left think tank, Demos2, considered some of these issues, albeit from a 
position of engagement with the New Labour mission. In an edited book published 
in the year of New Labour's election victory, Geoff Mulgan reflected on the "new 
ideas and new thinking" required to meet contemporary social problems by arguing 
that "these challenges are, above all, collective ones, that aren't easily susceptible to 
individual choice and individual action" (Mulgan, 1997: ix). The democratic idea 
itself, he said, had "permeated" culture. But the democracy he had in mind was 
exercised by a community with a shared identity and purpose, it was not the 
atomistic libertarian ideal of the minimal state preferred by the previous 
Conservative government, with which New Labour was so often compared. The old 
minimal "night watchman state" 3 was, for New Labour, an idea as anachronistic as 
                                                     
1
 In his response as Discussant to Vivien Schmidt in the Third Annual Warwick University/ RIPE 
Debate - 'The Fall, Rise, Fall and Rise of the State within Modern Capitalism', 2nd March 2010. 
2
 Demos (taken from "democracy") was formed in 1993 by Martin Jacques, a past editor of Marxism 
Today, and Geoff Mulgan, in the belief that democracy was becoming the natural and dominant mode 
of government around the world and that the shifting relations between people and the state 
deserved special attention.  
3 This expression was first coined by Ferdinand Lassalle in a speech in Berlin in 1862: "The bourgeoisie 
conceive the ethical purpose of the state as consisting solely and exclusively in the protections of the 
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the command economics of socialist dirigisme. Instead, state institutions were to be 
nodes in a reticulated society of economic actors, adopting the perceived virtues of 
the business world for its managerial practices and thrusting entrepreneurialism, 
both being employed to hone the tools of government and "scale up the capacities of 
government to use them" (6, 1995: 3). In a quote made earlier in this thesis, but 
worth repeating here as it goes to the core of New Labour's convictions, Perri 6, 
expressed this new ideology strongly: 
 
Culture is now the centre of the agenda for government reform, because we 
now know from the findings of a wide range of recent research that culture is 
perhaps the most important determinant of a combination of long-run 
economic success and social cohesion (6, 1997: 272). 
 
By any traditional understanding of culture, this might have seemed a far-fetched 
and unsupported proposition. But this was not the "culture" of the past, this was a 
civic take on a socio-anthropological description of culture in which arts were no 
more than a symptomatic product. "When I speak of culture", said Perri 6:  
 
I mean nothing more sophisticated than those sets of beliefs and behaviours, 
aspirations, expectations, values, senses of duty and right, those way of 
evaluating what is prudent and legitimate and so forth, that inform the 
decisions of politicians, bureaucrats, organizations, users of services or the 
public at large" (6, 1997: 424n).  
 
This was the "culture" defined in theories of social capital in economic and civic life 
as elaborated by Putnam, Coleman, and Fukuyama (Putnam and Coleman op.cit. 
Fukuyama, 1995b). It was a collective expression for the norms shared by society and 
which, 6 claimed, informed our decisions and steered our actions. How to manage 
and manipulate that culture then became a crucial issue. Accordingly, "we need to 
understand the full range of tools with which governments can influence cultures" 
(6, 1997: 262).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
personal freedom and property of the individual. This is a night-watchman concept, gentlemen, a 
night-watchman concept because we can conceive of the state only in the form of a night watchman 
whose functions consist solely in preventing robbery and burglary". Quoted in BERNSTEIN, E. 1993. 
Ferdinand Lassalle as a Social Reformer. London, Swan Sonnenschien. pp 139-202. 
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The economist, Sir Douglas Hague, had looked at just this question for Demos (of 
which he later became a trustee) in a 1993 paper tellingly entitled Transforming the 
Dinosaurs. His analysis rested on the "compatibility" of culture and values, for which 
changes in one should be reflected in changes in the other. His focus was on 
changing the culture of organisations and institutions, but they could just as easily 
be read for how institutions might change the cultural norms of the individuals that 
constitute those organisations: 
 
Table 11:   Transforming the Dinosaurs 
 
Method Hague's Explanation 
 
As Applied by New Labour 
Coercion "pressure exerted by 
competition or recession..."  
"All organisations are coerced 
by direct government 
interference in their affairs..." 
 
In this category can be placed 
privatisation, the creation of 
"pseudo-[internal] markets", the 
introduction of PSAs, contracts 
between DCMS and its funded 
bodies, and the increase in targets 
and league tables across 
government. However, all 
regulation could be argued to fall 
into this category if defined as 
"government action to control 
activities in which it is not directly 
involved" (Bishop, 1995: 153;  see 
also Bishop, Kay et al., 1995). 
 
Contagion The transference of ideas 
resulting from the movement 
of people and interactively 
shifting shared values and 
norms 
New Labour's promotions of private 
sector practices and of 
entrepreneurialism, together with 
the increasing role of NDPBs in the 
delivery of government policy; all 
contributed to ideological and 
methodological contagion. Tony 
Blair's promotion of popular culture 
may also have had a part to play. 
Note also that contagion may result 
from the exercise of "bridging" 
social capital. 
 
Coaching An effect of institutional, 
organisational  and community 
Across government, the increasing 
use of external advisors and 
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insiders seeking external and 
objective views of themselves 
and their activities 
consultants. New Labour's close 
ideological relations with particular 
thinkers, such as Anthony Giddens, 
Charles Leadbeater, Tom Bentley 
and Geoff Mulgan, come into this 
category 
 
Learning "The most desirable way of 
changing a culture is for the 
organisation to set about doing 
it for itself. This involves 
becoming, in today's vogue 
phrase, a learning 
organisation". Hague related 
this to economic growth, 
saying: "An ability to innovate 
will be vital in a world of global 
competition, and learning is 
the key element in 
innovation..." 
 
In Tony Blair's (in)famous words: 
"Our top priority was, is and always 
will be education, education, 
education. To overcome decades of 
neglect and make Britain a learning 
society, developing the talents and 
raising the ambitions of all our 
young people" (Blair, 2001). 
Knowledge as human and social 
capital became the fuel of the 
"knowledge economy", promoted as 
much by DCMS as it was by the 
Department of Education. In policy 
terms, it can be found in the 
promotion of creativity (for 
example, in the Creative 
Partnerships programme), in 
employment and training initiatives 
as much as in formal education. 
Blair's promotion of education in 
civil society also echoes another 
cultural concept -  German bildung. 
Source: (Hague, 1993: 3-4)  
 
Hague's approach provided a civil and business-orientated view of cultural change 
redolent of the psychological, but contains a cybernetic implication that reaches 
from Karl Deutsche's Nerves of Government (Deutsche, 1963) to Geert Hofstede's 
definition of culture as: “ ... the collective programming of the human mind that 
distinguishes the members of one human group from those of another” (Hofstede, 
2001: 24). The assertion is simple: that the culture of organisations, constantly 
constructed and re-constructed by its individual members, can be changed by 
coercion, contagion, coaching and learning. 
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Perri 6 considered this a "reinvention" of government's relationship with its citizens; 
a challenge to the "Libertarian Right" on one side, represented by the likes of 
Friedrich Hayek, Alan Duncan (Duncan and Hobson, 1995) and Newt Gingrich 
(Gingrich, 1995), as much as it was to the "social democratic left", exemplified by  J. 
Kenneth Galbraith, and to "moderate centre Left" politicians like Frank Field  (6, 
1997: 263;  1995: 2). Drawing on Osborne and Gaebler's study on Reinventing 
Government (D. Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), what was being reinvented in this 
middle way, soon after to be invariably known as the "Third Way", was the 
normative conception of the state by its citizens - just as Blair proposed. Some have 
seen these changes in governance as a search for a method to manage "the inherent 
complexity and interdependencies of modern societies", "...enabling new modes of 
societal self-regulation" (Bevir, Rhodes et al., 2003: 10;  Jann, 2003), rather than an 
ideological desire for social engineering. The evidence for that more technically 
complex proposition is much harder to find. For DCMS, though, it enhanced and 
promoted through cultural formation a cohesive and comprehensive economic 
model that could make cultural policy the generative engine for economic growth. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions 
 
This research began with a series of questions arising from the "conceptual 
inconsistencies" of New Labour's cultural policies (Selwood, 2006: 36), and the 
unexplained decentring of the arts in favour of concerns that had never previously 
been relevant to a department of culture by any definition. Even by its own extended 
remit, Chris Smith's "four themes", declared to be the "pillars" on which all DCMS 
policy was constructed, appeared to be internally conflicted: "excellence" difficult to 
reconcile with "access"; initiatives in "education" were marginal to national 
education policy; and, despite the focus given to them, the "cultural industries" were 
not obviously categorisable as either cultural or industrial. In many respects they 
were more relevant to the work of the DTI than that of DCMS. Behind them all was 
Smith's statement that their work "places the Department at the centre of the 
country’s economic life and regeneration” (C. Smith, 1997a) - a claim then without 
precedent for a government department of culture.  
 
What has been shown is that Smith constructed within DCMS the policies to give 
the department a role in the government's management of the economy and in 
social policy - issues that then, as now, lay at the centre of governmental concerns. 
Strong evidence for this has been discussed in the course of this thesis, but what is 
more difficult to establish is why Smith would have this intention. The most obvious 
answer is political power and influence, but it can only be offered speculatively. 
Smith's claim was not that the DCMS would just support the government's economic 
plan, but would be at its centre. Yet to hold this ambition for a department of 
culture appears incompatible with its purposes and quite unlikely to succeed. As 
ever, though, he chose his words carefully. It would have been risible for DCMS to 
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claim a central responsibility for national economic policy but, with a cultural remit, 
Smith could lay claim to "economic life" (emphasis added) and his department's role 
in its "regeneration". His letter to staff, from which that quotation was taken, goes 
on to list other policy objectives, but they are quite tepid by comparison: to "bring 
excitement into the life of the nation and the work of Government"; to "make things 
of quality available to the many, not just the few"; and to "create the jobs of the 
future". These hardly justify the earlier claim, although the unconditional nature of 
that last statement does imply the new knowledge economy that was to be promoted 
by DCMS.  
 
This research has established the socio-economic purposes of cultural policy and 
that, to achieve those objectives, conflicts with traditions and inherited 
responsibilities were inevitable. The inconsistencies and contradictions that arose 
can be explained in this way (although not always resolved). A review of the research 
shows these clearly.  
 
Defining Culture 
For the protean nature of this central term, definition is essential. It is not just that 
meanings of "culture" have changed over time but that in general use the word is 
also synchronically polysemic. The common distinction between its anthropological 
and artistic meanings (O. Bennett, 1995: 201) make a fundamental distinction but 
one that does not delineate meaning sufficiently for the analysis of the policies to 
which it has been applied. Four distinct uses have been identified:  
(i) Culture in scientific anthropology; 
(ii) Culture in social anthropology;  
(iii) Culture as cultivation; and  
(iv) Culture as the arts, intellectual and aesthetic works.  
The distinction between scientific and social anthropology (categories (i) and (ii)) is 
one not normally made in cultural policy but two characteristics make it analytically 
useful. New Labour had defined objectives intended to be achieved through cultural 
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interventions, implying the nomothetic logic of cause and effect and the 
deterministic view that an action (or policy) can have a predictable outcome. By this 
approach culture policies operating on social practices and cultural norms sought to 
coerce changes in both. Yet, at the same time, the individualism, innovation and 
creativity that New Labour identified as necessary for economic development  was 
definitionally ideographic. This implies a dialectic between individual internal 
cognition and resulting social behaviour, not as conflicting processes but in the 
manner of "structuration" in which each is generative of the other (Archer, 1982;  
Giddens, 1984). With respect to the anthropological meanings of culture, this 
process can only be analysed by separating its scientific and sociological 
components.  As noted, DCMS's search for evidence in support of its policies 
appeared to have been undertaken without any realistic prospect of finding any and 
with little concern that that turned out to be the case. It was the social and economic 
effects of policy that were of concern, not measurable aspects of individual 
behaviour.  That they could not be measured was less important than the belief in 
their aggregate effects. 
 
Cultivation and the arts, categories (iii) and (iv) of cultural meaning, are also tightly 
intertwined but analytically separable. In all their forms, the most valued elements 
of artistic heritage have been perceived as defining a cultivated society, just as 
knowledge and comprehension of those works have been claimed as the central 
mechanisms for the creation of the civilised individual. Through education and 
tradition these interrelate with social structures. The formation of the ACGB can be 
argued to result from this combination but, in its early days, exemplifying the elitism 
of F.R. Leavis and T.S. Eliot rather than the ambitions for access and equality of 
opportunity required by New Labour (Leavis, 1930;  Eliot, 1948). The Arts Council 
was only to lower the walls of its cultural citadel slowly over decades, although 
Keynes's rejection of amateurs (the focus of CEMA's work) largely remains. The arts, 
then, may define culture but, as has been shown, anthropologists were content with 
a definition that entirely omitted their existence except as stylistic characteristics of 
local practices. In the same way, culture as the arts appeared not to be a concept of 
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use to DCMS for influencing social norms and practices, despite its promotion of 
individual creativity. 
 
History and Context 
It is striking that most of the theatre, music, art, literature and built heritage that 
attracts Britain's "cultural tourism", said to be rank 7th in the world in value and 
numbers (Visit Britain, 2010), is founded mostly on a history of private rather than 
public finance. Tylor Cowen followed Alan Swingewood's earlier argument that the 
depth, range, variety and even accessibility of cultural works was a result of this 
private, commercial history, countering theories critical of capitalist markets argued 
from Adorno and the Frankfurt School to McGuigan and the Cultural Studies 
movement (Swingewood, 1977;  Cowen, 1988). But these arguments were also 
integral with Parliament's historic relations with the private and public spheres. At 
least since the mid-18th century it has been shown that the commercial nature of the 
arts was concomitant with Parliament's determined disinterest in matters now 
judged to be of public value, although that changed gradually over the period. That 
is the first and most important of the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
historical sketches of the development of a cultural policy in Britain given in chapter 
2.   
 
The Treasury's disinterest in the collections of Sir Hans Sloane were significant as 
much for how they defined that attitude to cultural concerns as for the precedent of 
state intervention they marked, however reluctantly. For these were private 
interests, and not matters for government. Yet for both the intervention and the 
reluctance displayed it is a line of argument that persists even now, however much 
protested and counter-argued by the arts "industry". Indeed, there is some irony in 
the argument for increased subsidies that have, since the 1970s, been constructed 
around the purported commercial or economic value of the arts in that they are 
redolent of that commercially calculated "good deal" that persuaded Parliament in 
1753 to take actions that eventually formed the British Museum.   
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That logic has only been dislodged by the actions of powerful individuals. This is the 
second observation: that changes have resulted not from public pressure or through 
democratic processes, and rarely as a result of party policies or from institutional 
decisions, but rather from the efforts of individuals 1. The novelty of Sir Hans 
Sloane's bequest, Prince Albert's ambitions for the Great Exhibition and Henry Cole's 
creation of the Kensington museums, John Lubbock and Pitt Rivers determination to 
preserve our archaeological heritage, and Matthew Arnold's insistence for the 
necessity of education, all stand as great examples. Half a century later that same 
missionary spirit was evident in Lord Reith's moral exhortations in the development 
of the BBC, which in turn strengthened and deepened the path that led to Keynes's 
support for the elite performing arts in the formation of the ACGB. Given the nature 
of the status quo on each occasion, it is hard to believe that the same developmental 
path of arts policy would have been followed without the energy of powerful 
individuals. The new direction of policy instigated by Chris Smith, independently of 
Parliament and the Cabinet, might be seen in that tradition. 
 
Where all British governments since the mid 18th century did intervene was in the 
support and promotion of scientific institutions and "learned societies", even where 
these were obviously not scientific by any modern understanding (for example, the 
Royal Academy of Music). These lie at the origins of the third characteristic: 
institutional path dependence. Fittingly, this term is derived from an economic 
concept which states that decisions in the present are guided, and choices limited, 
by those of the past.  Among the many authors on this subject, James Mahoney 
argued for its use in sociology when defined as: "those historical sequences in which 
contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have 
deterministic properties" (Mahoney, 1999: 507). Once formed, the persistence of 
institutions and the continuity of their funding is shown clearly in the Appropriation 
Accounts. Few institutions were dismantled, but many were added over the years. 
The grouping of these institutions has produced some odd bed-fellows but came 
                                                     
1 This argument follows Thomas Carlyle's "great man theory": CARLYLE, T. 1904. On heroes, hero-
worship, and the heroic in history. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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together in the 20th century under the Board of Education and stayed within that 
taxon until 1993 when a number of departmental responsibilities were brought 
together as "Heritage". Only in 1997 does a department of "culture" abruptly 
terminate that institutional lineage. But it was not simply the department's name, 
Culture Media and Sport, but its distinct socio-economic agenda that defined the 
breach. Nevertheless, as is noted, certain characteristics still persisted, even when at 
odds with the new policy initiatives.  
 
The fourth characteristic arises from the attitudinal changes of government to 
subsidies for artistic activities. These also mark shifts in the nature, place and 
perceived legitimacy of laissez-faire as both an economic and social libertarian 
principle. Bennett noted laissez-faire as a "recurring theme" in government 
rationales for cultural policy, which "persisted ... until our own time"(O. Bennett, 
1995: 203). The point was made earlier (in Chapter 1) that the principles of laissez-
faire have remained in place to the present day; what has altered are perceptions of 
appropriate mechanisms to ensure its workings and compensate selectively for its 
effects. By the arguments of Keynes and Goodman, these compensations also work 
in both directions as subsidy became a necessary adjustment to the effects of 
taxation. Pertinently, laissez-faire was also the principle on which arm's-length 
funding depended if decisions of exactly what should be funded and to what extent 
were to remain beyond the direct control of politicians. In this respect, DCMS was 
conflicted; imposing controls while exhorting creative independence. The defence, if 
one were needed, would be that individual funding decisions remained with the 
funding agency concerned, but this could be countered by demands for policy 
consistency engrossed in funding contracts. How contractual obligations were 
exercised in practice may not have demonstrated the policy rigor that these 
contracts sought to impose (as seen, for example, in the case study of the CBSO), but 
their intended effects would most certainly impinge fundamentally on the decisions 
of funding bodies and the work of their clients. This attenuation of laissez faire was 
not for the maintenance or re-adjustment of libertarian principles, but for political 
gain.  
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Changes in the practice of laissez-faire related also to governments' increasing 
support of cultural institutions since the mid-19th century. This, the fifth 
characteristic, can also be expressed as a progressive change in the balance between 
the public and private realms in cultural matters. A clear example can be seen in the 
attempts to save historic objects for the nation (initially, mostly pre-historic). John 
Lubbock's influential book Pre-historic Times greatly widened public interest in the 
issues at a time when many ancient remains were being plundered, defaced or 
simply reused (Lubbock, 2002 [1872]). The first Parliamentary Bill for their 
protection was put before Parliament in 1873 but the resulting Ancient Monuments 
Protection Act was not actually passed until 1882. By the late 20th century, not only 
thousands of historic objects but buildings and even landscapes were protected with 
the upkeep of many partly financed by the State for the benefit of the nation. This 
braiding of private and public concerns was similarly found across the arts. What in 
the 18th century were essentially private matters and subject to the demands of that 
market (music, art, theatre, and literature) became selectively adopted by the state 
on arguments of "market failure"; an argument dependent on them being 
reconceived as public goods. Debate in the latter decades of the last century then 
polarised around the moral choice between the public or private funding of the arts; 
arguments which largely ignored the prevailing dominance of the private sector. The 
policies of DCMS appeared to disregard that polemic, not in recognition of the 
interdependence of subsidised and commercial activities, but in a denial of 
difference. It resulted in a profound contradiction: the lauding of artistic 
individualism and creativity in the promotion of entrepreneurialism and innovation 
in the private sector in conflict with policy conformity for the betterment of access 
and social cohesion. 
  
DCMS was nevertheless inevitably influenced by the history of ideas and attitudes to 
cultural matters. Where these carried through from earlier periods, their 
contemporary relevance to New Labour was still discernible and, conversely, where 
they were abandoned and new ideas invented in their place, their reasoning was 
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plain and consistent. These are described in the table below. Although the process of 
tabulation inevitably over-simplifies complex changes with generalisations, it does 
identify elements that have characterised cultural policy (implied or nominal) past 
and present. 
 
Table 12: 
Ideational Strands of Cultural Policy 
 
Strand Origin Under New Labour 
 
Culture as 
cultivation 
Education and 
Bildung 
Threadbare Replaced with relativism, 
and the promotion of 
creativity 
 
Culture as 
education 
Part of 
cultivation 
Lost Replaced with the arts as 
exemplars of creativity and 
innovation 
 
Culture as the Arts Ancient Threadbare Replaced with economic 
commodities 
 
L'art pour l'art 18th century Reformed Creative "Cool": the Tate 
Modern phenomenon. A tool 
for national marketing 
 
The Arts as 
industrial design 
19th century Continued Design as a Cultural Industry 
 
Cultural (arts) 
institutions 
18th century Continued But re-conceived as 
structural nodes in a 
networked society and co-
opted into delivering DCMS 
policy 
 
Creativity 1980s Continued Expanded in importance in 
the industrial sector 
 
Culture as society 1960s Continued 
but 
reformed 
The central concept from 
which economic relations 
can be formed. 
 
Culture as the 
economy 
1997 New The central purpose to which 
all others are tied: Culture as 
the generator of an economic 
structure 
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Non-intervention 
in the arts (as 
private concerns) 
Traditional, then 
aligned with 
principles of 
liberty 
Partially 
continued 
The traditions of 
independence and 
commercialism now 
controlled with subsidy 
 
The Arts as a 
public good 
Developed in 
the 20th century 
from earlier 
origins 
Marginalised The arts now subsumed 
within social and economic 
policy (in themselves 
affording little power within 
government) 
 
 
 
The table demonstrates the dominance of economic intentions, shown here to be 
even greater even than social concerns. By this argument, policies for access were the 
techniques by which citizens might be brought to operate with commercial society.  
 
DCMS Policies 
Academic analyses have addressed separately DCMS's policy interests across arts, 
media, and sport and many of the 54 NDPBs it financed, never accounting for the 
resulting diversity of policies but proposing explanations for their individual 
characteristics: instrumentalism, attachment, the economic value of artistic works; 
the application of NPM for greater efficiency; access for greater equality and social 
cohesion; and, in the spirit of joined-up government, participation in the remits of 
other departments (Bogdanor, 2005). These are valid and important arguments but 
are partial, in that they do not lead to an understanding of DCMS's underlying 
rationales, and superficial as they illustrate but never explain conceptual 
inconsistencies.  
 
With respect to the arts, the quondam concern of DCMS's predecessors, the 
strongest contenders for a comprehensive explanation are instrumentalism and 
attachment. The former is the less useful. All policy is instrumental to some end, 
whether for a measurable economic or social change or the enhancement of the 
public good. What that term does not in itself provide is the rationale for the use of 
the instrument. Furthermore, any instrumental use of the arts would rely on a 
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presumption of their power, but that has been shown to be, at the very least, a 
doubtful notion. "Attachment", as conceived by Clive Gray, is the reverse of 
instrumentalism in that it assumes an inherent weakness in the attached policy 
(Gray, 2002: 81;  see also Gray, 2007: 211;  2008: 217). By this argument, attaching the 
arts to social or economic policy would give them a higher political profile. The 
empirical evidence for this is apparent in the way the arts were argued under New 
Labour to be among the creative industries and, hence, of considerable economic 
importance. What was promoted, though, was not the aesthetic or intrinsic values of 
the arts but their market values and the artists' putative skills of creativity and 
innovation that might be applied across the economy. On balance, the weight of 
evidence in policy documents and political statements suggests that the arts were 
more exploited as one part of an economic model than attached for their own 
benefit. In this sense, they were of relatively little interest to government and, 
therefore, to DCMS. 
 
 That comparative disinterest was further demonstrated in three ways. Firstly, 
although awards to the Arts Council increased markedly after the CSR, rising 20% in 
a year, it was actually only a 1.6% increase on the award from the DNH in 1993/41 
(although the following year's award was reduced by 17%, after devolving  the Arts 
Council of Great Britain). Secondly, the higher award was given under the conditions 
of the new PSA, which contained the statement that: "All areas for which the 
Department is responsible have a role in delivering the Government’s wider social, 
educational and economic objectives", with the specific requirement that all funded 
bodies must "invest" in new responsibilities (DCMS, 1999a: 95, 17). The conditions of 
the PSA were then expressed quantitatively; no interest in artistic standards was 
given nor strategies for their support and enhancement. The third characteristic 
concerns the rhetoric on arts policy. There are some references to the intrinsic 
                                                     
1
 Figures calculated in real terms, after discounting for inflation. Sources:  Grants-in-Aid from the 
House of Commons Appropriation Accounts, and inflation figures from the House of Commons 
Research Paper 02/44, Inflation: the value of the pound 1750-2001.  
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qualities of the arts in Creative Britain but they are otherwise few and far between. 
Compared to the persistent exhortations for access, creativity, innovation, education 
and economic impact, the arts had comparatively little profile within DCMS policy.  
 
This marginalising of the arts and heritage, the traditional purposes of the 
department's predecessors, within a concept of culture that could envelop social and 
economic policy, also left the department functionally marooned. Its individual 
responsibilities to its funded NDPBs continued but the abandonment of support for 
the intrinsic values of the arts and an inability to prove its relevance to wider 
government policy left its purposes appearing fragmented and incoherent (despite 
the economic focus argued here). Chris Smith's successor, Tessa Jowell, later noted: 
"How we got here is well charted; how we get away is not so easy" (Jowell, 2004: 10).  
 
It could be argued that DCMS's policies nevertheless successfully stimulated the 
mixed economy in which the arts operated. Promoting the commercially-orientated 
creative industries, tourism, sponsorship, and policy collaborations with the private 
sector, all point in that direction when notionally related to the arts by their 
characteristics of creativity and innovation as the seeds of economic growth. The 
CMS Select Committee made those economic ambitions very clear, stating: "The 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport is avowedly an economic Department" 
(DCMS, 1999a: v). However, neither Smith nor DCMS departmentally related these 
ambitions to arts funding. That said, responding to ideas from arts and heritage 
organisations, there were some new policies for arts funding: the New Audiences 
Fund, the establishment of the Youth Music Trust, and capital expenditure in 
museums notably among them. But these also had "access" as their declared 
rationale which, for New Labour, was a structural factor in the creation of social 
capital for economic development. 
 
At a bureaucratic level that strategy was successful. As the CMS Select Committee 
noted, DCMS had little interest in increasing budgets but applied its efforts to 
gaining relevance in a broad range of government initiatives. Its participation in ten 
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of the eighteen Policy Action Teams of the Social Exclusion Unit, reporting directly 
to the Prime Minister, are a good example. Within these, DCMS worked on 
improving workforce skills, social housing, transportation, schools policy, 
information technology, and government information systems. It created the 
"quality, efficiency and standards" "watchdog" (their term) QUEST, and placed 
senior staff in all the regional Government Offices. Nominally, the Regional Cultural 
Consortia appeared to have had a culture remit and, indeed, their members were 
mostly drawn from arts and other culturally-related organisations. But its brief  to 
"play a full and coherent part in contributing to increasing prosperity and enjoyment 
of life in the regions” (DCMS, 2001a: 146), promoting "the role of culture, tourism 
and the creative industries in economic development, regeneration and social 
inclusion” (2001a: 125) suggested again that DCMS's underlying objectives were more 
for participation in cross-government policy. The absence of any budget with which 
to take action further defined the RCCs as DCMS's collaborative conscripts for the 
creation and extension of policy rather than for the development of the culture as 
the arts.   
 
However, in pursuit of policy conformity DCMS had a difficulty. Unlike other 
government departments, DCMS was the paymaster of a large number of 
independent NDPBs, all of which had their own policies and objectives, some of 
which then funded other individual organisations which were also legally 
independent. Funding the BBC was achieved by passing receipts from licences to the 
independent BBC Trust; support for heritage was given via English Heritage 
following the 1983 National Heritage Act; the Museum and Galleries  Commission 
was financed by DCMS, as were several national libraries and related institutions. 
Support for the arts was channelled through the Arts Council just as sport was 
supported through the UK Sport Council, and similar arms-length arrangements 
applied to crafts and film. Then there was the Royal Household and the Historic 
Royal Palaces Agency, the Royal Parks Agency, English Tourist Board, British Film 
Institute, and numerous others. By the time DCMS had transferred to itself 
responsibilities previously held within other departments and had added a few 
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organisations of its own making (QUEST and Youth Music being examples) it had 
become paymaster for fifty-four NDPBs, 97% of which were classified as grant 
distributing bodies in the arts and sport. Together they provided 95% of the 
department's programme (Select Committee on Public Administration, 1999: v, x, 
99).  
 
Organisationally, the agglomeration of activities that began with the preceding DNH 
could be argued as transitional between an Office of Arts & Libraries and a 
Department of Culture as it demanded greater control over the use of its funds and  
policy conformity across its clients. But DCMS could only gain control of funds and 
policy by reducing the independence of its funded bodies. The introduction by the 
Treasury of PSAs provided the mechanism with which to do exactly that. Indeed, the 
whole idea of "best practice" as imposed by QUEST was said by DCMS to be "indirect 
policy persuasion" (DCMS, 2001a: 51;  2000: 37). The case study of the CBSO 
described how the resulting policy "delivery chain" operated. In addition, the DCMS 
also had vetoes over senior appointments, it demanded particular reporting 
structures, and applied to them all a consistent coercive rhetoric. What DCMS had 
constructed were structures that guided, limited and directed the actions of 
ostensibly independent agencies.  
 
Economics and Governance 
All DCMS policy can be argued to have had an economic purpose, as was proudly 
noted by Chris Smith and the CMS Select Committee. Policy concerns for education, 
health, technology and the entrepreneurial facets of innovation and creativity were 
all directed at national workforce, urban and social regeneration and, thereby, to 
economic development. They defined an interest in culture as the structures, 
physical and sociological, on which the national economic system depended. These 
are factors difficult to integrate into classical economic models but, as Gordon 
Brown had recognised, they could be incorporated with the adjustments made 
within EGT. The essential ingredients were human capital (generated through skills 
and education policies), social capital (promoted by policies for "Joining it up locally" 
257 
 
as one of the PATs expressed it, but also in the work of the cultural consortia and the 
whole panoply of access policies), institutional power (in effect, the constituency of 
DCMS), and the innovative and creative side of the working population exhorted 
through adjuncts to arts policy (for example in the Creative Partnerships initiative). 
Once policy objectives were applied across all funded NDPBs and their clients, and 
social interrelations had become fluid and collaborative, the principles of EGT 
suggest economic growth would result of its own accord. But for these things to 
happen, formative structures and social compliance were the necessary precursors, 
each promoted and controlled through methods of distributed governance. As 
Andrew Brighton noted acerbically, these were characteristics at odds with an 
individualistic, libertarian, capitalist society, but in many respects were redolent of 
dirigiste socialist economies (Brighton, 1999); yet paradoxically, for its promotion of 
entrepreneurialism, innovation and a market economy, they are just what New 
Labour sought to enforce. The ideational conflicts were innate and unavoidable.  
 
The International Context 
 
Throughout this thesis, the analysis of New Labour's cultural policies have been 
placed in an historical context. But there is also an international perspective that 
shows them to be far from unique and in some respects synchronous with the 
policies of a number of other nations. The notion of the "cultural industries", for 
example, had featured in Australia's first "cultural" policy (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1994); ideas arising from the work of Robert Putnam on social capital were 
quickly universalised;  and the appealing post-industrial theories of Richard Florida, 
the Comedia authors and Charles Leadbeater's hypothesis of the weightless new 
knowledge economy were all coincident with the rise of New Labour. But Britain's 
particular cultural history mixed with New Labour's defining (if only loosely defined) 
Third Way ideology produced ideas and a rhetorical lexicon that were also exported. 
Half a century after Jennie Lee's White Paper, the International Federation of Arts 
Councils and Culture Agencies explained the intentions of its forthcoming (2014) 6th 
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World Summit on the Arts without any reference to the arts at all (other than in its 
title): 
 
Within the overarching theme of Creative Times: new models for cultural 
development, the 6th World Summit will focus on how globalisation, shifts in 
social and economic development, and new forms of communication are 
generating an array of challenges and opportunities within the cultural field, 
and on how this is impacting on the development of our societies and nations 
(IFACCA, 2013). 
 
In the years since Lee's White Paper the arts in Britain had become culture, and 
culture society:  "the aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered 
community" says the OED. The incorporation of this change into government policy 
was firmly completed on May 1st 1997 with the formation of the DCMS. As IFACCA 
demonstrates, creativity and the development of societies, economies and even 
nations appear now to be the raison d'etre of cultural policy. They are themes with 
roots that lie deep in British governments' relations with the arts but, since Chris 
Smith and the DCMS, are now followed almost universally for social and economic 
purposes.  
 
That description is implicitly critical, but at the same time New Labour expressed a 
general change across British society where the protecting walls of elitism and 
intellectual obscurity, both remnants of 20th century modernism, were falling under 
the onslaught of relativism. New Labour's advocacy for an economy in which the 
private and public realms were interlaced (albeit following a trend sharply defined in 
preceding decades) allowed variety and choice in the arts just as it was intended to 
do in other areas of life. "Has Amazon done more for access to literature and music 
than the Arts Council?" has become a rhetorical question which points to changes in 
society, technology, social norms and expectations that DCMS may not have 
invented but certainly sought to exploit. 
 
Unquestionably, Chris Smith had ambitions for DCMS well beyond those of any 
previous ministers with responsibilities for cultural matters, seeking to lead DCMS 
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into the heart of the government's business. New Labour's promotion of neo-liberal 
market economics, active social welfare policy, and Gordon Brown's social economic 
theories all provided opportunities for just that. But so too did the spirit of the age, 
with social relations mutating under the onslaught of new technology and access to 
cultural experiences of unlimited variety. This research has placed Chris Smith's 
ambitions in the context of Britain's cultural history and within the contemporary 
zeitgeist around which DCMS policy was institutionalised and operated. Making 
cultural policy into a cross-government concern required a construction of culture 
that adopted influential ideas but which, when placed alongside the traditions of 
British cultural policy, laissez-faire and private-sector economic liberalism, resulted 
in contradictions and inconsistencies that obfuscated his driving rationales. Smith 
sought power and influence within a department that had, since its earliest 
manifestations, been at the periphery of government. The arts could be co-opted for 
this task but were otherwise of little practical interest. The rationales for New 
Labour's cultural policies were then inevitably replete with contradictions, most 
especially as, by any historical understanding, they were not cultural at all. 
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